Event Notification Report for July 19, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
07/18/2001 - 07/19/2001
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38152
Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: RYAN RODE
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: RYAN RODE
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 07/19/2001
Notification Time: 05:16 [ET]
Event Date: 07/19/2001
Event Time: 03:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/19/2001
Notification Time: 05:16 [ET]
Event Date: 07/19/2001
Event Time: 03:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/19/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
BRUCE JORGENSEN (R3)
BRUCE JORGENSEN (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 90 | Power Operation |
TECH SPEC REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO TIME LIMIT ON NON-SAFETY POWER TO INSTRUMENT BUS
The licensee entered Technical Specification 15.3.7(b)(1)(j) at 1900 CDT on 7/18/2001, which allowed 8 hours to restore electrical power from a safety powered bus to the Unit 1 instrument bus. Non-safety power was provided when a problem caused an automatic transfer. At 0300 CDT on 7/19/2001, a Technical Specification required shutdown was commenced. The plant has 6 hours to reach Hot Shutdown and another 44 hours to reach Cold Shutdown. The licensee has been and continues to research the problem and does not know when safety power will be restored to the instrument bus.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATED AT 0936 EDT ON 7/19/2001 BY MIKE MEYER TO FANGIE JONES * * *
The licensee restored power from a safety powered bus to the instrument bus and has exited the Tech Spec required shutdown. Plant is being restored to full power.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R3DO (Bruce Jorgensen) has been notified.
The licensee entered Technical Specification 15.3.7(b)(1)(j) at 1900 CDT on 7/18/2001, which allowed 8 hours to restore electrical power from a safety powered bus to the Unit 1 instrument bus. Non-safety power was provided when a problem caused an automatic transfer. At 0300 CDT on 7/19/2001, a Technical Specification required shutdown was commenced. The plant has 6 hours to reach Hot Shutdown and another 44 hours to reach Cold Shutdown. The licensee has been and continues to research the problem and does not know when safety power will be restored to the instrument bus.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATED AT 0936 EDT ON 7/19/2001 BY MIKE MEYER TO FANGIE JONES * * *
The licensee restored power from a safety powered bus to the instrument bus and has exited the Tech Spec required shutdown. Plant is being restored to full power.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R3DO (Bruce Jorgensen) has been notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38154
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ANDY DISMUKE
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ANDY DISMUKE
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 07/19/2001
Notification Time: 17:10 [ET]
Event Date: 07/19/2001
Event Time: 16:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/19/2001
Notification Time: 17:10 [ET]
Event Date: 07/19/2001
Event Time: 16:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/19/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
73.71(b)(1) - SAFEGUARDS REPORTS
10 CFR Section:
73.71(b)(1) - SAFEGUARDS REPORTS
Person (Organization):
JAY HENSON (R2)
WILLIAM DEAN (NRR)
DICK WESSMAN (IRO)
JAY HENSON (R2)
WILLIAM DEAN (NRR)
DICK WESSMAN (IRO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
SECURITY REPORT
Unescorted access was granted inappropriately to an NRC employee and two NRC contractors. Immediate compensatory were measures taken upon discovery. (Call the NRC operations officer for additional details.)
The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector.
Unescorted access was granted inappropriately to an NRC employee and two NRC contractors. Immediate compensatory were measures taken upon discovery. (Call the NRC operations officer for additional details.)
The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 38155
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: MIKE UNDERWOOD
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: MIKE UNDERWOOD
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 07/19/2001
Notification Time: 21:57 [ET]
Event Date: 07/19/2001
Event Time: 17:10 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/19/2001
Notification Time: 21:57 [ET]
Event Date: 07/19/2001
Event Time: 17:10 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/19/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
GARY SHEAR (R3)
C.W. (BILL) REAMER (NMSS)
NADER MAMISH (IRO)
ROB KRSEK (R3RI)
GARY SHEAR (R3)
C.W. (BILL) REAMER (NMSS)
NADER MAMISH (IRO)
ROB KRSEK (R3RI)
BULLETIN 91-01 RESPONSE (4-Hour Report) - LOSS OF ALL DOUBLE CONTINGENCY CONTROLS APPLICABLE TO A FISSILE MATERIAL OPERATION DUE TO AN INADEQUATE NCS EVALUATION
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Paducah personnel:
"DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:"
"Neither NCSA GEN-010 [which deals with equipment removal and replacement] nor NCSA CAS-011 [which deals with cell shutdown and the controls for equipment moderation control] establish necessary moderation controls to ensure double contingency is maintained for the transition between equipment removal and cell shutdown. [Essentially, if a cell is taken out of service and a piece of equipment is removed, there are no controls in place to ensure that the equipment that goes back in has met the requirements of control 3.3.6 of CAS-011, and the purpose of this control is to prevent moderation by heating the equipment up to 140°F for 60 hours.] Control 3.3.6 of NCSA CAS-011 establishes a baseline hydration level for maintaining double contingency on shutdown process equipment."
