Event Notification Report for June 29, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
06/28/2001 - 06/29/2001
EVENT NUMBERS
38106381073810438114
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38106
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: ANTHONY PETRELLI
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: ANTHONY PETRELLI
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 06/29/2001
Notification Time: 19:19 [ET]
Event Date: 06/29/2001
Event Time: 17:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/29/2001
Notification Time: 19:19 [ET]
Event Date: 06/29/2001
Event Time: 17:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/29/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
Person (Organization):
RICHARD BARKLEY (R1)
RICHARD BARKLEY (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
NON-CONSERVATIVE ANALYSIS FOR OPRM SCRAM SETPOINTS
"On June 29, 2001, General Electric informed Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation of a non-conservative analysis that supports Operation Power Range Monitor (OPRM) scram setpoints. The non-conservative analysis is generic and has the potential to affect all stability option III and I-D plants.
"The consequences of the non-conservative analysis are that the associated OPRM Reactor Protection System (RPS) scram setpoints are also non-conservative. The non-conservative RPS setpoints may result in violating the Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) safety limit during a thermal-hydraulic instability.
"All OPRM channels have been declared inoperable. Technical Specification 3.3.1.1 Action F requires an alternate method of detecting and suppressing thermal-hydraulic instabilities to be implemented within 12 hours. Alternate methods are already established in procedures N2-SOP-29 and N2-RESP-12. Therefore, the Technical Specification required action is satisfied. These alternate methods are the same methods used prior to implementation of the OPRM scram function.
"Nine Mile Point Unit 2 has 120 days to restore the OPRMs to an operable condition. If the 120 day allowed outage time is exceeded, the Unit must be in at least STARTUP within the following six hours.
"This report is being made as required by 10CFR50.72 (B) (3) (V) (A) as condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system needed to shutdown the reactor."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
See EN #38104, GE Nuclear Energy 10 CFR 21 report.
"On June 29, 2001, General Electric informed Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation of a non-conservative analysis that supports Operation Power Range Monitor (OPRM) scram setpoints. The non-conservative analysis is generic and has the potential to affect all stability option III and I-D plants.
"The consequences of the non-conservative analysis are that the associated OPRM Reactor Protection System (RPS) scram setpoints are also non-conservative. The non-conservative RPS setpoints may result in violating the Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) safety limit during a thermal-hydraulic instability.
"All OPRM channels have been declared inoperable. Technical Specification 3.3.1.1 Action F requires an alternate method of detecting and suppressing thermal-hydraulic instabilities to be implemented within 12 hours. Alternate methods are already established in procedures N2-SOP-29 and N2-RESP-12. Therefore, the Technical Specification required action is satisfied. These alternate methods are the same methods used prior to implementation of the OPRM scram function.
"Nine Mile Point Unit 2 has 120 days to restore the OPRMs to an operable condition. If the 120 day allowed outage time is exceeded, the Unit must be in at least STARTUP within the following six hours.
"This report is being made as required by 10CFR50.72 (B) (3) (V) (A) as condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system needed to shutdown the reactor."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
See EN #38104, GE Nuclear Energy 10 CFR 21 report.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38107
Facility: WATTS BAR
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM RUSSELL
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM RUSSELL
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 06/29/2001
Notification Time: 21:12 [ET]
Event Date: 06/29/2001
Event Time: 17:28 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/29/2001
Notification Time: 21:12 [ET]
Event Date: 06/29/2001
Event Time: 17:28 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/29/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
THOMAS DECKER (R2)
THOMAS DECKER (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
MANUAL REACTOR TRIP PER PROCEDURE DUE TO INCREASING CONDENSER PRESSURE
"Watts Bar Unit 1 was manually tripped when the main condenser backpressure reached limits required by procedure. The rise in the backpressure was caused by a reduced condenser circulating water (CCW) flow which resulted from cooling tower fill material obstructing suction screens to the CCW pumps. All safety systems responded as required during the event. Auxiliary Feedwater initiated due to reactor trip with low Tavg, as required. All control rods inserted properly. Inspections are under way to determine the extent of the debris in the system."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. They will be notifying the State and Local authorities due to noise from the use of steam generator atmospheric reliefs for excess heat removal while the condenser is not available.
