Event Notification Report for August 10, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/09/2001 - 08/10/2001
EVENT NUMBERS
3819738198381993820038201
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38197
Facility: COOK
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: LEWIS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: LEWIS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 08/10/2001
Notification Time: 11:21 [ET]
Event Date: 08/10/2001
Event Time: 11:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/10/2001
Notification Time: 11:21 [ET]
Event Date: 08/10/2001
Event Time: 11:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/10/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
ANN MARIE STONE (R3)
ANN MARIE STONE (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 98 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SHUTDOWN DUE TO TWO AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS BEING INOPERABLE.
Commenced Unit 2 plant shutdown to comply with Technical Specification 3.7.1.2.b: Two Auxiliary Feedwater pumps inoperable. Unit 2 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pump was inoperable due to scheduled maintenance. Unit 2 "2 East" Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pump was declared inoperable due to a failure of associated room cooling (room cooler inoperable) required by administrative procedure PMP 4030.001.001, Impact of Safety Related Ventilation on the Operability of Technical Specification Equipment. All other systems fully are operable.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
Commenced Unit 2 plant shutdown to comply with Technical Specification 3.7.1.2.b: Two Auxiliary Feedwater pumps inoperable. Unit 2 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pump was inoperable due to scheduled maintenance. Unit 2 "2 East" Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pump was declared inoperable due to a failure of associated room cooling (room cooler inoperable) required by administrative procedure PMP 4030.001.001, Impact of Safety Related Ventilation on the Operability of Technical Specification Equipment. All other systems fully are operable.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 38198
Facility: HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE PRODUCTION
NRC Notified By: W. LESSIG
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE PRODUCTION
NRC Notified By: W. LESSIG
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 08/10/2001
Notification Time: 11:24 [ET]
Event Date: 08/10/2001
Event Time: 09:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/10/2001
Notification Time: 11:24 [ET]
Event Date: 08/10/2001
Event Time: 09:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/10/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
ANNE MARIE STONE (R3)
FRED BROWN (NMSS)
ANNE MARIE STONE (R3)
FRED BROWN (NMSS)
SMALL URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE RELEASE ONSITE
The licensee reported that from 0945 to 0950 CDT, a small UF6 release occurred in the feeds material building. No material left the site, nor did the licensee declare an Alert. Two individuals were exposed to fumes from the leak. Those individuals were treated with oxygen at the facility and transported to a local hospital. The UF6 leak has been stopped.
The exact quantity of material released has yet to be determined. The licensee is currently conducting an investigation of this event.
The licensee reported that from 0945 to 0950 CDT, a small UF6 release occurred in the feeds material building. No material left the site, nor did the licensee declare an Alert. Two individuals were exposed to fumes from the leak. Those individuals were treated with oxygen at the facility and transported to a local hospital. The UF6 leak has been stopped.
The exact quantity of material released has yet to be determined. The licensee is currently conducting an investigation of this event.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38199
Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: GENE OLSON
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: GENE OLSON
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 08/10/2001
Notification Time: 13:18 [ET]
Event Date: 08/10/2001
Event Time: 10:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/10/2001
Notification Time: 13:18 [ET]
Event Date: 08/10/2001
Event Time: 10:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/10/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
DANIEL HOLODY (R1)
DANIEL HOLODY (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Decommissioned | 0 | Decommissioned |
| 2 | N | Y | 92 | Power Operation | 92 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
PLANNED OFFSITE NOTIFICATION REGARDING A FISH KILL IN THE DISCHARGE QUARRY DUE TO A RECENT SUSTAINED HEAT WAVE IN THE NORTHEAST
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"A visual inspection by Millstone [station biologists] on August 10, 2001, revealed approximately 50 dead [Tautog] (blackfish) in the discharge quarry by the fish barrier. A subsequent dive into the quarry by station biologists [revealed] 2 additional dead Tautog along the fish barrier. No additional [mortalities] or other species were found on the bottom of the quarry."
"The fish most likely died as a result of the sustained elevated temperatures during the week of August 6, 2001, experienced throughout New England and Connecticut. Intake water temperatures have risen above 70 degrees F with discharge temperatures about 98 degree F. Water temperatures in the quarry have climbed to above 90 degrees F at times during the week. Tautog are known to have decreased resistant when water temperatures are above 90 degrees F."
"Station [biologists] continue to monitor fish in the quarry."
The licensee stated that there was nothing unusual about the temperature deltas across the condensers and that discharge temperatures are normal. The licensee also stated that load has been reduced on Unit 2 in order to keep condenser pressure below the condenser low pressure alarm setpoint and to maintain discharge temperatures within acceptable limits. The discharge temperatures for Unit 3 were reported to be normal with the unit at full power.
The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector and the State Department of Environmental Protection.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"A visual inspection by Millstone [station biologists] on August 10, 2001, revealed approximately 50 dead [Tautog] (blackfish) in the discharge quarry by the fish barrier. A subsequent dive into the quarry by station biologists [revealed] 2 additional dead Tautog along the fish barrier. No additional [mortalities] or other species were found on the bottom of the quarry."
"The fish most likely died as a result of the sustained elevated temperatures during the week of August 6, 2001, experienced throughout New England and Connecticut. Intake water temperatures have risen above 70 degrees F with discharge temperatures about 98 degree F. Water temperatures in the quarry have climbed to above 90 degrees F at times during the week. Tautog are known to have decreased resistant when water temperatures are above 90 degrees F."
"Station [biologists] continue to monitor fish in the quarry."
The licensee stated that there was nothing unusual about the temperature deltas across the condensers and that discharge temperatures are normal. The licensee also stated that load has been reduced on Unit 2 in order to keep condenser pressure below the condenser low pressure alarm setpoint and to maintain discharge temperatures within acceptable limits. The discharge temperatures for Unit 3 were reported to be normal with the unit at full power.
