Event Notification Report for September 19, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/18/2001 - 09/19/2001
EVENT NUMBERS
382953829638297382983829938300
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 38295
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: MIKE RICHIE
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: MIKE RICHIE
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 09/19/2001
Notification Time: 09:00 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2001
Event Time: 08:13 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/19/2001
Notification Time: 09:00 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2001
Event Time: 08:13 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/19/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JOHN MADERA (R3)
SUSAN FRANT (NMSS)
JOHN MADERA (R3)
SUSAN FRANT (NMSS)
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION REGARDING AN OPACITY VIOLATION (4-hour Report)
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth personnel:
"At 0813 hours [on] 09/19/01, the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (OEPA) was notified per Ohio Administrative Code (OAC) 3745-15-06(B) that an opacity exceedance had occurred at the X-600 Steam Plant. The opacity violation occurred on [the] #2 Boiler when our #2A Precipitator voltages began to fluctuate. Operators adjusted load/air requirements on the #2 Boiler in an effort to prevent further exceedances. [The] cause of the voltage fluctuations has not been determined at this time."
"This is reportable as a 4-hour NRC Event due to notification to an outside agency (OEPA) being made per Nuclear Regulatory Reporting Procedure UE2-PAE1030, Appendix D, Criteria P (Miscellaneous)."
Portsmouth personnel notified the NRC resident inspector.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth personnel:
"At 0813 hours [on] 09/19/01, the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (OEPA) was notified per Ohio Administrative Code (OAC) 3745-15-06(B) that an opacity exceedance had occurred at the X-600 Steam Plant. The opacity violation occurred on [the] #2 Boiler when our #2A Precipitator voltages began to fluctuate. Operators adjusted load/air requirements on the #2 Boiler in an effort to prevent further exceedances. [The] cause of the voltage fluctuations has not been determined at this time."
"This is reportable as a 4-hour NRC Event due to notification to an outside agency (OEPA) being made per Nuclear Regulatory Reporting Procedure UE2-PAE1030, Appendix D, Criteria P (Miscellaneous)."
Portsmouth personnel notified the NRC resident inspector.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 38296
Facility: HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE PRODUCTION
NRC Notified By: HUGH ROBERTS
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE PRODUCTION
NRC Notified By: HUGH ROBERTS
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 09/19/2001
Notification Time: 10:16 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2001
Event Time: 09:05 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/19/2001
Notification Time: 10:16 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2001
Event Time: 09:05 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/19/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
40.60(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
10 CFR Section:
40.60(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
JOHN MADERA (R3)
SUSAN FRANT (NMSS)
JOHN MADERA (R3)
SUSAN FRANT (NMSS)
STANDBY DIESEL GENERATOR FAILED TO START AND IS UNAVAILABLE
The licensee reported that a standby diesel generator failed to start in manual and automatic during a test. The generator is unavailable as redundant for required safety function. The generator is being worked on. The plant is shutting down their processing until repairs are made.
The licensee will submit a 30-day written report and is notifying NRC Region 3.
The licensee reported that a standby diesel generator failed to start in manual and automatic during a test. The generator is unavailable as redundant for required safety function. The generator is being worked on. The plant is shutting down their processing until repairs are made.
The licensee will submit a 30-day written report and is notifying NRC Region 3.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 38297
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: MCCLEERY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: MCCLEERY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 09/19/2001
Notification Time: 15:04 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2001
Event Time: 12:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/19/2001
Notification Time: 15:04 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2001
Event Time: 12:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/19/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JOHN MADERA (R3)
BRIAN SMITH (NMSS)
JOHN MADERA (R3)
BRIAN SMITH (NMSS)
AUTOCLAVE ISOLATION
OTHER NON-CFR REQUIREMENT - 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION
At 1245 hours on 09/19/01, both the "A" and "B" High Level Condensate probes activated on Autoclave # 3 in the X-334 uranium hexafluoride Sampling Facility causing a High Condensate Alarm. The activation of either of these probes will cause the autoclave steam supply valves ("Q" components) to actuate (close). The steam supply valves closed, as designed, autoclave # 3 was in TSR Mode 2 (Heating) at the time of the alarm activation. Operations personnel immediately responded to the alarm in accordance with the approved Alarm Response Procedures. The alarm reset when operations personnel drained excess condensate from autoclave drain line, and then acknowledged the alarm at the local autoclave control panel. All autoclave (and cylinder) operating parameters were determined to be within normal ranges. Autoclave # 3 was placed in TSR mode 7 (Shutdown) by operations personnel and declared inoperable by the Plant Shift Superintendent. Based on the actuation of both High Level Condensate probes, this event is being reported as a valid safety system actuation, a 24-hour NRC event. An Engineering Evaluation has been requested to investigate the circumstances surrounding this safety system actuation.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the certificate holder.
OTHER NON-CFR REQUIREMENT - 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION
At 1245 hours on 09/19/01, both the "A" and "B" High Level Condensate probes activated on Autoclave # 3 in the X-334 uranium hexafluoride Sampling Facility causing a High Condensate Alarm. The activation of either of these probes will cause the autoclave steam supply valves ("Q" components) to actuate (close). The steam supply valves closed, as designed, autoclave # 3 was in TSR Mode 2 (Heating) at the time of the alarm activation. Operations personnel immediately responded to the alarm in accordance with the approved Alarm Response Procedures. The alarm reset when operations personnel drained excess condensate from autoclave drain line, and then acknowledged the alarm at the local autoclave control panel. All autoclave (and cylinder) operating parameters were determined to be within normal ranges. Autoclave # 3 was placed in TSR mode 7 (Shutdown) by operations personnel and declared inoperable by the Plant Shift Superintendent. Based on the actuation of both High Level Condensate probes, this event is being reported as a valid safety system actuation, a 24-hour NRC event. An Engineering Evaluation has been requested to investigate the circumstances surrounding this safety system actuation.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the certificate holder.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 38298
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: MCCLEERY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: MCCLEERY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 09/19/2001
Notification Time: 18:36 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2001
Event Time: 10:06 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/19/2001
Notification Time: 18:36 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2001
Event Time: 10:06 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/19/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JOHN MADERA (R3)
ERIC LEEDS (NMSS)
JOHN MADERA (R3)
ERIC LEEDS (NMSS)
NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24 NOTIFICATION
During a meeting to discuss compensatory actions for PR-PTS-01-04202, additional concerns were raised regarding compliance with the requirements of NCSA-705-076. Specifically, exterior walls have openings (windows and gaps) which could allow uranium bearing solution to spray outside the facility and collect in an unfavorable geometry inadvertent container. A walk down was performed. The findings resulted in a violation of control # 3 of NCSA 705-76, inadvertent containers. Compliance with NCSA was reestablished with the closure of windows, caulking of identified openings and continued shutdown of system involved.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
The safety significance is low because there was no leak of uranium bearing material! near the identified openings in the walls of the X-705. The two areas in question are designated as "Inadvertent Container Area" due to the presence of the Recovery System and Microfiltration, neither of which are currently in operation due to a stand down of all X-705 operations. The presence of an inadvertent container in the area is a violation of NCS controls and one leg of the double contingency principle as described in NCSE-0705 _076.E.03.
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):
For a criticality to occur, the following events would be required: The recovery system or Microfiltration would have to be operating and processing uranium bearing liquid with a high concentration of uranium. Then a leak in this system must occur such that an unsafe amount of liquid sprays from the system directly through an open window or through another penetration in the building wall. The liquid would then have to flow or drip into a potentially unfavorable geometry that may be present immediately adjacent to the outside building wall. Depending on the volume collected, some reflection would also be required to sustain a critical chain reaction The Recovery and Microfiltration systems are not currently in operation.
CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION. ETC.):
Inadvertent containers are controlled based upon volume (2.5 liters maximum) or geometry (1.5 inches in depth or 4 inches in diameter). The exact potential collection volume for this event is unknown. Although analyzed for 100% enriched materials, the Recovery System would Currently process materiel with less than or equal to 5% enrichment
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):
No uranium bearing material was involved in this event. There were no leaks of uranium bearing materiel in the area during this event. The event involves the presence of an unsafe geometry (via an opening in the building block wall) that could collect solution in the event of a spill.
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
The presence of holes in the exterior building walls could lead to the collection of a spill or leak in the unfavorable geometry space. This is a violation of control #3 of NCSA-0705_076, Inadvertent Containers, which specifically evaluates this event. Compliance with inadvertent container controls was reestablished for a shutdown Recovery system and for the Microfiltration system (running or shutdown) within four hours of discovery.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
Compliance with the NCSA was reestablished with the closure of windows, caulking of identified openings and continued shutdown of Systems involved.
During a meeting to discuss compensatory actions for PR-PTS-01-04202, additional concerns were raised regarding compliance with the requirements of NCSA-705-076. Specifically, exterior walls have openings (windows and gaps) which could allow uranium bearing solution to spray outside the facility and collect in an unfavorable geometry inadvertent container. A walk down was performed. The findings resulted in a violation of control # 3 of NCSA 705-76, inadvertent containers. Compliance with NCSA was reestablished with the closure of windows, caulking of identified openings and continued shutdown of system involved.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
The safety significance is low because there was no leak of uranium bearing material! near the identified openings in the walls of the X-705. The two areas in question are designated as "Inadvertent Container Area" due to the presence of the Recovery System and Microfiltration, neither of which are currently in operation due to a stand down of all X-705 operations. The presence of an inadvertent container in the area is a violation of NCS controls and one leg of the double contingency principle as described in NCSE-0705 _076.E.03.
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):
For a criticality to occur, the following events would be required: The recovery system or Microfiltration would have to be operating and processing uranium bearing liquid with a high concentration of uranium. Then a leak in this system must occur such that an unsafe amount of liquid sprays from the system directly through an open window or through another penetration in the building wall. The liquid would then have to flow or drip into a potentially unfavorable geometry that may be present immediately adjacent to the outside building wall. Depending on the volume collected, some reflection would also be required to sustain a critical chain reaction The Recovery and Microfiltration systems are not currently in operation.
CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION. ETC.):
Inadvertent containers are controlled based upon volume (2.5 liters maximum) or geometry (1.5 inches in depth or 4 inches in diameter). The exact potential collection volume for this event is unknown. Although analyzed for 100% enriched materials, the Recovery System would Currently process materiel with less than or equal to 5% enrichment
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):
No uranium bearing material was involved in this event. There were no leaks of uranium bearing materiel in the area during this event. The event involves the presence of an unsafe geometry (via an opening in the building block wall) that could collect solution in the event of a spill.
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
The presence of holes in the exterior building walls could lead to the collection of a spill or leak in the unfavorable geometry space. This is a violation of control #3 of NCSA-0705_076, Inadvertent Containers, which specifically evaluates this event. Compliance with inadvertent container controls was reestablished for a shutdown Recovery system and for the Microfiltration system (running or shutdown) within four hours of discovery.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
Compliance with the NCSA was reestablished with the closure of windows, caulking of identified openings and continued shutdown of Systems involved.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38299
Facility: CATAWBA
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: P. MCINTYRE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: P. MCINTYRE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 09/19/2001
Notification Time: 22:12 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2001
Event Time: 20:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/19/2001
Notification Time: 22:12 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2001
Event Time: 20:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/19/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
SCOTT SPARKS (R2)
SCOTT SPARKS (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
BORIC RESIDUE BUILDUP
Visual inspection of the Unit 2 Steam Generator 2B (SG 2B) lower head bowl drain during the current refueling outage indicated boron residue buildup on the 0.5" piping immediately below the SG. The total volume of residue was approximately 1 cubic inch. The origin appears to be the partial penetration of a weld between the reducing coupling and the lower head shell. Exact location could not be conclusively determined at this time and additional inspection using NDE will be conducted. Visual inspection of the other three SG's was also conducted and no indications of leakage were identified. State and Local officials will be given a courtesy call.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified by the licensee.
Visual inspection of the Unit 2 Steam Generator 2B (SG 2B) lower head bowl drain during the current refueling outage indicated boron residue buildup on the 0.5" piping immediately below the SG. The total volume of residue was approximately 1 cubic inch. The origin appears to be the partial penetration of a weld between the reducing coupling and the lower head shell. Exact location could not be conclusively determined at this time and additional inspection using NDE will be conducted. Visual inspection of the other three SG's was also conducted and no indications of leakage were identified. State and Local officials will be given a courtesy call.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified by the licensee.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 38300
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: STEVEN RAAS AND ASSOCIATES, INC.
Region: 4
City: WATSONVILLE State: CA
County:
License #: 5214
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT GREGER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Licensee: STEVEN RAAS AND ASSOCIATES, INC.
Region: 4
City: WATSONVILLE State: CA
County:
License #: 5214
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT GREGER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 09/20/2001
Notification Time: 15:15 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2001
Event Time: 16:30 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/20/2001
Notification Time: 15:15 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2001
Event Time: 16:30 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/20/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JOHN PELLET (R4)
SUSAN FRANT (NMSS)
JOHN PELLET (R4)
SUSAN FRANT (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING A DAMAGED TROXLER GAUGE
"A Troxler model 3401B moisture density gauge (serial #016692) was run over by earth moving/compacting equipment while the gauge was in use (i.e., the source rod was extended). The source rod was bent such that the source could not be retracted into the shielded position. The unshielded source contained nominally 10 mCi of Cs-137. The source rod was cut by the fire department with the source in a lead 'pig' provided by the UC Santa Cruz health physics program. The source and the gauge housing will be sent to Troxler for repairs."
"A Troxler model 3401B moisture density gauge (serial #016692) was run over by earth moving/compacting equipment while the gauge was in use (i.e., the source rod was extended). The source rod was bent such that the source could not be retracted into the shielded position. The unshielded source contained nominally 10 mCi of Cs-137. The source rod was cut by the fire department with the source in a lead 'pig' provided by the UC Santa Cruz health physics program. The source and the gauge housing will be sent to Troxler for repairs."