Event Notification Report for May 31, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/30/2001 - 05/31/2001
EVENT NUMBERS
38041
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 38041
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: RICK LARSON
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: RICK LARSON
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 05/31/2001
Notification Time: 16:52 [ET]
Event Date: 05/31/2001
Event Time: 13:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/31/2001
Notification Time: 16:52 [ET]
Event Date: 05/31/2001
Event Time: 13:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/31/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MARK RING (R3)
LARRY CAMPER (NMSS)
MARK RING (R3)
LARRY CAMPER (NMSS)
BULLETIN 91-01 - 24 HOUR REPORT
The licensee, during a review of the plant surveillance program, discovered a surveillance that was supposed to be done every 6 months was missed the last time and is about 6 months overdue.
The following is taken from a faxed report:
At 1330 hrs. the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified that a required surveillance for NCSA 705_040 was not performed in the required periodicity. This surveillance is necessary to ensure that uranium bearing material is not accumulating in the piping due to either precipitating out or through bonding with oil-bearing material which then layers out in the piping. By not performing this surveillance one of the barriers for maintaining double contingency was lost for this operation thus making this a reportable event.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
The surveillance required to perform non-destructive analysis (NDA) on piping of the 705 geometrically safe overhead storage (GSS) was not performed. However, based on the historic evidence as discussed in sections 4.3 and 4.5 of analysis performed for this system it is highly unlikely that material is accumulating in the piping and thus the safety significance of this event is low.
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):
Without measuring a significant amount of material could accumulate in GSS piping and result in an unsafe condition.
CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):
The parameter which was violated during this upset was maintaining the concentration of material in the GSS piping to a safe level through periodic NDA surveillance of various piping in the GSS. It should be noted that the physical integrity of the piping in question (i.e., that containing the uranium-bearing material) was maintained.
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF:
Based on the most recent sampling of solution contained in the GSS the amount of uranium involved is small (approximately 0.0002 grams uranium/liter)
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
Did not perform the required surveillance within the allotted time period.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
Isolated the GSS from other influents at 1335 hrs. Will commence NDA measurements 06/01/01.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the local DOE representative.
The licensee, during a review of the plant surveillance program, discovered a surveillance that was supposed to be done every 6 months was missed the last time and is about 6 months overdue.
The following is taken from a faxed report:
At 1330 hrs. the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified that a required surveillance for NCSA 705_040 was not performed in the required periodicity. This surveillance is necessary to ensure that uranium bearing material is not accumulating in the piping due to either precipitating out or through bonding with oil-bearing material which then layers out in the piping. By not performing this surveillance one of the barriers for maintaining double contingency was lost for this operation thus making this a reportable event.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
The surveillance required to perform non-destructive analysis (NDA) on piping of the 705 geometrically safe overhead storage (GSS) was not performed. However, based on the historic evidence as discussed in sections 4.3 and 4.5 of analysis performed for this system it is highly unlikely that material is accumulating in the piping and thus the safety significance of this event is low.
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):
Without measuring a significant amount of material could accumulate in GSS piping and result in an unsafe condition.
CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):
The parameter which was violated during this upset was maintaining the concentration of material in the GSS piping to a safe level through periodic NDA surveillance of various piping in the GSS. It should be noted that the physical integrity of the piping in question (i.e., that containing the uranium-bearing material) was maintained.
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF:
Based on the most recent sampling of solution contained in the GSS the amount of uranium involved is small (approximately 0.0002 grams uranium/liter)
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
Did not perform the required surveillance within the allotted time period.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
Isolated the GSS from other influents at 1335 hrs. Will commence NDA measurements 06/01/01.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the local DOE representative.