Event Notification Report for June 22, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
06/21/2001 - 06/22/2001
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38087
Facility: HOPE CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: CHRISTOPHER SERATA
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: CHRISTOPHER SERATA
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 06/22/2001
Notification Time: 21:18 [ET]
Event Date: 06/22/2001
Event Time: 13:25 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/22/2001
Notification Time: 21:18 [ET]
Event Date: 06/22/2001
Event Time: 13:25 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/22/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1)
JAMES TRAPP (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LIFTING OF AN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR (EDG) HEAT EXCHANGER COOLING WATER OUTLET RELIEF VALVE DUE TO AN INCORRECT RELIEF SETTING
On 06/22/01 at approximately 1325 hours, the 'C' emergency diesel generator (EDG) heat exchanger cooling water outlet relief valve (1EGPSV2409C) opened when two pumps were operating in the 'A' safety auxiliary's cooling system (SACS) loop. The relief valve reseated when one of the 'A' SACS loop pumps was secured.
This problem was identified when control room personnel noticed that the indicated 'A' SACS loop head tank level was decreasing, and the leak itself was actually located by an equipment operator in the field walking down his building. The licensee reported that the relief valve was open for 38 minutes and that the estimated amount of leakage was approximately 400 gallons. (This relates to approximately 10% in the indicated level band of the 'A' SACS loop head tank, and the indicated level band was reported to be a small range in the entire tank.)
Preliminary investigation indicates that a new relief valve was installed on 06/05/01, and the relief valve installed was set to relieve at 120 pounds instead of the design lift setting of 150 pounds. The initial analysis indicates that following a postulated design basis accident scenario with two SACS pumps operating in the 'A' SACS loop, the 'A' SACS loop could have reached a pressure causing the relief valve to open resulting in draining the 'A' SACS loop head tank and loop inoperability. The inoperability of the 'A' SACS loop would have prevented the 'A' control room emergency filtration unit from performing its design function. At the time of discovery, scheduled maintenance was underway that prevented the 'B' control room emergency filtration unit from performing its design function.
This condition is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident -- specifically, that the operation of systems designed to maintain control room habitability could have been jeopardized.
To prevent additional lifting of the relief valve, the 'A' SACS loop has been placed in a configuration that ensures system pressure will not reach a level at which the relief valve will lift (120 pounds). One pump in the loop has been tagged to prevent automatic starting, and certain flow paths were enabled and established such that they will preclude pressure increasing to 120 pounds. The licensee also checked the same relief valves associated with the other three EDGs and confirmed them to be set at the design pressure (150 pounds).
The evaluation of the relief valve and its impact on 'A' SACS loop operability is continuing. The licensee plans to complete the maintenance on the 'B' control room ventilation train and return it to an operable condition. Then, the licensee plans to isolate and tag the relief valve in order to facilitate repairs.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and plans to notify the Lower Alloways Creek Township.
On 06/22/01 at approximately 1325 hours, the 'C' emergency diesel generator (EDG) heat exchanger cooling water outlet relief valve (1EGPSV2409C) opened when two pumps were operating in the 'A' safety auxiliary's cooling system (SACS) loop. The relief valve reseated when one of the 'A' SACS loop pumps was secured.
This problem was identified when control room personnel noticed that the indicated 'A' SACS loop head tank level was decreasing, and the leak itself was actually located by an equipment operator in the field walking down his building. The licensee reported that the relief valve was open for 38 minutes and that the estimated amount of leakage was approximately 400 gallons. (This relates to approximately 10% in the indicated level band of the 'A' SACS loop head tank, and the indicated level band was reported to be a small range in the entire tank.)
Preliminary investigation indicates that a new relief valve was installed on 06/05/01, and the relief valve installed was set to relieve at 120 pounds instead of the design lift setting of 150 pounds. The initial analysis indicates that following a postulated design basis accident scenario with two SACS pumps operating in the 'A' SACS loop, the 'A' SACS loop could have reached a pressure causing the relief valve to open resulting in draining the 'A' SACS loop head tank and loop inoperability. The inoperability of the 'A' SACS loop would have prevented the 'A' control room emergency filtration unit from performing its design function. At the time of discovery, scheduled maintenance was underway that prevented the 'B' control room emergency filtration unit from performing its design function.
