Event Notification Report for August 03, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/02/2001 - 08/03/2001
EVENT NUMBERS
382523818438185381883863747004
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 38252
Rep Org: DOMINION
Licensee: DOMINION GENERATION
Region: 2
City: MT. STORM State: WV
County:
License #: GLG-1105
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVE SUMMERS
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Licensee: DOMINION GENERATION
Region: 2
City: MT. STORM State: WV
County:
License #: GLG-1105
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVE SUMMERS
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 08/30/2001
Notification Time: 11:55 [ET]
Event Date: 08/03/2001
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/30/2001
Notification Time: 11:55 [ET]
Event Date: 08/03/2001
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/30/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MARK LESSER (R2)
FRITZ STURZ (NMSS)
MARK LESSER (R2)
FRITZ STURZ (NMSS)
MISSING NUCLEAR GAUGE
A Texas Nuclear gauge, Model 5197 (S/N B847), has been discovered to be missing from the Mt. Storm coal generating station. The gauge contains 100 mCi of Cs-137 and was purchased under a general license. The vendor notified the Mt. Storm facility on 8/3/2001 that the gauge had never been returned. The gauge was last inventoried in August of 1982. All attempts to locate the gauge have been unsuccessful.
A Texas Nuclear gauge, Model 5197 (S/N B847), has been discovered to be missing from the Mt. Storm coal generating station. The gauge contains 100 mCi of Cs-137 and was purchased under a general license. The vendor notified the Mt. Storm facility on 8/3/2001 that the gauge had never been returned. The gauge was last inventoried in August of 1982. All attempts to locate the gauge have been unsuccessful.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 38184
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: RON CRABTREE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: RON CRABTREE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 08/03/2001
Notification Time: 20:33 [ET]
Event Date: 08/03/2001
Event Time: 16:42 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/03/2001
Notification Time: 20:33 [ET]
Event Date: 08/03/2001
Event Time: 16:42 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/03/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JOHN MADERA (R3)
JOHN MADERA (R3)
4-HOUR REPORT INVOLVING NOTIFICATION TO OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
"On 8/3/01 at 1642 the Plant Shift Superintendent received a 911 emergency response notification of a vehicle accident on perimeter road, which is included in the Department Of Energy (DOE) reservation. There was one (1) fatality and three (3) injuries which required hospitalization. Notifications of the vehicle accident were made to Pike County (Ohio) Sheriff's Office. Once it was determined that the accident involved a fatality DOE-OROC, and DOE-HQ were also notified.
"This PORTS notification to 'other government agencies' requires notification to the NRC as a 4-hour NRC Event Report."
The NRC resident inspector was informed of this report.
"On 8/3/01 at 1642 the Plant Shift Superintendent received a 911 emergency response notification of a vehicle accident on perimeter road, which is included in the Department Of Energy (DOE) reservation. There was one (1) fatality and three (3) injuries which required hospitalization. Notifications of the vehicle accident were made to Pike County (Ohio) Sheriff's Office. Once it was determined that the accident involved a fatality DOE-OROC, and DOE-HQ were also notified.
"This PORTS notification to 'other government agencies' requires notification to the NRC as a 4-hour NRC Event Report."
The NRC resident inspector was informed of this report.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38185
Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: JOEL SORENSEN
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: JOEL SORENSEN
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 08/03/2001
Notification Time: 22:56 [ET]
Event Date: 08/03/2001
Event Time: 20:40 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/04/2001
Notification Time: 22:56 [ET]
Event Date: 08/03/2001
Event Time: 20:40 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/04/2001
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION 73.71(b)(1) - SAFEGUARDS REPORTS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION 73.71(b)(1) - SAFEGUARDS REPORTS
Person (Organization):
JOHN MADERA (R3)
HERB BERKOW (NRR)
JOSEPH HOLONICH (IRO)
JIM DYER (RA)
JON JOHNSON (NRR)
JOHN MADERA (R3)
HERB BERKOW (NRR)
JOSEPH HOLONICH (IRO)
JIM DYER (RA)
JON JOHNSON (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 20 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
UNIT 1 DECLARED AN UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO A FIRE LASTING GREATER THAN 10 MINUTES
A fire occurred in the 4KV Bus 12 while realigning the electrical power supplies from the 1 Reserve Transformer to the 1 Main Transformer during power ascension. Bus 12 supplies both the 12 Reactor Coolant Pump and the 12 Feedwater Pump which were secured. The 11 Reactor Coolant Pump was also secured placing the unit in natural circulation. Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps 11 and 12 are in service (autostarted on lo-lo SG level) supplying both Steam Generators (SG) as normal for a reactor trip. The Main Condenser is in-service for decay heat removal.
The licensee is in the process of electrically isolating Bus 12. The Red Wing Fire Department is onsite responding to the fire which has not been confirmed extinguished at the time of this report.
The cause of the reactor trip and the fire is unknown.
The licensee informed state/local agencies and the NRC resident inspector.
* * * UPDATED AT 0016 EDT ON 8/4/2001 BY SCOTT WHITSON TO FANGIE JONES * * *
The licensee reported that 2 employees were treated for heat exhaustion on site and another employee was transported to a local hospital at 2255 CDT for the same reason. All were part of the onsite fire brigade.
