Event Notification Report for July 23, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
07/22/2001 - 07/23/2001
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 38161
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: TOM WHITE
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: TOM WHITE
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 07/23/2001
Notification Time: 17:27 [ET]
Event Date: 07/23/2001
Event Time: 12:55 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/07/2001
Notification Time: 17:27 [ET]
Event Date: 07/23/2001
Event Time: 12:55 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/07/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3)
C.W. (BILL) REAMER (NMSS)
NADER MAMISH (IRO)
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3)
C.W. (BILL) REAMER (NMSS)
NADER MAMISH (IRO)
4-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Paducah personnel:
"At 1255, on 7-23-01, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that checks required to meet the requirements of NCSA CAS-011 were not performed during replacement of the C-337 Unit 5 Cell 10 RCW [recirculating cooling water] spool piece. NCSA CAS-011 requires a line clarity check on the peak reading pressure gauges prior to connecting the spool piece. This check was not performed. The purpose of this requirement is to ensure the RCW pressure in the condenser does not exceed 35.5 PSIA.
"The NRC Acting Senior Resident has been notified of this event.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
"While a control was violated, insufficient time existed for moisture from the RCW system to enter the process gas system.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):
"In order for a criticality to be possible, the following conditions must exist. With the condenser RCW supply and return valves closed, the supply or return valve must be leaking to allow the condenser pressure to exceed the minimum coolant pressure of 35.5 PSIA. The process gas equipment must contain a UO2F2 deposit greater than a critical mass. The condenser must have a leak of sufficient rate and duration to allow enough water to overcome the down corner allowing liquid water to enter the cooler. The cooler must also have a simultaneous leak which would allow wet coolant to leak into the process gas side of the equipment at a location which would allow a moderation of the deposit.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC):
"Two controls on moderation.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):
"No known deposits of concern at this time..
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
"Double contingency for this scenario is established by implementing two controls on moderation.
"The first leg of double contingency is based on preventing moderation of a deposit by maintaining the RCW pressure in a condenser below 35.5 PSIA. Pressure gauges are installed and checked for clarity whenever the RCW return valve is closed on a cell without a fluorinating environment. Since clarity of the pressure reading instrument was not verified, the functionality of the pressure reading instrument cannot be assured, violating the control.
"The second leg of double contingency is based upon independent verification that the RCW pressure gauges are reading correctly. Since clarity of the pressure reading instrument was not independently verified, this control was violated.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
"Upon discovery of the failure to perform the requirement, the coolant system was sampled for moisture and verified to be dry."
* * * UPDATE AT 1623EDT ON 8/7/01 FROM MIKE UNDERWOOD TO S. SANDIN * * *
This report is retracted based on the following:
"UPDATE 8-7-01: THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. Additional information was discovered which changes the initial evaluation of the violation. In preparation for maintenance, the peak reading pressure gauges were adequately installed on the condenser head and clarity verified prior to isolating the condenser. Since the maintenance involved the RCW control valve, it was not necessary to remove the pressure gauges. The normal course of events would be to remove the pressure gauges after the condenser is drained. However, in this case, the maintenance evolution was limited and Cascade Operations decided to leave the pressure gauges installed on the condenser head. If the pressure gauges had been removed while the RCW system was drained the gauges would have been required to be reinstalled and clarity verified prior to reestablishing system integrity. Once system integrity is reestablished, the pressure gauges are used to ensure the RCW pressure in the condenser does not exceed 35.5 psia. The clarity check supports the double contingency principle by ensuring the common instrument line to the gauges is not blocked. However, in this case, the gauges were not removed and the instrument isolation valves were not manipulated. Therefore, clarity was maintained.
"After the maintenance had been performed, Operations realized the second clarity check had not been performed. At this point, NCS was contacted and direction was given to perform the remedial actions as if the pressure limit were exceeded according to NCSA CAS-011. These actions included opening the RCW return valve and sampling the coolant system for moisture, which was found to be below the moisture limits, These actions were performed within the NCSA CAS-011 required inspection frequency of 12 hours.
"After the incident report was competed, it was discovered that the pressure gauges had not been removed from the condenser head. Therefore, the requirement for the reinstallation and clarity check of the pressure gauges had already been performed. Since the requirement of NCSA CAS-011 to perform a clarity check was met and the system conditions were clearly bounded by the analysis of NCSA CAS-011, no violation occurred.
"The NRC Acting Senior Resident has been notified of this event."
Notified R3DO(Stone) and NMSS(Brown).
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Paducah personnel:
"At 1255, on 7-23-01, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that checks required to meet the requirements of NCSA CAS-011 were not performed during replacement of the C-337 Unit 5 Cell 10 RCW [recirculating cooling water] spool piece. NCSA CAS-011 requires a line clarity check on the peak reading pressure gauges prior to connecting the spool piece. This check was not performed. The purpose of this requirement is to ensure the RCW pressure in the condenser does not exceed 35.5 PSIA.
"The NRC Acting Senior Resident has been notified of this event.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
"While a control was violated, insufficient time existed for moisture from the RCW system to enter the process gas system.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):
"In order for a criticality to be possible, the following conditions must exist. With the condenser RCW supply and return valves closed, the supply or return valve must be leaking to allow the condenser pressure to exceed the minimum coolant pressure of 35.5 PSIA. The process gas equipment must contain a UO2F2 deposit greater than a critical mass. The condenser must have a leak of sufficient rate and duration to allow enough water to overcome the down corner allowing liquid water to enter the cooler. The cooler must also have a simultaneous leak which would allow wet coolant to leak into the process gas side of the equipment at a location which would allow a moderation of the deposit.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC):
"Two controls on moderation.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):
"No known deposits of concern at this time..
