Event Notification Report for August 15, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/14/2001 - 08/15/2001
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 38215
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: MIKE RITCHIE
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: MIKE RITCHIE
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 08/16/2001
Notification Time: 12:23 [ET]
Event Date: 08/15/2001
Event Time: 15:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/16/2001
Notification Time: 12:23 [ET]
Event Date: 08/15/2001
Event Time: 15:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/16/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
THOMAS KOZAK (R3)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
THOMAS KOZAK (R3)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
24-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the DOE representative.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth personnel:
During a walk through of the X-705 Decontamination Facility a hole was discovered on the top of the Calciner glove box. The hole could have allowed uranium bearing solution to accumulate in the bottom of the glove box [in] the unlikely event of a leak. This is in violation of the analysis of NCSA-705_024.E02 "Calciner Solution Recovery" which specifically evaluates this event.
The PSS entered an anomalous condition. Tape was placed over the hole on the top of the Calciner glove box. The PSS exited the anomalous condition.
This event is reportable per NRC BL 91-01 as a loss of one control of the double contingency principle.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: low
There was no leak of uranium bearing material in the vicinity of the Calciner glove box. Also, the opening on the glove box is very small. This would require a significant amount of time for the solution to accumulate in the glove [box] had a leak occurred at that exact location.
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD
OCCUR):
For a criticality to occur, the following events would be required: The recovery system would have to be operating and processing uranium bearing liquid with a high concentration of uranium. Then the leak in this system must occur such that solution sprays onto the glove box. The liquid would then have to flow through the small opening on the top of the glove box and accumulate to a depth of >1.5 inches.
CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): volume, geometry
The unlikely event supporting double contingency credits the integrity of the glove box for preventing solution from collecting in an unsafe geometry/volume. The hole on the top of the glove box could potentially allow solution to enter the glove box.
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):
No uranium material was involved in this event.
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
The hole could have allowed uranium bearing solution to accumulate in the bottom of the glove box in the unlikely event of a leak. This is in violation of the analysis of NCSA-705_024.E02 "Calciner Solution Recovery" which specifically evaluates this event. The presence of the opening undermines the basis of an unlikely event credited for double contingency.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
Tape was [placed] on the hole on top of the glove box.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the DOE representative.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth personnel:
During a walk through of the X-705 Decontamination Facility a hole was discovered on the top of the Calciner glove box. The hole could have allowed uranium bearing solution to accumulate in the bottom of the glove box [in] the unlikely event of a leak. This is in violation of the analysis of NCSA-705_024.E02 "Calciner Solution Recovery" which specifically evaluates this event.
The PSS entered an anomalous condition. Tape was placed over the hole on the top of the Calciner glove box. The PSS exited the anomalous condition.
This event is reportable per NRC BL 91-01 as a loss of one control of the double contingency principle.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: low
There was no leak of uranium bearing material in the vicinity of the Calciner glove box. Also, the opening on the glove box is very small. This would require a significant amount of time for the solution to accumulate in the glove [box] had a leak occurred at that exact location.
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD
OCCUR):
For a criticality to occur, the following events would be required: The recovery system would have to be operating and processing uranium bearing liquid with a high concentration of uranium. Then the leak in this system must occur such that solution sprays onto the glove box. The liquid would then have to flow through the small opening on the top of the glove box and accumulate to a depth of >1.5 inches.
CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): volume, geometry
The unlikely event supporting double contingency credits the integrity of the glove box for preventing solution from collecting in an unsafe geometry/volume. The hole on the top of the glove box could potentially allow solution to enter the glove box.
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):
No uranium material was involved in this event.
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
The hole could have allowed uranium bearing solution to accumulate in the bottom of the glove box in the unlikely event of a leak. This is in violation of the analysis of NCSA-705_024.E02 "Calciner Solution Recovery" which specifically evaluates this event. The presence of the opening undermines the basis of an unlikely event credited for double contingency.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
Tape was [placed] on the hole on top of the glove box.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38209
Facility: TURKEY POINT
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JIM HICKEY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JIM HICKEY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 08/15/2001
Notification Time: 06:30 [ET]
Event Date: 08/15/2001
Event Time: 04:49 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/15/2001
Notification Time: 06:30 [ET]
Event Date: 08/15/2001
Event Time: 04:49 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/15/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
CHARLIE PAYNE (R2)
CHARLIE PAYNE (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | M/R | Y | 15 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
UNIT 3 WAS MANUALLY TRIPPED DURING A LOAD REDUCTION DUE TO A LOSS OF CONDENSER VACUUM.
"During a Unit 3 load reduction, a manual reactor trip was initiated. Plant documents provide guidance for manually tripping the reactor.
"If reactor power is greater than 10% and condenser vacuum decreases below 24.5" Hg with generator load less than 531 MWe, then the reactor is manually tripped.
"The balance-of-plant operator noted condenser vacuum at 24.2" Hg with reactor power at 15% and generator load at 30 MWe. The Unit RCO with SRO concurrence manually tripped the reactor.
"Systems which did not function as required:
a. N-35 Intermediate Range; High Level Trip did not clear as expected.
b. N-36 Intermediate Range; Spiking indication following reactor trip.
c. Rod Position Indicator E-9 indicates mid-scale approximately 117 steps (Rod Bottom light on)."
The licensee has the cause for the loss of condenser vacuum under investigation. The licensee will inform the NRC resident inspector.
"During a Unit 3 load reduction, a manual reactor trip was initiated. Plant documents provide guidance for manually tripping the reactor.
"If reactor power is greater than 10% and condenser vacuum decreases below 24.5" Hg with generator load less than 531 MWe, then the reactor is manually tripped.
"The balance-of-plant operator noted condenser vacuum at 24.2" Hg with reactor power at 15% and generator load at 30 MWe. The Unit RCO with SRO concurrence manually tripped the reactor.
"Systems which did not function as required:
a. N-35 Intermediate Range; High Level Trip did not clear as expected.
b. N-36 Intermediate Range; Spiking indication following reactor trip.
c. Rod Position Indicator E-9 indicates mid-scale approximately 117 steps (Rod Bottom light on)."
The licensee has the cause for the loss of condenser vacuum under investigation. The licensee will inform the NRC resident inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38211
Facility: PEACH BOTTOM
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [3] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BREIDENBAUGH
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [3] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BREIDENBAUGH
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 08/15/2001
Notification Time: 13:12 [ET]
Event Date: 08/15/2001
Event Time: 05:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/15/2001
Notification Time: 13:12 [ET]
Event Date: 08/15/2001
Event Time: 05:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/15/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
RONALD BELLAMY (R1)
RONALD BELLAMY (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 82 | Power Operation | 82 | Power Operation |
UNEXPECTED LOSS OF POWER TO THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"An unexpected electrical breaker trip has caused a loss of power to the Technical Support Center (TSC). On 08/15/01 at 0550, the Main Control Room was notified that the TSC, which is located in a building adjacent to the protected area, was without power."
"Subsequent investigation revealed that the feed breakers supplying power to the affected bus had tripped. Further investigation is in progress to identify and repair any deficiencies. In accordance with station procedures, contingency actions are in place should an event occur which required the use of the TSC. Communication remains available from the TSC."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"An unexpected electrical breaker trip has caused a loss of power to the Technical Support Center (TSC). On 08/15/01 at 0550, the Main Control Room was notified that the TSC, which is located in a building adjacent to the protected area, was without power."
"Subsequent investigation revealed that the feed breakers supplying power to the affected bus had tripped. Further investigation is in progress to identify and repair any deficiencies. In accordance with station procedures, contingency actions are in place should an event occur which required the use of the TSC. Communication remains available from the TSC."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.