Event Notification Report for June 18, 2001

VITAL BUS SOURCE SEQUENCER ACTIVATED ON LOSS OF NORMAL POWER SUPPLY

"This is a notification of an unplanned automatic actuation of the Unit 1 4.16 kV Sfgds Bus 16 (B-train) source sequencer. Severe weather resulted in an electrical grid disturbance which caused 4.16 kV Bkr CT11-1 to open, subsequently rendering the normal Bus 16 offsite 4.16 kV source (CT11) from 345 kV Bus 1 to Unit 1 to be lost. CT11 transformer is a 13.8 to 4.16 kV step-down transformer. Nothing appears to be wrong with the CT11 transformer. The sequencer operated as designed and transferred Bus 16 to its backup 4.16 kV offsite source (1R).

"Charging and letdown were lost during this transient, and subsequently restored. Two (2) of the 4 Cooling Tower Pumps and associated Cooling Towers were also lost and remain out of service. B train Sfgds Control Room ventilation was also lost during the transient. This resulted in a temporary dual unit 7 day LCO entry per TS 3.13.A.2, which was subsequently exited when the operability of the ventilation system was restored.

"The plant is currently in a Unit 1 7 day LCO per TS 3.7.B2., and investigating the cause of Bkr CT11-1 opening."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

BREAKER CONTROL SWITCHES NOT PROPERLY ALIGNED

"This report is being made under the reporting requirement in 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(vi) to describe an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.

"On June 18, 2001, at approximately 0315, an offsite power supply to two of four emergency buses on both Units 2 and 3 was lost. All four emergency buses automatically transferred to their respective alternate supply per design.

"The restoration procedure subsequently directed the crew to 'green flag' the tripped breakers. The purpose of the procedural step was to align the breaker switch with the actual position of the breaker. The procedure, however, did not direct the crew to 'red flag' the alternate breakers which automatically closed (i.e. match the switch position to the actual breaker position). This created a condition in the electrical logic which would have prevented two of four emergency buses from automatically receiving power from their respective diesel generators in the event of a design basis accident.

"Once discovered, the crew 'red flagged' the alternate breakers and restored diesel generator operability.

"The restoration procedures have been revised to prevent this condition from reoccurring.

"The NRC resident has been informed."

The condition existed for about 3 hours, at which time the breaker switches were placed in the 'red flagged' position as required. An investigation is ongoing to determine the cause of the initial power loss.

PLANT DECLARED AN UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO A TOXIC FUME RELEASE LIMITING ACCESS TO THE AREA

During chemical unloading of sulfuric acid from a truck trailer, excessive acid fumes came from the tank, which was located in the turbine building. The chemistry technician supporting the delivery experienced throat and respiratory irritation and was transported to the hospital for examination. The delivery was stopped at the time of discovery and access to the area has been limited. An investigation as to the cause is in progress. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector and has notified the New Jersey, Delaware and Lower Alloways Creek Township Police Departments.

* * * UPDATE ON 6/18/01 @ 1832 BY MCGREGER TO GOULD * * *

The NOUE was terminated at 1828 since there no longer is any leakage being detected. They believe the leak was from a vent path, since no breech was detected.

The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.

The Reg 1 RDO(Trap), EO(Matthews) and FEMA(Belcher) were notified.