Event Notification Report for August 08, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/07/2001 - 08/08/2001
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38228
Facility: WATTS BAR
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: TOUCHSTONE
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: TOUCHSTONE
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 08/23/2001
Notification Time: 13:05 [ET]
Event Date: 08/08/2001
Event Time: 22:43 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/23/2001
Notification Time: 13:05 [ET]
Event Date: 08/08/2001
Event Time: 22:43 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/23/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
EDWARD MCALPINE (R2)
EDWARD MCALPINE (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
AUTOMATIC START OF AN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR
The following information is provided as a 60 day telephone notification to NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) in lieu of submitting a written LER to report a condition that resulted in an invalid actuation of WBN Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 2B-B. NUREG 1022, Rev 2, identifies the information that needs to be reported as discussed:
(a)The specific train(s) and system(s) that were actuated.
On August 8, 2001, at 2243 hours, Train B, Emergency Diesel Generator 2B-B (System 82) actuated (automatically started). The cause of the start is under evaluation, but was not in response to actual plant conditions or an ESF signal. No loss of essential board voltage was observed, no emergency start signal initiated (manually or automatically), and no other initiating signal such as an SI occurred.
(b) Whether each train actuation was complete or partial.
The actuation is considered complete. EDG 2B-B automatically started and accelerated to rated speed of 900 RPM. As there was no loss of essential board voltage, no load shedding occurred and the diesel generator output breaker remained disconnected from its respective shutdown board.
(c) Whether or not the system started and functioned successfully.
EDG 2B-B automatically started and functioned successfully. As discussed above, the EDG accelerated to rated speed of 900 RPM. Since there was no loss of essential board voltage, the diesel remained disconnected from its respective shutdown board and available to perform its safety function in the event of a loss of offsite power. No complications were observed.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
The following information is provided as a 60 day telephone notification to NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) in lieu of submitting a written LER to report a condition that resulted in an invalid actuation of WBN Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 2B-B. NUREG 1022, Rev 2, identifies the information that needs to be reported as discussed:
(a)The specific train(s) and system(s) that were actuated.
On August 8, 2001, at 2243 hours, Train B, Emergency Diesel Generator 2B-B (System 82) actuated (automatically started). The cause of the start is under evaluation, but was not in response to actual plant conditions or an ESF signal. No loss of essential board voltage was observed, no emergency start signal initiated (manually or automatically), and no other initiating signal such as an SI occurred.
(b) Whether each train actuation was complete or partial.
The actuation is considered complete. EDG 2B-B automatically started and accelerated to rated speed of 900 RPM. As there was no loss of essential board voltage, no load shedding occurred and the diesel generator output breaker remained disconnected from its respective shutdown board.
(c) Whether or not the system started and functioned successfully.
EDG 2B-B automatically started and functioned successfully. As discussed above, the EDG accelerated to rated speed of 900 RPM. Since there was no loss of essential board voltage, the diesel remained disconnected from its respective shutdown board and available to perform its safety function in the event of a loss of offsite power. No complications were observed.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 38191
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: K. A. BEASLEY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: K. A. BEASLEY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 08/08/2001
Notification Time: 21:20 [ET]
Event Date: 08/08/2001
Event Time: 09:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/08/2001
Notification Time: 21:20 [ET]
Event Date: 08/08/2001
Event Time: 09:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/08/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
ANNE MARIE STONE (R3)
SUSAN FRANT (NMSS)
ANNE MARIE STONE (R3)
SUSAN FRANT (NMSS)
24-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT INVOLVING VIOLATION OF CRITICALITY CONTROLS
"At 0915, on 8-8-01, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified of an NCSA violation that had occurred in the C-335 building. While a Waste Management operator was transporting a potentially fissile 5.5 gallon waste drum on the ground floor of C-335, the operator momentarily set down the drum being transported closer than 2 feet from another potentially fissile drum in violation of the spacing requirements in NCSA GEN-15. The operator them continued the task, and transported the container to its desired location. The requirement states that a minimum 2 foot edge-to edge spacing is required between fissile/potentially fissile waste containers. This requirement is used as an interaction control.
"Since one leg of double contingency was lost this is being reported to the NRC as a 24-hr. Event report.
"The NRC Acting Senior Resident has been notified of this event.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
"While a control was violated, concurrent violations of the same control would have to occur for a criticality to be possible. NCSA GEN-15 limits the movement of fissile/potentially fissile waste to one container at a time, limiting the possibility of concurrent violations of the spacing control.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR:
"In order for a criticality to be possible, additional concurrent spacing violations would have to occur.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):
"Double contingency for this scenario is established by Implementing a control for geometry and a control for interaction.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND %WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):
"Less than 240 grams U-235
.
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES
"Double contingency for this scenario is established by implementing a control for geometry and a control for interaction.
"The first leg of double contingency is based on geometry. Specific dimensions for the 5.5 gallon waste drums are used in the calculation analysis. The drum used was an AQ-NCS approved container. This control was not violated.