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
"Double contingency for this scenario is established by implementing two controls on moderation.
"The first leg of double contingency is based on preventing moderation of a deposit by maintaining the RCW pressure in a condenser below 35.5 PSIA. Pressure gauges are installed and checked for clarity whenever the RCW return valve is closed on a cell without a fluorinating environment. Since clarity of the pressure reading instrument was not verified, the functionality of the pressure reading instrument cannot be assured, violating the control.
"The second leg of double contingency is based upon independent verification that the RCW pressure gauges are reading correctly. Since clarity of the pressure reading instrument was not independently verified, this control was violated.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
"Upon discovery of the failure to perform the requirement, the coolant system was sampled for moisture and verified to be dry."
* * * UPDATE AT 1623EDT ON 8/7/01 FROM MIKE UNDERWOOD TO S. SANDIN * * *
This report is retracted based on the following:
"UPDATE 8-7-01: THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. Additional information was discovered which changes the initial evaluation of the violation. In preparation for maintenance, the peak reading pressure gauges were adequately installed on the condenser head and clarity verified prior to isolating the condenser. Since the maintenance involved the RCW control valve, it was not necessary to remove the pressure gauges. The normal course of events would be to remove the pressure gauges after the condenser is drained. However, in this case, the maintenance evolution was limited and Cascade Operations decided to leave the pressure gauges installed on the condenser head. If the pressure gauges had been removed while the RCW system was drained the gauges would have been required to be reinstalled and clarity verified prior to reestablishing system integrity. Once system integrity is reestablished, the pressure gauges are used to ensure the RCW pressure in the condenser does not exceed 35.5 psia. The clarity check supports the double contingency principle by ensuring the common instrument line to the gauges is not blocked. However, in this case, the gauges were not removed and the instrument isolation valves were not manipulated. Therefore, clarity was maintained.
"After the maintenance had been performed, Operations realized the second clarity check had not been performed. At this point, NCS was contacted and direction was given to perform the remedial actions as if the pressure limit were exceeded according to NCSA CAS-011. These actions included opening the RCW return valve and sampling the coolant system for moisture, which was found to be below the moisture limits, These actions were performed within the NCSA CAS-011 required inspection frequency of 12 hours.
"After the incident report was competed, it was discovered that the pressure gauges had not been removed from the condenser head. Therefore, the requirement for the reinstallation and clarity check of the pressure gauges had already been performed. Since the requirement of NCSA CAS-011 to perform a clarity check was met and the system conditions were clearly bounded by the analysis of NCSA CAS-011, no violation occurred.
"The NRC Acting Senior Resident has been notified of this event."
Notified R3DO(Stone) and NMSS(Brown).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38162
Facility: SEABROOK
Region: 1 State: NH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: HUGH HAWKINS
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 1 State: NH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: HUGH HAWKINS
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 07/23/2001
Notification Time: 18:34 [ET]
Event Date: 07/23/2001
Event Time: 17:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/23/2001
Notification Time: 18:34 [ET]
Event Date: 07/23/2001
Event Time: 17:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/23/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
73.71(b)(1) - SAFEGUARDS REPORTS
10 CFR Section:
73.71(b)(1) - SAFEGUARDS REPORTS
Person (Organization):
JOHN WHITE (R1)
JOHN WHITE (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
SECURITY REPORT
Unescorted access granted inappropriately. Immediate compensatory measures taken upon discovery. The NRC resident inspector will be informed. Contact the NRC Operations Center for additional details.
Unescorted access granted inappropriately. Immediate compensatory measures taken upon discovery. The NRC resident inspector will be informed. Contact the NRC Operations Center for additional details.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38163
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEVE HOWARD
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEVE HOWARD
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 07/23/2001
Notification Time: 22:19 [ET]
Event Date: 07/23/2001
Event Time: 21:36 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/23/2001
Notification Time: 22:19 [ET]
Event Date: 07/23/2001
Event Time: 21:36 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/23/2001
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
Person (Organization):
JAY HENSON (R2)
WILLIAM DEAN (NRR)
MR. EACHES (FEMA)
NADER MAMISH (IRO)
JAY HENSON (R2)
WILLIAM DEAN (NRR)
MR. EACHES (FEMA)
NADER MAMISH (IRO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 85 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 90 | Power Operation |
UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO LOW SERVICE WATER INTAKE LEVEL
At 2136, the licensee declared an Unusual Event due to service water intake pump well level less than 60.7' MSL (mean sea level). The licensee determined that one of the intake traveling water screens had become clogged with debris, cleared the screen, and terminated the UE at 2137 when normal pump well level was restored. Reactor power of both units was reduced as a result of the event.
The licensee's preliminary investigation indicates that the upstream traveling water screen did not automatically enter a backwash cycle as designed in response to increased differential pressure. The downstream screen was tagged out of service for a planned design modification. The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.
At 2136, the licensee declared an Unusual Event due to service water intake pump well level less than 60.7' MSL (mean sea level). The licensee determined that one of the intake traveling water screens had become clogged with debris, cleared the screen, and terminated the UE at 2137 when normal pump well level was restored. Reactor power of both units was reduced as a result of the event.
The licensee's preliminary investigation indicates that the upstream traveling water screen did not automatically enter a backwash cycle as designed in response to increased differential pressure. The downstream screen was tagged out of service for a planned design modification. The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.