The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector and the State Department of Environmental Protection.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38200
Facility: PEACH BOTTOM
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [3] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ROSS MOONITZ
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [3] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ROSS MOONITZ
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 08/10/2001
Notification Time: 19:52 [ET]
Event Date: 08/10/2001
Event Time: 18:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/10/2001
Notification Time: 19:52 [ET]
Event Date: 08/10/2001
Event Time: 18:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/10/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
DANIEL HOLODY (R1)
DANIEL HOLODY (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 84 | Power Operation | 84 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF GREATER THAN 25% OF THE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS SIRENS DUE TO POWER OUTAGES FROM ELECTRICAL STORMS
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"[A total of 26 out of] 97 emergency preparedness sirens (>25%) are out of service due to power outages from electrical storms. [This includes 20 out of] 27 in York County, 2 in Herford County, 2 in Lancaster County, 1 in Cecil County, and 1 in Chester County. Plans are in progress to restore power."
The licensee reported that all systems functioned as required and that there was nothing unusual or misunderstood. The licensee also reported that there was no loss of offsite power.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
***** UPDATE FROM JACK POPIELARSKI TO LEIGH TROCINE RECEIVED AT 2101 ON 08/10/01 *****
The licensee also notified York County. The NRC operations officer notified the R1DO (Holody).
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"[A total of 26 out of] 97 emergency preparedness sirens (>25%) are out of service due to power outages from electrical storms. [This includes 20 out of] 27 in York County, 2 in Herford County, 2 in Lancaster County, 1 in Cecil County, and 1 in Chester County. Plans are in progress to restore power."
The licensee reported that all systems functioned as required and that there was nothing unusual or misunderstood. The licensee also reported that there was no loss of offsite power.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
***** UPDATE FROM JACK POPIELARSKI TO LEIGH TROCINE RECEIVED AT 2101 ON 08/10/01 *****
The licensee also notified York County. The NRC operations officer notified the R1DO (Holody).
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38201
Facility: OYSTER CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2
NRC Notified By: ERIC DEMONCH
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2
NRC Notified By: ERIC DEMONCH
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 08/10/2001
Notification Time: 23:02 [ET]
Event Date: 08/10/2001
Event Time: 21:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/16/2001
Notification Time: 23:02 [ET]
Event Date: 08/10/2001
Event Time: 21:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/16/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
DANIEL HOLODY (R1)
DANIEL HOLODY (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 84 | Power Operation | 84 | Power Operation |
UNPLANNED REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) SYSTEM/SAFETY SYSTEM ACTUATIONS WHILE CRITICAL
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"[The unit] received [an] isolation of the [transverse incore probe (TIP)] purge system and the offgas system during [an] electrical transient on the 230kV distribution system. [The licensee believes] the isolations were caused by the voltage fluctuations felt in the plant from the grid. Since the TIP purge isolation is processed through [the reactor protection system (RPS)] and offgas from the offgas [radiation] monitors, this falls under actuation of a safety system while critical."
"[The licensee] reset isolations and restored systems to normal."
The licensee stated that the isolation signals that were processed did not show up on any alarms. Alarms were received but nothing specific to indicate the isolations. This may have been due to voltage fluctuations/losses as a result of power/instrument panels that transferred to their alternate power supplies. The voltage fluctuations on the in-house 4160V buses were attributed to the electrical transient on the 230kV distribution system.
There was severe weather in the area at the time of this event. As a result, one of two 230kV outgoing power lines and both 34.5kV feed lines were lost. All of these lines have since been returned to service. The licensee stated that offsite power was never lost because one 230kV line remained available to backfeed/supply the 34.5kV buses.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
* * * RETRACTED AT 1840 EDT ON 8/16/2001 BY JERE FREEMAN TO FANGIE JONES * * *
The licensee, after review of the event, determined that the actuation of a single component due to a power panel transfer on a voltage transient did not meet the requirement of an actuation of the containment isolation system for reportability. Per NUREG 1022 Rev 2, this event was not reportable and is retracted.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R1DO (William Ruland) has been notified.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"[The unit] received [an] isolation of the [transverse incore probe (TIP)] purge system and the offgas system during [an] electrical transient on the 230kV distribution system. [The licensee believes] the isolations were caused by the voltage fluctuations felt in the plant from the grid. Since the TIP purge isolation is processed through [the reactor protection system (RPS)] and offgas from the offgas [radiation] monitors, this falls under actuation of a safety system while critical."
"[The licensee] reset isolations and restored systems to normal."
The licensee stated that the isolation signals that were processed did not show up on any alarms. Alarms were received but nothing specific to indicate the isolations. This may have been due to voltage fluctuations/losses as a result of power/instrument panels that transferred to their alternate power supplies. The voltage fluctuations on the in-house 4160V buses were attributed to the electrical transient on the 230kV distribution system.
There was severe weather in the area at the time of this event. As a result, one of two 230kV outgoing power lines and both 34.5kV feed lines were lost. All of these lines have since been returned to service. The licensee stated that offsite power was never lost because one 230kV line remained available to backfeed/supply the 34.5kV buses.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
* * * RETRACTED AT 1840 EDT ON 8/16/2001 BY JERE FREEMAN TO FANGIE JONES * * *
The licensee, after review of the event, determined that the actuation of a single component due to a power panel transfer on a voltage transient did not meet the requirement of an actuation of the containment isolation system for reportability. Per NUREG 1022 Rev 2, this event was not reportable and is retracted.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R1DO (William Ruland) has been notified.