Event Notification Report for June 27, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
06/26/2001 - 06/27/2001
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38099
Facility: PERRY
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: BRIAN STETSON
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: BRIAN STETSON
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 06/27/2001
Notification Time: 13:39 [ET]
Event Date: 06/27/2001
Event Time: 11:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/27/2001
Notification Time: 13:39 [ET]
Event Date: 06/27/2001
Event Time: 11:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/27/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
Person (Organization):
GEOFFREY WRIGHT (R3)
JOHN TAPPERT (NRR)
GEOFFREY WRIGHT (R3)
JOHN TAPPERT (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OSCILLATION POWER RANGE MONITOR SCRAM SETPOINTS ARE NON-CONSERVATIVE
"The Plant Staff was notified by General Electric (GE) via a BWR Owners Group conference call today at approximately 1130 that the Oscillation Power Range Monitor (OPRM) instrumentation SCRAM setpoints are non-conservative due to a non-conservative GE analysis. The OPRM instrumentation is an input to the Reactor Protection System. The OPRM instrument is relied on for providing a safe shutdown safety function when operating during an unstable power to flow condition. The OPRM Instrumentation equipment is therefore considered inoperable and is reportable to the NRC law 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system needed to shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition.
"The plant is currently operating within its Technical Specifications 3.3.1.3 Required Action with Off-Normal Instruction (NO C51) procedure as an alternate method to monitor and suppress thermal hydraulic instability oscillations. GE is currently issuing a 10 CFR Part 21 Interim Report and Transfer of Information to formally notify licensees with an evaluation pending."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
"The Plant Staff was notified by General Electric (GE) via a BWR Owners Group conference call today at approximately 1130 that the Oscillation Power Range Monitor (OPRM) instrumentation SCRAM setpoints are non-conservative due to a non-conservative GE analysis. The OPRM instrumentation is an input to the Reactor Protection System. The OPRM instrument is relied on for providing a safe shutdown safety function when operating during an unstable power to flow condition. The OPRM Instrumentation equipment is therefore considered inoperable and is reportable to the NRC law 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system needed to shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition.
"The plant is currently operating within its Technical Specifications 3.3.1.3 Required Action with Off-Normal Instruction (NO C51) procedure as an alternate method to monitor and suppress thermal hydraulic instability oscillations. GE is currently issuing a 10 CFR Part 21 Interim Report and Transfer of Information to formally notify licensees with an evaluation pending."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38100
Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: MIKE MEYER
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: MIKE MEYER
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 06/27/2001
Notification Time: 21:10 [ET]
Event Date: 06/27/2001
Event Time: 18:19 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/28/2001
Notification Time: 21:10 [ET]
Event Date: 06/27/2001
Event Time: 18:19 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/28/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
STEVE REYNOLDS (R3)
STEVE REYNOLDS (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | M/R | Y | 68 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOW PUMP BAY LEVEL
"Unit 2 was manually tripped at 1819 due to low pump bay level (-11 feet) in accordance with AOP-13A, Circulating Water System malfunction. The plant is experiencing an alewife fish kill at this time, which is the cause of the circulating water system problems. The unit 2 MSIVs were manually shut per AOP-13A. Decay heat removal is though the atmospheric steam dumps. The auxfeedwater system activated on an AMSAC signal. There is no primary to secondary leakage on unit 2. N-32 source range failed to energize on the reactor trip. Technical specification 15.3.0 was momentarily entered due to a loss of service water pumps to both units. Pump bay level has been restored."
All control rods full inserted after the trip. The licensee is investigating the cause of the fish kill and the reason the N-32 source range failed to energize.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
* * * UPDATED AT 1518 EDT ON 6/28/01 BY RICK ROBBINS TO FANGIE JONES * * *
"This supplemental notification corrects a mischaracterization reported in EN 38100. The reference to a 'fish kill' was misleading. The condition was actually caused by an unusually large influx of small forager fish at the circ water intake that resulted in blockage of the intake travelling screens.