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROLS INVOLVED AND THEIR IMPACT ON DOUBLE CONTINGENCY:"
"NCSE 039 establishes double contingency based on two controls on moderation."
"Controls have not been established to ensure moderation control is maintained during the transition from equipment installation activities performed under NCSA GEN-010 and cell shutdown approved under NCSA CAS-011. Therefore, double contingency was not maintained."
"Potential Critical Pathways:"
"In order for a criticality to be possible, an equipment item containing a hydrated UH by mass deposit would have to be installed in the cascade. Following installation, normal equipment treatment activities would have to fail to dehydrate the deposit. Following startup, the equipment would have to fail to operate at or above 140 F for 60 hrs. The deposit would then have to more than double in size and achieve a total of at least 10 kg of water hydration in a geometry favorable to result in a critical configuration."
"Safety Significance:"
"No NCSA controls have been established to address the currently allowed transition from equipment installation to cell shutdown."
"EXCLUSION ZONE AND POSTINGS:"
"None."
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:"
"1. Areas of the cascade containing equipment that was installed following implementation of NCSA CAS-011 should be reviewed to determine if the drying requirements established in NCSA CAS-011 have been met."
"2. Discontinue installation of process gas equipment containing fissile deposits until adequate controls have been established for this transition."
"3. Include work packages related to GEN-010 equipment installation on Work Control Functional Directive WC-99-001."
Paducah personnel plan to ensure that these requirements are addressed in the procedures in addition to following up on equipment that could potentially have been installed that was not addressed under these requirements.
Paducah personnel notified the NRC resident inspector (Rob Krsek).
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Paducah personnel:
"DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:"
"Neither NCSA GEN-010 [which deals with equipment removal and replacement] nor NCSA CAS-011 [which deals with cell shutdown and the controls for equipment moderation control] establish necessary moderation controls to ensure double contingency is maintained for the transition between equipment removal and cell shutdown. [Essentially, if a cell is taken out of service and a piece of equipment is removed, there are no controls in place to ensure that the equipment that goes back in has met the requirements of control 3.3.6 of CAS-011, and the purpose of this control is to prevent moderation by heating the equipment up to 140°F for 60 hours.] Control 3.3.6 of NCSA CAS-011 establishes a baseline hydration level for maintaining double contingency on shutdown process equipment."
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROLS INVOLVED AND THEIR IMPACT ON DOUBLE CONTINGENCY:"
"NCSE 039 establishes double contingency based on two controls on moderation."
"Controls have not been established to ensure moderation control is maintained during the transition from equipment installation activities performed under NCSA GEN-010 and cell shutdown approved under NCSA CAS-011. Therefore, double contingency was not maintained."
"Potential Critical Pathways:"
"In order for a criticality to be possible, an equipment item containing a hydrated UH by mass deposit would have to be installed in the cascade. Following installation, normal equipment treatment activities would have to fail to dehydrate the deposit. Following startup, the equipment would have to fail to operate at or above 140 F for 60 hrs. The deposit would then have to more than double in size and achieve a total of at least 10 kg of water hydration in a geometry favorable to result in a critical configuration."
"Safety Significance:"
"No NCSA controls have been established to address the currently allowed transition from equipment installation to cell shutdown."
"EXCLUSION ZONE AND POSTINGS:"
"None."
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:"
"1. Areas of the cascade containing equipment that was installed following implementation of NCSA CAS-011 should be reviewed to determine if the drying requirements established in NCSA CAS-011 have been met."
"2. Discontinue installation of process gas equipment containing fissile deposits until adequate controls have been established for this transition."
"3. Include work packages related to GEN-010 equipment installation on Work Control Functional Directive WC-99-001."
Paducah personnel plan to ensure that these requirements are addressed in the procedures in addition to following up on equipment that could potentially have been installed that was not addressed under these requirements.
Paducah personnel notified the NRC resident inspector (Rob Krsek).