* * * UPDATED AT 0115 EDT ON 8/4/2001 BY DENNIS CARLSON TO FANGIE JONES * * *
The licensee exited the Unusual Event at 0012 CDT on 8/4/2001. The plant is stable in natural circulation and all safeguards buses are energized by offsite power. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The R3DO (John Madera), NRR EO (Herb Berkow), and FEMA (Zapata) have been notified.
* * * UPDATED AT 0325 EDT ON 8/4/2001 BY MIKE SLEIGH TO FANGIE JONES * * *
The licensee reported that at the beginning of the Unusual Event a safeguards degradation related to the area boundary took place. Compensatory measures were taken upon discovery.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and intends to notify R3 IAT (James Creed). The R3DO (John Madera) was notified.
Refer to the HOO Log for details.
A fire occurred in the 4KV Bus 12 while realigning the electrical power supplies from the 1 Reserve Transformer to the 1 Main Transformer during power ascension. Bus 12 supplies both the 12 Reactor Coolant Pump and the 12 Feedwater Pump which were secured. The 11 Reactor Coolant Pump was also secured placing the unit in natural circulation. Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps 11 and 12 are in service (autostarted on lo-lo SG level) supplying both Steam Generators (SG) as normal for a reactor trip. The Main Condenser is in-service for decay heat removal.
The licensee is in the process of electrically isolating Bus 12. The Red Wing Fire Department is onsite responding to the fire which has not been confirmed extinguished at the time of this report.
The cause of the reactor trip and the fire is unknown.
The licensee informed state/local agencies and the NRC resident inspector.
* * * UPDATED AT 0016 EDT ON 8/4/2001 BY SCOTT WHITSON TO FANGIE JONES * * *
The licensee reported that 2 employees were treated for heat exhaustion on site and another employee was transported to a local hospital at 2255 CDT for the same reason. All were part of the onsite fire brigade.
* * * UPDATED AT 0115 EDT ON 8/4/2001 BY DENNIS CARLSON TO FANGIE JONES * * *
The licensee exited the Unusual Event at 0012 CDT on 8/4/2001. The plant is stable in natural circulation and all safeguards buses are energized by offsite power. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The R3DO (John Madera), NRR EO (Herb Berkow), and FEMA (Zapata) have been notified.
* * * UPDATED AT 0325 EDT ON 8/4/2001 BY MIKE SLEIGH TO FANGIE JONES * * *
The licensee reported that at the beginning of the Unusual Event a safeguards degradation related to the area boundary took place. Compensatory measures were taken upon discovery.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and intends to notify R3 IAT (James Creed). The R3DO (John Madera) was notified.
Refer to the HOO Log for details.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 38188
Rep Org: SC DIV OF HEALTH & ENV CONTROL
Licensee: GME ENGINEERING
Region: 2
City: GREENVILLE State: SC
County:
License #: 522
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KING
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Licensee: GME ENGINEERING
Region: 2
City: GREENVILLE State: SC
County:
License #: 522
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KING
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 08/07/2001
Notification Time: 13:53 [ET]
Event Date: 08/03/2001
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/07/2001
Notification Time: 13:53 [ET]
Event Date: 08/03/2001
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/07/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
CAUDLE JULIAN (R2)
FRED BROWN (NMSS)
CAUDLE JULIAN (R2)
FRED BROWN (NMSS)
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA WAS NOTIFIED BY ONE OF THEIR LICENSEES OF A HIGH FILM BADGE READING
GME Engineering, which uses moisture density gauges, received a second quarter film badge reading for one of its employees that measured 33.5 Rem. The employee had been terminated in mid May for vandalizing company property. It is believed that the employee intentionally exposed his badge so that he would not have to work with a moisture density gauge any more. The licensee has not been able to locate the individual. The State was notified on 8/7/01.
GME Engineering, which uses moisture density gauges, received a second quarter film badge reading for one of its employees that measured 33.5 Rem. The employee had been terminated in mid May for vandalizing company property. It is believed that the employee intentionally exposed his badge so that he would not have to work with a moisture density gauge any more. The licensee has not been able to locate the individual. The State was notified on 8/7/01.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 38637
Rep Org: COLORADO DEPT OF HEALTH
Licensee: LITTLETON RADIATION ONCOLOGY
Region: 4
City: DENVER State: CO
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BONZER (fax)
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Licensee: LITTLETON RADIATION ONCOLOGY
Region: 4
City: DENVER State: CO
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BONZER (fax)
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 01/17/2002
Notification Time: 18:23 [ET]
Event Date: 08/03/2001
Event Time: 00:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 01/17/2002
Notification Time: 18:23 [ET]
Event Date: 08/03/2001
Event Time: 00:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 01/17/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4)
SUSAN FRANT (NMSS)
DALE POWERS (R4)
SUSAN FRANT (NMSS)
OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE INCIDENT
On August 3, 2001, Littleton Radiation Oncology called to report error codes 4 and 20. Upon inspection, the Field Service Engineer (FSE) identified a loop in the source cable at the top of the source drum. The FSE removed the loop in the cable; however, the source motor would not drive the source out. The source exchange tool was connected to the service port of the emergency container and the source was driven out manually. The emergency container was used to house the source instead of the source shipping pig since the motor would not drive the source. Per the FSE, the lead technologist was informed of the source status within the room and that the source would need to be moved to a secure storage area.
