Event Notification Report for August 17, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/16/2001 - 08/17/2001
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 38219
Rep Org: McMINN'S ASPHALT CO., INC.
Licensee: McMINN'S ASPHALT CO., INC.
Region: 1
City: MANHEIM State: PA
County:
License #: 371965901
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GARY LUTZ
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Licensee: McMINN'S ASPHALT CO., INC.
Region: 1
City: MANHEIM State: PA
County:
License #: 371965901
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GARY LUTZ
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 08/17/2001
Notification Time: 04:59 [ET]
Event Date: 08/17/2001
Event Time: 00:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/17/2001
Notification Time: 04:59 [ET]
Event Date: 08/17/2001
Event Time: 00:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/17/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM RULAND (R1)
BRIAN SMITH (NMSS)
WILLIAM RULAND (R1)
BRIAN SMITH (NMSS)
TROXLER GAUGE DAMAGED BY VEHICLE AT CONSTRUCTION SITE
At 0030EDT on 8/17/01 a light pickup truck struck a Troxler gauge at a road construction project on State Road 340 in Lancaster, PA. The East Lampeter Police Department responded (Incident # 01-414) briefly closing traffic. The RSO surveyed the device and confirmed that the sealed source was intact prior to removal. The Troxler is a model 4640B containing an 8-millicurie Cs-137 source. The licensee is returning the device to the manufacturer's service center in Timonium, MD for inspection and repair.
At 0030EDT on 8/17/01 a light pickup truck struck a Troxler gauge at a road construction project on State Road 340 in Lancaster, PA. The East Lampeter Police Department responded (Incident # 01-414) briefly closing traffic. The RSO surveyed the device and confirmed that the sealed source was intact prior to removal. The Troxler is a model 4640B containing an 8-millicurie Cs-137 source. The licensee is returning the device to the manufacturer's service center in Timonium, MD for inspection and repair.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38220
Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: RUSSELL STROUD
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: RUSSELL STROUD
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 08/17/2001
Notification Time: 21:19 [ET]
Event Date: 08/17/2001
Event Time: 16:45 [MST]
Last Update Date: 10/16/2001
Notification Time: 21:19 [ET]
Event Date: 08/17/2001
Event Time: 16:45 [MST]
Last Update Date: 10/16/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
ANTHONY GODY (R4)
ANTHONY GODY (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 97 | Power Operation | 55 | Power Operation |
TECH SPEC REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE A LEAK FROM THE FUEL POOL INTO CONTAINMENT
"On August 17, 2001 at approximately 1245 MST, Palo Verde Unit 3 was at approximately 97 percent power and at normal RCS temperature and pressure, when operations personnel detected an increase in containment sump level. Subsequent investigation revealed the quick operating closure device (QOCD) (EQID #PCE-M01) that isolates the containment from the fuel transfer tube was leaking by borated water from the fuel transfer canal at approximately 1 gallon per minute. Operations personnel entered TS LCO 3.6.1 Containment, Required Action A. This action requires the containment be restored to an operable status within one hour.
"Since containment integrity was uncertain, and compliance with LCO 3.6 1 Required Action A could not be met within one hour, operations personnel entered LCO 3.6.1, Required Action 8.1 at 1345 MST. Required Action B.1 requires the unit be placed in Mode 3 in 6 hours, and Required Action 8.2 requires the unit be placed in Mode 5 within 36 hours, Following operations briefings, shutdown was commenced at approximately 1645 MST. At this time, Palo Verde Unit 3 is continuing to reduce power in an orderly manner and anticipates being in Mode 3 (Hot Standby) by approximately 1845 MST.
"There were no other component failures, testing or work in progress that contributed to this event. The QOCD leak is allowing 4400 part per million borated water into the containment. There has been no release of radioactivity to the environment and no impact to the health and safety of the public has occurred or is anticipated. There is no elevated RCS activity and heat removal is via normal steaming to the main turbine condenser. The electric grid is stable."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTED AT 1257 EDT ON 10/16/01 BY DANIEL HAUTALA TO FANGIE JONES * * *
"This notification is a retraction to the August 17, 2001, ENS #38220 which reported a Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 3 shutdown required by Technical Specification 3.6.1. In the condition described by this ENS, the failure, a loss of containment integrity, never existed. Although personnel conservatively declared containment inoperable, plant engineers have since determined that containment integrity per Technical Specification 3.6.1 was maintained. The water leakage into containment via the Quick Operating Closure Device (QOCD) 0-rings did not constitute or create a potential accident leakage path out of containment. Therefore, the subsequent plant shutdown was not required by a Technical Specification action.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The Region 4 Duty Officer (Bill Jones) has been notified.
"On August 17, 2001 at approximately 1245 MST, Palo Verde Unit 3 was at approximately 97 percent power and at normal RCS temperature and pressure, when operations personnel detected an increase in containment sump level. Subsequent investigation revealed the quick operating closure device (QOCD) (EQID #PCE-M01) that isolates the containment from the fuel transfer tube was leaking by borated water from the fuel transfer canal at approximately 1 gallon per minute. Operations personnel entered TS LCO 3.6.1 Containment, Required Action A. This action requires the containment be restored to an operable status within one hour.
"Since containment integrity was uncertain, and compliance with LCO 3.6 1 Required Action A could not be met within one hour, operations personnel entered LCO 3.6.1, Required Action 8.1 at 1345 MST. Required Action B.1 requires the unit be placed in Mode 3 in 6 hours, and Required Action 8.2 requires the unit be placed in Mode 5 within 36 hours, Following operations briefings, shutdown was commenced at approximately 1645 MST. At this time, Palo Verde Unit 3 is continuing to reduce power in an orderly manner and anticipates being in Mode 3 (Hot Standby) by approximately 1845 MST.
"There were no other component failures, testing or work in progress that contributed to this event. The QOCD leak is allowing 4400 part per million borated water into the containment. There has been no release of radioactivity to the environment and no impact to the health and safety of the public has occurred or is anticipated. There is no elevated RCS activity and heat removal is via normal steaming to the main turbine condenser. The electric grid is stable."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTED AT 1257 EDT ON 10/16/01 BY DANIEL HAUTALA TO FANGIE JONES * * *
"This notification is a retraction to the August 17, 2001, ENS #38220 which reported a Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 3 shutdown required by Technical Specification 3.6.1. In the condition described by this ENS, the failure, a loss of containment integrity, never existed. Although personnel conservatively declared containment inoperable, plant engineers have since determined that containment integrity per Technical Specification 3.6.1 was maintained. The water leakage into containment via the Quick Operating Closure Device (QOCD) 0-rings did not constitute or create a potential accident leakage path out of containment. Therefore, the subsequent plant shutdown was not required by a Technical Specification action.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The Region 4 Duty Officer (Bill Jones) has been notified.