"Watts Bar Unit 1 was manually tripped when the main condenser backpressure reached limits required by procedure. The rise in the backpressure was caused by a reduced condenser circulating water (CCW) flow which resulted from cooling tower fill material obstructing suction screens to the CCW pumps. All safety systems responded as required during the event. Auxiliary Feedwater initiated due to reactor trip with low Tavg, as required. All control rods inserted properly. Inspections are under way to determine the extent of the debris in the system."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. They will be notifying the State and Local authorities due to noise from the use of steam generator atmospheric reliefs for excess heat removal while the condenser is not available.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 38104
Rep Org: GE NUCLEAR ENERGY
Licensee: GE NUCLEAR ENERGY
Region: 4
City: SAN JOSE State: CA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JASON POST
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Licensee: GE NUCLEAR ENERGY
Region: 4
City: SAN JOSE State: CA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JASON POST
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 06/29/2001
Notification Time: 13:31 [ET]
Event Date: 06/29/2001
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 06/29/2001
Notification Time: 13:31 [ET]
Event Date: 06/29/2001
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 06/29/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4)
RICHARD BARKLEY (R1)
THOMAS DECKER (R2)
GEOFFREY WRIGHT (R3)
VERN HODGE (FAX) (NRR)
GREG PICK (R4)
RICHARD BARKLEY (R1)
THOMAS DECKER (R2)
GEOFFREY WRIGHT (R3)
VERN HODGE (FAX) (NRR)
10 CFR 21 REPORT: STABILITY RELOAD LICENSING CALCULATIONS MAY BE NON-CONSERVATIVE
"This letter provides information concerning the potential for non-conservative reload licensing calculations for plants which have implemented stability detect and suppress trip systems. The non-conservatism could result in (1) Option III stability trip system setpoints which do not provide Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) Safety Limit protection, and (2) inadequate MCPR safety limit protection from the flow-biased Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) flux trip for plants which have implemented Option I-D or Option II. This notification is provided under 10 CFR Part 21(d) as a reportable condition for Hatch Units 1 and 2, and as an interim report per §21.21(a)(2) for the other plants listed in Attachment 1: the full impact of this deviation cannot be completed within 60 days from the date of discovery. Therefore, this notification describes the deviation that is being evaluated by GE Nuclear Energy (GE-NE) for associated safety related reload licensing calculations supplied to licensees by GE-NE and states when the evaluation will be completed.
"In addition, GE-NE does not have the capability to perform the evaluation to determine if a defect exists for plants at which GE-NE is not responsible for stability reload licensing calculations. GE-NE has transferred information pursuant to §21.21(b) to those licensees which are known to be potentially affected.
"GE-NE has informed all BWR utilities of this issue through the BWROG Potential Issues Response Team (PIRT). All potentially affected utilities have been notified. Compensatory action has been taken at the plants which have been determined to be reportable. Additional information is included in this notification and has been provided to the potentially affected licensees so that they can determine if the concern impacts their stability detect and suppress reload licensing calculations."
All GE BWR plants are potentially affected.
"This letter provides information concerning the potential for non-conservative reload licensing calculations for plants which have implemented stability detect and suppress trip systems. The non-conservatism could result in (1) Option III stability trip system setpoints which do not provide Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) Safety Limit protection, and (2) inadequate MCPR safety limit protection from the flow-biased Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) flux trip for plants which have implemented Option I-D or Option II. This notification is provided under 10 CFR Part 21(d) as a reportable condition for Hatch Units 1 and 2, and as an interim report per §21.21(a)(2) for the other plants listed in Attachment 1: the full impact of this deviation cannot be completed within 60 days from the date of discovery. Therefore, this notification describes the deviation that is being evaluated by GE Nuclear Energy (GE-NE) for associated safety related reload licensing calculations supplied to licensees by GE-NE and states when the evaluation will be completed.
"In addition, GE-NE does not have the capability to perform the evaluation to determine if a defect exists for plants at which GE-NE is not responsible for stability reload licensing calculations. GE-NE has transferred information pursuant to §21.21(b) to those licensees which are known to be potentially affected.
"GE-NE has informed all BWR utilities of this issue through the BWROG Potential Issues Response Team (PIRT). All potentially affected utilities have been notified. Compensatory action has been taken at the plants which have been determined to be reportable. Additional information is included in this notification and has been provided to the potentially affected licensees so that they can determine if the concern impacts their stability detect and suppress reload licensing calculations."
All GE BWR plants are potentially affected.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 38114
Rep Org: COLORADO DEPT OF HEALTH
Licensee: KAISER PERMANENTE
Region: 4
City: DENVER State: CO
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TIM BONZER
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Licensee: KAISER PERMANENTE
Region: 4
City: DENVER State: CO
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TIM BONZER
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 07/03/2001
Notification Time: 11:30 [ET]
Event Date: 06/29/2001
Event Time: 00:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 07/03/2001
Notification Time: 11:30 [ET]
Event Date: 06/29/2001
Event Time: 00:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 07/03/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
LINDA HOWELL (R4)
DONALD COOL (NMSS)
LINDA HOWELL (R4)
DONALD COOL (NMSS)
MEDICAL MISADMINISTRATIONS DUE TO INCORRECTLY CALCULATED RADIONUCLIDE ACTIVITIES
The Syncor pharmacy in Denver, CO miscalculated the activity in three doses of I-131 due to the use of incorrect settings on the dose calibrator. Of the three doses, two were delivered to a Kaiser Permanente facility and administered. The two doses were as follows:
Dose 1 was ordered to be 5 mCi to be used for a whole body scan. Syncor believed that 5.28 mCi had been dispensed; however, the actual activity was 7.97 mCi.
Dose 2 was ordered to be 15 mCi to be used for a hyperthyroid treatment. Syncor believed that 15.8 mCi had been dispensed; however, the actual activity was 24 mCi.
The state is currently following this issue with the Kaiser Permanente staff.
The Syncor pharmacy in Denver, CO miscalculated the activity in three doses of I-131 due to the use of incorrect settings on the dose calibrator. Of the three doses, two were delivered to a Kaiser Permanente facility and administered. The two doses were as follows:
Dose 1 was ordered to be 5 mCi to be used for a whole body scan. Syncor believed that 5.28 mCi had been dispensed; however, the actual activity was 7.97 mCi.
Dose 2 was ordered to be 15 mCi to be used for a hyperthyroid treatment. Syncor believed that 15.8 mCi had been dispensed; however, the actual activity was 24 mCi.
The state is currently following this issue with the Kaiser Permanente staff.