The FSE then left the treatment room to discuss the situation with the physician when the lead technologist interrupted indicating that the source had been pulled out of the container. The FSE secured the source in the emergency container. Parts to make the appropriate repairs were sent immediately and the afterloader was restored to proper working condition. In order to identify the problem, secure the source, and make repairs, the FSE handled a partially shielded to unshielded source on three occasions: i. manually driving the source into the emergency container, ii. securing the source back into the emergency container after it been pulled out by ancillary staff, iii. moving the source from the emergency container to the shipping pig.
The FSE wore a self-reading dosimeter along with body and extremity badges provided by Landauer. The occupational exposure reported by Landauer for the period during which the exposure incident occurred is as follows:
Deep Dose (DDE) 447 mrem
Extremity (SDE) 760 mrem
The year to date (1/15/01-8/14/01) total for the individual is 487 mrem (DDE).
On August 3, 2001, Littleton Radiation Oncology called to report error codes 4 and 20. Upon inspection, the Field Service Engineer (FSE) identified a loop in the source cable at the top of the source drum. The FSE removed the loop in the cable; however, the source motor would not drive the source out. The source exchange tool was connected to the service port of the emergency container and the source was driven out manually. The emergency container was used to house the source instead of the source shipping pig since the motor would not drive the source. Per the FSE, the lead technologist was informed of the source status within the room and that the source would need to be moved to a secure storage area.
The FSE then left the treatment room to discuss the situation with the physician when the lead technologist interrupted indicating that the source had been pulled out of the container. The FSE secured the source in the emergency container. Parts to make the appropriate repairs were sent immediately and the afterloader was restored to proper working condition. In order to identify the problem, secure the source, and make repairs, the FSE handled a partially shielded to unshielded source on three occasions: i. manually driving the source into the emergency container, ii. securing the source back into the emergency container after it been pulled out by ancillary staff, iii. moving the source from the emergency container to the shipping pig.
The FSE wore a self-reading dosimeter along with body and extremity badges provided by Landauer. The occupational exposure reported by Landauer for the period during which the exposure incident occurred is as follows:
Deep Dose (DDE) 447 mrem
Extremity (SDE) 760 mrem
The year to date (1/15/01-8/14/01) total for the individual is 487 mrem (DDE).
Agreement State
Event Number: 47004
Rep Org: NEW YORK STATE DEPT. OF HEALTH
Licensee: STANDARD MIRCOSYSTEMS
Region: 1
City: HAUPPAUGE State: NY
County:
License #: GENERAL
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT SNYDER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Licensee: STANDARD MIRCOSYSTEMS
Region: 1
City: HAUPPAUGE State: NY
County:
License #: GENERAL
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT SNYDER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 07/01/2011
Notification Time: 11:19 [ET]
Event Date: 08/03/2001
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/01/2011
Notification Time: 11:19 [ET]
Event Date: 08/03/2001
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/01/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
BLAKE WELLING (R1DO)
DEBORAH JACKSON (FSME)
ILTAB VIA E-MAIL
BLAKE WELLING (R1DO)
DEBORAH JACKSON (FSME)
ILTAB VIA E-MAIL
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST POLONIUM-210 STATIC ELIMINATORS
The following information was received from the State of NY Bureau of Environmental Radiation Protection via fax:
"The state received notification 03/06/2007 that static eliminators were lost sometime around 8/3/2001. SMSC [Standard Microsystems] suspects that they were inadvertently shipped to Delta Design because they were placed inside Delta Flex Handlers and were not visible from the outside. Delta Design presumes that the sources were scrapped sometime after 2001. The activity of the Polonium-210 at that time was less than 45 microcuries.
"The written report from SMSC indicates that 5 NRD static eliminators, model P-2042, s/n SP101713 thru SP101717, each containing 5 milliCuries on 3/9/1998 were disposed. Decay corrected activity of each foil is less than 1 nanocurie. No further action is warranted."
New York Incident: 519
New York Event: NY-11-13
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
The following information was received from the State of NY Bureau of Environmental Radiation Protection via fax:
"The state received notification 03/06/2007 that static eliminators were lost sometime around 8/3/2001. SMSC [Standard Microsystems] suspects that they were inadvertently shipped to Delta Design because they were placed inside Delta Flex Handlers and were not visible from the outside. Delta Design presumes that the sources were scrapped sometime after 2001. The activity of the Polonium-210 at that time was less than 45 microcuries.
"The written report from SMSC indicates that 5 NRD static eliminators, model P-2042, s/n SP101713 thru SP101717, each containing 5 milliCuries on 3/9/1998 were disposed. Decay corrected activity of each foil is less than 1 nanocurie. No further action is warranted."
New York Incident: 519
New York Event: NY-11-13
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf