Event Notification Report for July 11, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
07/10/2001 - 07/11/2001
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38130
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: DAVID BARNETT
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: DAVID BARNETT
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 07/11/2001
Notification Time: 23:01 [ET]
Event Date: 07/11/2001
Event Time: 16:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/13/2001
Notification Time: 23:01 [ET]
Event Date: 07/11/2001
Event Time: 16:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/13/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION 50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION 50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3)
DAVID HILLS (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation |
PRIMARY CONTAINMENT DECLARED INOPERABLE - TECH SPEC REQUIRED SHUTDOWN
The licensee found a shipping restraint installed on a drywell-to-torus vent pipe bellows, apparently in place since construction (about 30 years). This device was discovered due to another licensee with similar containment configuration notifying Monticello of their discovery. This device would partially impede axial motion. The primary containment was declared inoperable at 1650 CDT on 07/11/01, and removal was initiated. This is an 8-hour report under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(a) as a degraded condition and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(c and d), control of radiation release and accident mitigation.
The licensee initiated a required shutdown at 2050 CDT on 07/11/01 per Technical Specification 3.7.A.2.a, as a result of declaring primary containment inoperable because the drywell-to-torus vent pipe bellows shipping installation attachments were still installed. This is a 4-hour report under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i), technical specification required shutdown.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and intends to notify state and local agencies.
***** UPDATE FROM DAVE BARNETT RECEIVED BY LEIGH TROCINE AT 0039 EDT ON 07/12/01 *****
The four shipping fasteners have been removed from each of the eight drywell-to-torus vent pipe bellows, and primary containment was declared operable at 2304 CDT on 07/11/01. The technical specification required shutdown was terminated while the reactor was at 90% power. The licensee currently plans to restore reactor power to 100%.
The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector as well as the applicable state and county agencies. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Hills).
**** RETRACTION ON 08/13/01 AT 1253ET BY D. BARNETT TAKEN BY MACKINNON ****
Subsequent evaluation has shown the bellows as well as the drywell and torus attachments capable of performing their design safety functions. Therefore, Primary Containment was considered operable at all times and this event is not considered reportable. The licensee will notify state and local officials of this retraction. R3DO (T. Kozak) notified.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this event by the licensee.
The licensee found a shipping restraint installed on a drywell-to-torus vent pipe bellows, apparently in place since construction (about 30 years). This device was discovered due to another licensee with similar containment configuration notifying Monticello of their discovery. This device would partially impede axial motion. The primary containment was declared inoperable at 1650 CDT on 07/11/01, and removal was initiated. This is an 8-hour report under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(a) as a degraded condition and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(c and d), control of radiation release and accident mitigation.
The licensee initiated a required shutdown at 2050 CDT on 07/11/01 per Technical Specification 3.7.A.2.a, as a result of declaring primary containment inoperable because the drywell-to-torus vent pipe bellows shipping installation attachments were still installed. This is a 4-hour report under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i), technical specification required shutdown.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and intends to notify state and local agencies.
***** UPDATE FROM DAVE BARNETT RECEIVED BY LEIGH TROCINE AT 0039 EDT ON 07/12/01 *****
The four shipping fasteners have been removed from each of the eight drywell-to-torus vent pipe bellows, and primary containment was declared operable at 2304 CDT on 07/11/01. The technical specification required shutdown was terminated while the reactor was at 90% power. The licensee currently plans to restore reactor power to 100%.
The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector as well as the applicable state and county agencies. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Hills).
**** RETRACTION ON 08/13/01 AT 1253ET BY D. BARNETT TAKEN BY MACKINNON ****
Subsequent evaluation has shown the bellows as well as the drywell and torus attachments capable of performing their design safety functions. Therefore, Primary Containment was considered operable at all times and this event is not considered reportable. The licensee will notify state and local officials of this retraction. R3DO (T. Kozak) notified.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this event by the licensee.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38131
Facility: PERRY
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: FREDERICK W. SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: FREDERICK W. SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 07/12/2001
Notification Time: 00:29 [ET]
Event Date: 07/11/2001
Event Time: 22:27 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/12/2001
Notification Time: 00:29 [ET]
Event Date: 07/11/2001
Event Time: 22:27 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/12/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) - ECCS INJECTION 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) - ECCS INJECTION 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3)
TAD MARSH (NRR)
DAVID HILLS (R3)
TAD MARSH (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM, HPCS/RCIC SYSTEM INJECTION, AND FULL BALANCE-OF-PLANT ISOLATION FOLLOWING AN UNSPECIFIED, INTERNAL, ELECTRICAL TRANSIENT
An unspecified, internal, electrical transient affected balance-of-plant (BOP) systems and resulted in a feedwater control circuitry problem. Following this electrical transient, the reactor automatically scrammed from 100% power when reactor vessel water level reached level 3 (178 inches narrow range). All control rods fully inserted. When reactor vessel water level decreased to level 2 (approximately 120 inches narrow range), the high pressure core spray (HPCS) and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) systems automatically initiated and injected into the reactor pressure vessel (RPV). A BOP isolation signal was also received on level 2, and a full BOP isolation occurred. In addition, the Division 3 emergency diesel generator (EDG) automatically started on level 2 (in support of HPCS). The EDG did not load, nor was it required to. The lowest reactor vessel water level received was 107 inches narrow range. This was reported to be well above the top of the active full, which is at 0 inches wide range.
