Event Notification Report for May 24, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/23/2001 - 05/24/2001
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 38031
Rep Org: TRISTATE INSPECTION AND CONSULTANTS
Licensee: TRISTATE INSPECTION AND CONSULTANTS
Region: 3
City: FLINT State: MI
County: GENESEE
License #: 37-19640-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PAT DURKIN
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Licensee: TRISTATE INSPECTION AND CONSULTANTS
Region: 3
City: FLINT State: MI
County: GENESEE
License #: 37-19640-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PAT DURKIN
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 05/25/2001
Notification Time: 10:15 [ET]
Event Date: 05/24/2001
Event Time: 21:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/25/2001
Notification Time: 10:15 [ET]
Event Date: 05/24/2001
Event Time: 21:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/25/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
SONIA BURGESS (R3)
JOHN KINNEMAN (R1)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
SONIA BURGESS (R3)
JOHN KINNEMAN (R1)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
SOURCE HANG-UP AT A TRISTATE INSPECTION AND CONSULTANTS TEMPORARY JOB SITE IN HOMER CITY, PENNSYLVANIA
The licensee reported that there was a source hang-up at a temporary job site in Homer City, Pennsylvania. The radiography camera involved was an Amersham-660B which contained a 52-curie iridium-192 source.
When the source hang-up occurred, the crew involved (two radiographers) secured the area and notified an AEA Technologies Retrieval Team. Prior to the Retrieval Team's arrival, the Tristate crew (with assistance from other workers) was able to successfully shield the guide tube, straighten it out, and retrieve the source to its shielded position. As a result, the AEA Technologies Retrieval Team was not required.
A pocket dosimeter for one of the original two crew members when off scale at some point during the process, but it was also reported that the radiographer had dropped it two exposures prior to this one. He then noticed that the dose had increased by 10 millirem, but it remained on scale. It was later re-zeroed, and it was still approximately 10 millirem high. The second radiographer's total dose was 85 millirem.
The licensee plans to send the dosimetry out for analysis today. The licensee also plans to return the camera to Amersham for possible repairs.
(Call the NRC operations officer for a licensee contact telephone number.)
The licensee reported that there was a source hang-up at a temporary job site in Homer City, Pennsylvania. The radiography camera involved was an Amersham-660B which contained a 52-curie iridium-192 source.
When the source hang-up occurred, the crew involved (two radiographers) secured the area and notified an AEA Technologies Retrieval Team. Prior to the Retrieval Team's arrival, the Tristate crew (with assistance from other workers) was able to successfully shield the guide tube, straighten it out, and retrieve the source to its shielded position. As a result, the AEA Technologies Retrieval Team was not required.
A pocket dosimeter for one of the original two crew members when off scale at some point during the process, but it was also reported that the radiographer had dropped it two exposures prior to this one. He then noticed that the dose had increased by 10 millirem, but it remained on scale. It was later re-zeroed, and it was still approximately 10 millirem high. The second radiographer's total dose was 85 millirem.
The licensee plans to send the dosimetry out for analysis today. The licensee also plans to return the camera to Amersham for possible repairs.
(Call the NRC operations officer for a licensee contact telephone number.)
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38033
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL CONWAY
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL CONWAY
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 05/25/2001
Notification Time: 18:36 [ET]
Event Date: 05/24/2001
Event Time: 20:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/25/2001
Notification Time: 18:36 [ET]
Event Date: 05/24/2001
Event Time: 20:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/25/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JOHN KINNEMAN (R1)
JOHN KINNEMAN (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 87 | Power Operation |
24-HOUR REPORT MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE
"On 5/24/01 at 2015 hrs, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 experienced a sudden failure on the control circuitry of one of two Reactor Recirculation System flow control valves. The failure mechanism of the 'B' flow control valve produced reactor core flow changes in both the increase and decrease directions which had a resultant effect of raising and lowering reactor power. At the time of the failure, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 was operating at 100% power. The core flow changes occurred within a ninety second period and changed neutron flux (APRM) by approximately 30 to 40%. Plant conditions were stabilized by hydraulically locking the malfunctioning flow control valve in a stable position. Reactor Power is now 87% of rated. No Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) violations are known to have occurred.
"This report is being made as required by the Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Facility Operating License #NPF-69 section 2.F. During this event, Reactor Power may have nominally exceeded 102% of rated for several seconds. As such, this event is required to be reported to the NRC Operations Center within 24 hrs as a violation of License section 2.C(1) Maximum Power Level. Event analysis is continuing and may result in retraction of this notification at a later date."
The licensee will inform the NRC resident inspector of this notification.