This condition is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident -- specifically, that the operation of systems designed to maintain control room habitability could have been jeopardized.
To prevent additional lifting of the relief valve, the 'A' SACS loop has been placed in a configuration that ensures system pressure will not reach a level at which the relief valve will lift (120 pounds). One pump in the loop has been tagged to prevent automatic starting, and certain flow paths were enabled and established such that they will preclude pressure increasing to 120 pounds. The licensee also checked the same relief valves associated with the other three EDGs and confirmed them to be set at the design pressure (150 pounds).
The evaluation of the relief valve and its impact on 'A' SACS loop operability is continuing. The licensee plans to complete the maintenance on the 'B' control room ventilation train and return it to an operable condition. Then, the licensee plans to isolate and tag the relief valve in order to facilitate repairs.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and plans to notify the Lower Alloways Creek Township.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38086
Facility: BEAVER VALLEY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: A. HARTNER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: A. HARTNER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 06/22/2001
Notification Time: 11:05 [ET]
Event Date: 06/22/2001
Event Time: 09:31 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/22/2001
Notification Time: 11:05 [ET]
Event Date: 06/22/2001
Event Time: 09:31 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/22/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1)
JAMES TRAPP (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
REACTOR MANUALLY TRIPPED DUE TO DEGRADED INSTRUMENT AIR PRESSURE.
The reactor was manually tripped due to degraded Instrument Air pressure resulting in loss of cooling water to the Reactor Coolant pumps. All Reactor Coolant Pumps were secured: Two due to a loss of Component Cooling Water (Supply valves closed) and One due to potential loss of Cooling Water. Natural Circulation has been established with AUX Feed and Main Feed Water available to feed the Steam Generators. Presently the condenser is providing the Heat Sink (steam dumps to the main condenser). Plant is currently stable in Mode 3 (Hot Standby). All rods fully inserted into the core, and all safety systems operated as designed. The cause of degraded Instrument Air pressure is still under investigation. The Instrument Air Header pressure was restored when the Instrument Air dryer was bypassed and isolated. All Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Emergency Diesel Generators are fully operable if needed. The electrical grid is stable. No radiological releases, Reactor Coolant Leaks or steam generator leaks occurred during this event.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
* * * UPDATE ON 6/22/01 @ 1300 BY SENA TO GOULD * * *
The plant is off of natural circulation, the "C" reactor coolant pump was started @ 1120, "A" reactor coolant pump was started @ 1209 and the "B" reactor coolant pump was started @ 1252. The plant is stable and in mode 3.
The NRC Resident will be notified.
Reg 1 RDO(Trapp) was informed.
The reactor was manually tripped due to degraded Instrument Air pressure resulting in loss of cooling water to the Reactor Coolant pumps. All Reactor Coolant Pumps were secured: Two due to a loss of Component Cooling Water (Supply valves closed) and One due to potential loss of Cooling Water. Natural Circulation has been established with AUX Feed and Main Feed Water available to feed the Steam Generators. Presently the condenser is providing the Heat Sink (steam dumps to the main condenser). Plant is currently stable in Mode 3 (Hot Standby). All rods fully inserted into the core, and all safety systems operated as designed. The cause of degraded Instrument Air pressure is still under investigation. The Instrument Air Header pressure was restored when the Instrument Air dryer was bypassed and isolated. All Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Emergency Diesel Generators are fully operable if needed. The electrical grid is stable. No radiological releases, Reactor Coolant Leaks or steam generator leaks occurred during this event.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
* * * UPDATE ON 6/22/01 @ 1300 BY SENA TO GOULD * * *
The plant is off of natural circulation, the "C" reactor coolant pump was started @ 1120, "A" reactor coolant pump was started @ 1209 and the "B" reactor coolant pump was started @ 1252. The plant is stable and in mode 3.
The NRC Resident will be notified.
Reg 1 RDO(Trapp) was informed.