"To reiterate, PBNP Unit 2 was manually tripped from about 70% power at 1819 on Wednesday, June 27, following a rapid load reduction from 100%. The operations crew entered our Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP) in response to the lowering pump bay level that was caused by this unusually large influx of small fish (alewives). This fish influx overloaded our traveling screens and screen wash system, causing the lowering pump bay level. The AOP directs a reactor trip at -11 feet to ensure the service water system is operated within its design basis. Following the trip and after a circ water pump was secured, the pump bay level recovered to its normal level of about -5 feet.
"Due to the continuing fish influx on the travelling screens, Unit 1 was also affected and its load was reduced to about 80%. One of the Unit 1 circ water pumps was then secured, allowing pump bay level to be maintained at acceptable values. The unit remains stable."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R3DO (Geoffrey Wright) has been notified.
"Unit 2 was manually tripped at 1819 due to low pump bay level (-11 feet) in accordance with AOP-13A, Circulating Water System malfunction. The plant is experiencing an alewife fish kill at this time, which is the cause of the circulating water system problems. The unit 2 MSIVs were manually shut per AOP-13A. Decay heat removal is though the atmospheric steam dumps. The auxfeedwater system activated on an AMSAC signal. There is no primary to secondary leakage on unit 2. N-32 source range failed to energize on the reactor trip. Technical specification 15.3.0 was momentarily entered due to a loss of service water pumps to both units. Pump bay level has been restored."
All control rods full inserted after the trip. The licensee is investigating the cause of the fish kill and the reason the N-32 source range failed to energize.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
* * * UPDATED AT 1518 EDT ON 6/28/01 BY RICK ROBBINS TO FANGIE JONES * * *
"This supplemental notification corrects a mischaracterization reported in EN 38100. The reference to a 'fish kill' was misleading. The condition was actually caused by an unusually large influx of small forager fish at the circ water intake that resulted in blockage of the intake travelling screens.
"To reiterate, PBNP Unit 2 was manually tripped from about 70% power at 1819 on Wednesday, June 27, following a rapid load reduction from 100%. The operations crew entered our Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP) in response to the lowering pump bay level that was caused by this unusually large influx of small fish (alewives). This fish influx overloaded our traveling screens and screen wash system, causing the lowering pump bay level. The AOP directs a reactor trip at -11 feet to ensure the service water system is operated within its design basis. Following the trip and after a circ water pump was secured, the pump bay level recovered to its normal level of about -5 feet.
"Due to the continuing fish influx on the travelling screens, Unit 1 was also affected and its load was reduced to about 80%. One of the Unit 1 circ water pumps was then secured, allowing pump bay level to be maintained at acceptable values. The unit remains stable."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R3DO (Geoffrey Wright) has been notified.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 38101
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: T.E. WHITE
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: T.E. WHITE
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 06/27/2001
Notification Time: 10:00 [ET]
Event Date: 06/27/2001
Event Time: 02:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/27/2001
Notification Time: 10:00 [ET]
Event Date: 06/27/2001
Event Time: 02:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/27/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
STEVE REYNOLDS (R3)
PATRICIA HOLAHAN (NMSS)
STEVE REYNOLDS (R3)
PATRICIA HOLAHAN (NMSS)
BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR REPORT
"At 0200 on 6-27-01, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that during a procedure review for obtaining a UF6 negative on C-335 U/4 C/8, it was discovered that a weekly check for the presence of a fluorinating environment was not performed as required by NCSA CAS.002, Operation of the Uranium Enrichment Cascade, Control 34.11. The purpose of the control is to ensure a fluorinating environment exists without reliance on any administrative controls on the RCW system. Subsequent sampling of the cell determined the presence of UF6."
Because the fluorinating environment was not checked on a weekly basis as required, the second leg of the double contingency was violated.
The NRC Senior Resident has been notified of this event.
"At 0200 on 6-27-01, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that during a procedure review for obtaining a UF6 negative on C-335 U/4 C/8, it was discovered that a weekly check for the presence of a fluorinating environment was not performed as required by NCSA CAS.002, Operation of the Uranium Enrichment Cascade, Control 34.11. The purpose of the control is to ensure a fluorinating environment exists without reliance on any administrative controls on the RCW system. Subsequent sampling of the cell determined the presence of UF6."
Because the fluorinating environment was not checked on a weekly basis as required, the second leg of the double contingency was violated.
The NRC Senior Resident has been notified of this event.