"On 5/24/01 at 2015 hrs, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 experienced a sudden failure on the control circuitry of one of two Reactor Recirculation System flow control valves. The failure mechanism of the 'B' flow control valve produced reactor core flow changes in both the increase and decrease directions which had a resultant effect of raising and lowering reactor power. At the time of the failure, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 was operating at 100% power. The core flow changes occurred within a ninety second period and changed neutron flux (APRM) by approximately 30 to 40%. Plant conditions were stabilized by hydraulically locking the malfunctioning flow control valve in a stable position. Reactor Power is now 87% of rated. No Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) violations are known to have occurred.
"This report is being made as required by the Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Facility Operating License #NPF-69 section 2.F. During this event, Reactor Power may have nominally exceeded 102% of rated for several seconds. As such, this event is required to be reported to the NRC Operations Center within 24 hrs as a violation of License section 2.C(1) Maximum Power Level. Event analysis is continuing and may result in retraction of this notification at a later date."
The licensee will inform the NRC resident inspector of this notification.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38029
Facility: DUANE ARNOLD
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MIKE HAUNER
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MIKE HAUNER
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 05/24/2001
Notification Time: 21:50 [ET]
Event Date: 05/24/2001
Event Time: 18:09 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 12/10/2001
Notification Time: 21:50 [ET]
Event Date: 05/24/2001
Event Time: 18:09 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 12/10/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
SONIA BURGESS (R3)
SONIA BURGESS (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 1 | Startup | 1 | Startup |
HPCI DECLARED INOPERABLE
"During a reactor startup following a refueling outage, HPCI was declared inoperable and is reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) and 50.72(b)(3)(vi) as a single failure.
"Upon completion of HPCI system operability testing, it was discovered that the HPCI system flow controller indicated approximately 500 GPM verses an expected 0 GPM. Since the plant is in MODE 2 and reactor pressure is greater than 150 PSIG, HPCI was declared inoperable and a 14-day LCO was entered per TS 3.5.1, condition F.
"The preliminary investigation results are that air in the HPCI system flow transmitter sensing lines is causing the erroneous flow indication. Troubleshooting efforts are in progress."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.
***** RETRACTION FROM JOHN KARRICK TO LEIGH TROCINE AT 1536 EDT ON 12/10/01 *****
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"This is a retraction of event number 38029 from May 24, 2001. The initial report involved an erroneous reading on the flow-indicating controller (FIC-2309) for the HPCI system. At the time of the discovery, the consequence of FIC-2309 reading high was believed to be a non-conservative speed demand signal to the HPCI turbine such that the actual HPCI injection flow would fall short of that required (assuming an auto start with no operator action). As a result, HPCI was declared inoperable and a report was made. A calculation has since concluded that actual HPCI operability would not have been lost given the as-found condition. Also, the quarterly surveillance test to prove HPCI operability had just been successfully completed. During the time HPCI was considered inoperable, it remained available for use (as documented in Operator logs). Therefore, there was no actual loss of HPCI as a single train safety system and there was no event or condition that could have prevented safety function fulfillment. This event is being retracted. A formal cancellation letter to withdraw the LER (331/2001-002) is also being mailed."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Anne Marie Stone).
"During a reactor startup following a refueling outage, HPCI was declared inoperable and is reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) and 50.72(b)(3)(vi) as a single failure.
"Upon completion of HPCI system operability testing, it was discovered that the HPCI system flow controller indicated approximately 500 GPM verses an expected 0 GPM. Since the plant is in MODE 2 and reactor pressure is greater than 150 PSIG, HPCI was declared inoperable and a 14-day LCO was entered per TS 3.5.1, condition F.
"The preliminary investigation results are that air in the HPCI system flow transmitter sensing lines is causing the erroneous flow indication. Troubleshooting efforts are in progress."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.
***** RETRACTION FROM JOHN KARRICK TO LEIGH TROCINE AT 1536 EDT ON 12/10/01 *****
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"This is a retraction of event number 38029 from May 24, 2001. The initial report involved an erroneous reading on the flow-indicating controller (FIC-2309) for the HPCI system. At the time of the discovery, the consequence of FIC-2309 reading high was believed to be a non-conservative speed demand signal to the HPCI turbine such that the actual HPCI injection flow would fall short of that required (assuming an auto start with no operator action). As a result, HPCI was declared inoperable and a report was made. A calculation has since concluded that actual HPCI operability would not have been lost given the as-found condition. Also, the quarterly surveillance test to prove HPCI operability had just been successfully completed. During the time HPCI was considered inoperable, it remained available for use (as documented in Operator logs). Therefore, there was no actual loss of HPCI as a single train safety system and there was no event or condition that could have prevented safety function fulfillment. This event is being retracted. A formal cancellation letter to withdraw the LER (331/2001-002) is also being mailed."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Anne Marie Stone).