The licensee stated that all safety systems functioned as required. The extent and cause of the electrical transient are currently under investigation. It was reported that the cause may be related to a possible auctioneered power supply failure which affected BOP systems and the feedwater system control circuitry.
The unit is currently in Mode 3 (Hot Shutdown). The RCIC system and the main turbine bypass valves are being utilized for reactor water level control and RPV pressure control, respectively. The main steam isolation valves are open, and the condenser is available as a heat sink. HPCS has been placed in standby. (The quantity of water injected was not available at the time of this event notification.) The full BOP isolation has been reset, and the Division 3 EDG is still running (unloaded). (The licensee needs to load the EDG for 1 hour before securing it.) Containment parameters were reported to be normal, and there were no challenges to offsite power. All emergency core cooling systems and engineered safety feature systems are currently available. The feedwater system remains unavailable pending resolution of the transient's root cause.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector (who was in the control room at the time of this event notification).
An unspecified, internal, electrical transient affected balance-of-plant (BOP) systems and resulted in a feedwater control circuitry problem. Following this electrical transient, the reactor automatically scrammed from 100% power when reactor vessel water level reached level 3 (178 inches narrow range). All control rods fully inserted. When reactor vessel water level decreased to level 2 (approximately 120 inches narrow range), the high pressure core spray (HPCS) and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) systems automatically initiated and injected into the reactor pressure vessel (RPV). A BOP isolation signal was also received on level 2, and a full BOP isolation occurred. In addition, the Division 3 emergency diesel generator (EDG) automatically started on level 2 (in support of HPCS). The EDG did not load, nor was it required to. The lowest reactor vessel water level received was 107 inches narrow range. This was reported to be well above the top of the active full, which is at 0 inches wide range.
The licensee stated that all safety systems functioned as required. The extent and cause of the electrical transient are currently under investigation. It was reported that the cause may be related to a possible auctioneered power supply failure which affected BOP systems and the feedwater system control circuitry.
The unit is currently in Mode 3 (Hot Shutdown). The RCIC system and the main turbine bypass valves are being utilized for reactor water level control and RPV pressure control, respectively. The main steam isolation valves are open, and the condenser is available as a heat sink. HPCS has been placed in standby. (The quantity of water injected was not available at the time of this event notification.) The full BOP isolation has been reset, and the Division 3 EDG is still running (unloaded). (The licensee needs to load the EDG for 1 hour before securing it.) Containment parameters were reported to be normal, and there were no challenges to offsite power. All emergency core cooling systems and engineered safety feature systems are currently available. The feedwater system remains unavailable pending resolution of the transient's root cause.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector (who was in the control room at the time of this event notification).
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38132
Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GENE MICHELSON
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GENE MICHELSON
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 07/12/2001
Notification Time: 05:21 [ET]
Event Date: 07/11/2001
Event Time: 23:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/06/2001
Notification Time: 05:21 [ET]
Event Date: 07/11/2001
Event Time: 23:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/06/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1)
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
DISCOVERY OF AN EXCESSIVE ACCUMULATION OF WATER IN TWO UNDERGROUND FUEL OIL STORAGE TANKS
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"[An] excessive accumulation of water [was] discovered in both [the] D11 and D12 underground fuel oil storage tanks. [There was 33 inches of water in D11 and 22.5 inches of water in D12.] This event would prevent both diesel generators from fulfilling their required safety function. [Technical Specification 3.8.1.1, Actions 'b' and 'e,' were] entered, and reportability manual event SAF 1.8 [was also] entered."
"Actions Taken: Water has been removed from both [the] D11 and D12 underground fuel oil storage tanks. [The licensee is] currently performing [an] operability determination."
The licensee stated that the unit is remains in the 72-hour limiting condition for operation due to the ongoing operability determination.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
* * * RETRACTION ON 09/06/01 AT 1407 ET BY STAN GAMBLE TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * *
Subsequent testing verified that the water level in both tanks was below the fuel oil transfer pump suction and that no water was found in the associated Day Tanks.
Since no water had been nor would it have been transferred from the Fuel Oil Storage Tanks to the Day Tanks during operation of the Diesel Generators, a condition did not exist at the time of discovery that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction by the licensee.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"[An] excessive accumulation of water [was] discovered in both [the] D11 and D12 underground fuel oil storage tanks. [There was 33 inches of water in D11 and 22.5 inches of water in D12.] This event would prevent both diesel generators from fulfilling their required safety function. [Technical Specification 3.8.1.1, Actions 'b' and 'e,' were] entered, and reportability manual event SAF 1.8 [was also] entered."
"Actions Taken: Water has been removed from both [the] D11 and D12 underground fuel oil storage tanks. [The licensee is] currently performing [an] operability determination."
The licensee stated that the unit is remains in the 72-hour limiting condition for operation due to the ongoing operability determination.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
* * * RETRACTION ON 09/06/01 AT 1407 ET BY STAN GAMBLE TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * *
Subsequent testing verified that the water level in both tanks was below the fuel oil transfer pump suction and that no water was found in the associated Day Tanks.
Since no water had been nor would it have been transferred from the Fuel Oil Storage Tanks to the Day Tanks during operation of the Diesel Generators, a condition did not exist at the time of discovery that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction by the licensee.