Event Notification Report for May 20, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/19/2001 - 05/20/2001
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38015
Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RAAB
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RAAB
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 05/20/2001
Notification Time: 06:31 [ET]
Event Date: 05/20/2001
Event Time: 00:56 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 05/20/2001
Notification Time: 06:31 [ET]
Event Date: 05/20/2001
Event Time: 00:56 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 05/20/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
DURING SURVEILLANCE TESTING THE AUTO TRANSFER TO STARTUP POWER FAILED TO PICK UP A VITAL BUS.
During performance of Part 2 of surveillance test procedures M-13H (4kV Bus H Non-SI Auto Transfer Test) the auto transfer to startup power failed to pick up the bus when the auxiliary feeder breaker was opened. This was a result of the startup feeder breaker being in the test position. This resulted in the 4kV and 480 V bus H being de-energized. For this test diesel generator 2-2 is in manual and it did not load to the bus. With the dead bus the procedure contains a contingency to return diesel generator 2-2 to auto to re-energize bus H. This was done. This was a valid actuation of a diesel generator auto start due to bus undervoltage. Power was lost to bus H for about one minute, no important vital loads were lost and RHR was powered from a different vital bus.
Surveillance test procedure M-13H is divided into four parts. The surveillance test procedure assumes that you perform parts 1,2, 3, and 4 in order. Part 1 of the surveillance was done 2 days ago. Part 1 placed the startup feeder breaker in the test position. Later parts 3 and 4 of the surveillance test procedure were performed. Nothing in parts 3 or 4 of the surveillance test procedure took the startup feeder breaker out of its test position. When part 2 of the surveillance test procedure was performed it has the testing personnel look at the control panel to verify that the startup feeder breaker is racked in. With the breaker in test the control board looks exactly the same as if the breaker was racked in. There should have been something to state that the breaker was in test but it was not done.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
During performance of Part 2 of surveillance test procedures M-13H (4kV Bus H Non-SI Auto Transfer Test) the auto transfer to startup power failed to pick up the bus when the auxiliary feeder breaker was opened. This was a result of the startup feeder breaker being in the test position. This resulted in the 4kV and 480 V bus H being de-energized. For this test diesel generator 2-2 is in manual and it did not load to the bus. With the dead bus the procedure contains a contingency to return diesel generator 2-2 to auto to re-energize bus H. This was done. This was a valid actuation of a diesel generator auto start due to bus undervoltage. Power was lost to bus H for about one minute, no important vital loads were lost and RHR was powered from a different vital bus.
Surveillance test procedure M-13H is divided into four parts. The surveillance test procedure assumes that you perform parts 1,2, 3, and 4 in order. Part 1 of the surveillance was done 2 days ago. Part 1 placed the startup feeder breaker in the test position. Later parts 3 and 4 of the surveillance test procedure were performed. Nothing in parts 3 or 4 of the surveillance test procedure took the startup feeder breaker out of its test position. When part 2 of the surveillance test procedure was performed it has the testing personnel look at the control panel to verify that the startup feeder breaker is racked in. With the breaker in test the control board looks exactly the same as if the breaker was racked in. There should have been something to state that the breaker was in test but it was not done.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 38016
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: M. C. MAURER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: M. C. MAURER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 05/20/2001
Notification Time: 10:47 [ET]
Event Date: 05/20/2001
Event Time: 03:56 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/23/2001
Notification Time: 10:47 [ET]
Event Date: 05/20/2001
Event Time: 03:56 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/23/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
GARY SHEAR (R3)
JOHN GREEVES (NMSS)
GARY SHEAR (R3)
JOHN GREEVES (NMSS)
VALID HIGH LEVEL DRAIN SECONDARY ALARM
At 0356 on 05/20/01, the PSS office was notified that a High Level Drain Secondary alarm was received on the C-360 position 1 (autoclave 1) Autoclave Water Inventory Control System (WICS). The WICS system is required to be operable while heating in mode 5 (heat mode) according to TSR 2.2.4.2. The autoclave was checked according to the alarm response procedure and the alarm was determined to be due to a valid signal. The autoclave was removed from service and the Water Inventory Control System was declared inoperable by the Plant Shift Superintendent. Autoclave # 1 was removed from service and is inoperable.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the certificate holder.
* * * UPDATE ON 5/23/01 @ 1709 BY BEASLEY TO GOULD * * * RETRACTION
THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. Following the WICS activation, System Engineering lead a troubleshooting effort by Instrument and Control Maintenance and Operations personnel. This included inspection of the drain, testing of the WICS system using the approved autoclave functional test procedure, and a review of the recorded system data. This effort concluded that the actuation was initiated by an invalid signal from the secondary condensate probe. Testing indicated that the sensitivity band of the secondary probe had shifted in the conservative direction and alarmed without the presence of water. Based on the conclusion that the actuation was caused by an invalid signal and not a condition the WICS is designed to protect against, the reporting criteria is not met. Therefore the subject notification is being retracted.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
Reg 3 RDO(Burgess) and NMSS EO(Essig) were informed.
At 0356 on 05/20/01, the PSS office was notified that a High Level Drain Secondary alarm was received on the C-360 position 1 (autoclave 1) Autoclave Water Inventory Control System (WICS). The WICS system is required to be operable while heating in mode 5 (heat mode) according to TSR 2.2.4.2. The autoclave was checked according to the alarm response procedure and the alarm was determined to be due to a valid signal. The autoclave was removed from service and the Water Inventory Control System was declared inoperable by the Plant Shift Superintendent. Autoclave # 1 was removed from service and is inoperable.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the certificate holder.
* * * UPDATE ON 5/23/01 @ 1709 BY BEASLEY TO GOULD * * * RETRACTION
THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. Following the WICS activation, System Engineering lead a troubleshooting effort by Instrument and Control Maintenance and Operations personnel. This included inspection of the drain, testing of the WICS system using the approved autoclave functional test procedure, and a review of the recorded system data. This effort concluded that the actuation was initiated by an invalid signal from the secondary condensate probe. Testing indicated that the sensitivity band of the secondary probe had shifted in the conservative direction and alarmed without the presence of water. Based on the conclusion that the actuation was caused by an invalid signal and not a condition the WICS is designed to protect against, the reporting criteria is not met. Therefore the subject notification is being retracted.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
Reg 3 RDO(Burgess) and NMSS EO(Essig) were informed.