"The second leg of double contingency is based on interaction. NCSA GEN-15 requires fissile/potentially fissile waste container be maintained a minimum of 2 foot edge-to edge from other fissile/potentially fissile material. By placing the drum less than 2 feet from another fissile/potentially fissile waste container, the control was violated and the process condition limit was exceeded.
"Since the interaction process condition limit was exceeded, double contingency was not maintained.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AN WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
"The drum was placed in a safe configuration immediately following the incident."
"At 0915, on 8-8-01, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified of an NCSA violation that had occurred in the C-335 building. While a Waste Management operator was transporting a potentially fissile 5.5 gallon waste drum on the ground floor of C-335, the operator momentarily set down the drum being transported closer than 2 feet from another potentially fissile drum in violation of the spacing requirements in NCSA GEN-15. The operator them continued the task, and transported the container to its desired location. The requirement states that a minimum 2 foot edge-to edge spacing is required between fissile/potentially fissile waste containers. This requirement is used as an interaction control.
"Since one leg of double contingency was lost this is being reported to the NRC as a 24-hr. Event report.
"The NRC Acting Senior Resident has been notified of this event.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
"While a control was violated, concurrent violations of the same control would have to occur for a criticality to be possible. NCSA GEN-15 limits the movement of fissile/potentially fissile waste to one container at a time, limiting the possibility of concurrent violations of the spacing control.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR:
"In order for a criticality to be possible, additional concurrent spacing violations would have to occur.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):
"Double contingency for this scenario is established by Implementing a control for geometry and a control for interaction.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND %WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):
"Less than 240 grams U-235
.
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES
"Double contingency for this scenario is established by implementing a control for geometry and a control for interaction.
"The first leg of double contingency is based on geometry. Specific dimensions for the 5.5 gallon waste drums are used in the calculation analysis. The drum used was an AQ-NCS approved container. This control was not violated.
"The second leg of double contingency is based on interaction. NCSA GEN-15 requires fissile/potentially fissile waste container be maintained a minimum of 2 foot edge-to edge from other fissile/potentially fissile material. By placing the drum less than 2 feet from another fissile/potentially fissile waste container, the control was violated and the process condition limit was exceeded.
"Since the interaction process condition limit was exceeded, double contingency was not maintained.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AN WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
"The drum was placed in a safe configuration immediately following the incident."
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38192
Facility: TURKEY POINT
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [] [4] []
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: ROBERT GOODIN
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [] [4] []
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: ROBERT GOODIN
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 08/08/2001
Notification Time: 22:42 [ET]
Event Date: 08/08/2001
Event Time: 19:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/05/2001
Notification Time: 22:42 [ET]
Event Date: 08/08/2001
Event Time: 19:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/05/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
CAUDLE JULIAN (R2)
CAUDLE JULIAN (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
STARTUP TRANSFORMER (SUT) AND 4A EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR (EDG) BOTH INOPERABLE
Unit 4 Startup Transformer (SUT) and 4A EDG were both inoperable for 3 hours, 40 minutes on 08/08/01. This was discovered after the fact at 1900 hours on 08/08/01 while investigating a failure of the 4A EDG ventilation system. The 4A EDG was restored to operable status at 1920 hours on 08/08/01. The Unit 4 SUT was taken out of service at 0800 0n 08/08/01 for planned maintenance. The SUT on Unit 4 was returned to operable status at 1140 hours on 08/08/01.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
* * * UPDATE ON 9/5/01 @ 1734 BY MORRIS TO GOULD * * * RETRACTION
The licensee is retracting the notification made on August 8, 2001, in which it was reported that the Unit 4 Startup Transformer and the 4A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) were both inoperable (NRC Event Report 38192). The licensee has determined that the failure of the 4A EDG ventilation system did not make the 4A EDG inoperable. Therefore, there was no time during which the 4A EDG and the Unit 4 Startup Transformer were simultaneously inoperable.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. Notified Reg 2 RDO(Monninger)
Unit 4 Startup Transformer (SUT) and 4A EDG were both inoperable for 3 hours, 40 minutes on 08/08/01. This was discovered after the fact at 1900 hours on 08/08/01 while investigating a failure of the 4A EDG ventilation system. The 4A EDG was restored to operable status at 1920 hours on 08/08/01. The Unit 4 SUT was taken out of service at 0800 0n 08/08/01 for planned maintenance. The SUT on Unit 4 was returned to operable status at 1140 hours on 08/08/01.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
* * * UPDATE ON 9/5/01 @ 1734 BY MORRIS TO GOULD * * * RETRACTION
The licensee is retracting the notification made on August 8, 2001, in which it was reported that the Unit 4 Startup Transformer and the 4A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) were both inoperable (NRC Event Report 38192). The licensee has determined that the failure of the 4A EDG ventilation system did not make the 4A EDG inoperable. Therefore, there was no time during which the 4A EDG and the Unit 4 Startup Transformer were simultaneously inoperable.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. Notified Reg 2 RDO(Monninger)