Event Notification Report for April 04, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/03/2001 - 04/04/2001
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37889
Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: DAVE WILLIAMS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: DAVE WILLIAMS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 04/04/2001
Notification Time: 10:50 [ET]
Event Date: 04/04/2001
Event Time: 10:12 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/04/2001
Notification Time: 10:50 [ET]
Event Date: 04/04/2001
Event Time: 10:12 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/04/2001
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
Person (Organization):
KEN BARR (R2)
TAD MARSH (NRR)
RICHARD WESSMAN (IRO)
GARY BELCHER (FEMA)
KEN BARR (R2)
TAD MARSH (NRR)
RICHARD WESSMAN (IRO)
GARY BELCHER (FEMA)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE >10 GPM AS OBSERVED FROM CONTROL ROOM INDICATIONS
"EMERGENCY PLAN ENTRY DUE TO CONTROL ROOM INDICATION OF REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE GREATER THAN 10 GPM. IT APPEARS THAT SHUTDOWN COOLING RELIEF VALVE V-3483 LIFTED WHILE ATTEMPTING TO PLACE '1A' TRAIN OF SHUTDOWN COOLING IN SERVICE. WHEN V-3481, HOT LEG SUCTION VALVE, WAS OPENED, APPROXIMATELY 300 GALLONS OF REACTOR COOLANT WAS DIVERTED TO A HOLDUP TANK OVER A PERIOD OF 2 MINUTES. THE LEAK, ESTIMATED AT 150 GPM, WAS ISOLATED BY CLOSING HOT LEG SUCTION VALVE V-3480. AN UNUSUAL EVENT WAS ENTERED AND TERMINATED IMMEDIATELY AT 1012 HOURS AS THE LEAK HAD BEEN TERMINATED AT THE TIME OF THE NOTIFICATION.
"THIS EVENT IS SIMILAR TO EVENT #37882."
RCS PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE IS CURRENTLY 260 PSIG AND 250 DEGREES F, RESPECTIVELY. THE RELIEF VALVE SETPOINT IS 330 PSIG. FOLLOWING THE PREVIOUS EVENT, THE RELIEF VALVE V-3483 WAS REMOVED AND BENCH TESTED WITH NO ABNORMALITIES RELATED TO THE SETPOINT PRESSURE FOUND. PRESENTLY, THERE ARE TWO (2) RCPs RUNNING WITH A THIRD AVAILABLE AND THE "1B" SHUTDOWN COOLING TRAIN IN SERVICE. THE LICENSEE PER A PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENT INVOLVING LOW PRESSURE OPERATION OF THE RCPs (RCP SEAL PROTECTION) IS IN A 12 HOUR TIME PERIOD ENDING AT 1600 HOURS. THE CURRENT PLANS ARE TO INCREASE RCS PRESSURE TO GREATER THAN 350 PSIG. BOTH STEAM GENERATORS ARE AVAILABLE TO REMOVE DECAY HEAT. UNIT 1 HAS BEEN SHUTDOWN FOR APPROXIMATELY 50 HOURS. AN EVENT RESPONSE TEAM HAS BEEN ASSEMBLED TO RECOMMEND APPROPRIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF AN INVESTIGATION.
THE LICENSEE INFORMED STATE/LOCAL AGENCIES AND THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.
"EMERGENCY PLAN ENTRY DUE TO CONTROL ROOM INDICATION OF REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE GREATER THAN 10 GPM. IT APPEARS THAT SHUTDOWN COOLING RELIEF VALVE V-3483 LIFTED WHILE ATTEMPTING TO PLACE '1A' TRAIN OF SHUTDOWN COOLING IN SERVICE. WHEN V-3481, HOT LEG SUCTION VALVE, WAS OPENED, APPROXIMATELY 300 GALLONS OF REACTOR COOLANT WAS DIVERTED TO A HOLDUP TANK OVER A PERIOD OF 2 MINUTES. THE LEAK, ESTIMATED AT 150 GPM, WAS ISOLATED BY CLOSING HOT LEG SUCTION VALVE V-3480. AN UNUSUAL EVENT WAS ENTERED AND TERMINATED IMMEDIATELY AT 1012 HOURS AS THE LEAK HAD BEEN TERMINATED AT THE TIME OF THE NOTIFICATION.
"THIS EVENT IS SIMILAR TO EVENT #37882."
RCS PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE IS CURRENTLY 260 PSIG AND 250 DEGREES F, RESPECTIVELY. THE RELIEF VALVE SETPOINT IS 330 PSIG. FOLLOWING THE PREVIOUS EVENT, THE RELIEF VALVE V-3483 WAS REMOVED AND BENCH TESTED WITH NO ABNORMALITIES RELATED TO THE SETPOINT PRESSURE FOUND. PRESENTLY, THERE ARE TWO (2) RCPs RUNNING WITH A THIRD AVAILABLE AND THE "1B" SHUTDOWN COOLING TRAIN IN SERVICE. THE LICENSEE PER A PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENT INVOLVING LOW PRESSURE OPERATION OF THE RCPs (RCP SEAL PROTECTION) IS IN A 12 HOUR TIME PERIOD ENDING AT 1600 HOURS. THE CURRENT PLANS ARE TO INCREASE RCS PRESSURE TO GREATER THAN 350 PSIG. BOTH STEAM GENERATORS ARE AVAILABLE TO REMOVE DECAY HEAT. UNIT 1 HAS BEEN SHUTDOWN FOR APPROXIMATELY 50 HOURS. AN EVENT RESPONSE TEAM HAS BEEN ASSEMBLED TO RECOMMEND APPROPRIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF AN INVESTIGATION.
THE LICENSEE INFORMED STATE/LOCAL AGENCIES AND THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 37890
Rep Org: ALABAMA RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: JACKSON PAVING AND CONSTRUCTION, INC.
Region: 2
City: SCOTTSBORO State: AL
County:
License #: 1167
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES McNEES
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Licensee: JACKSON PAVING AND CONSTRUCTION, INC.
Region: 2
City: SCOTTSBORO State: AL
County:
License #: 1167
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES McNEES
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 04/04/2001
Notification Time: 17:32 [ET]
Event Date: 04/04/2001
Event Time: 07:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/04/2001
Notification Time: 17:32 [ET]
Event Date: 04/04/2001
Event Time: 07:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/04/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
KEN BARR (R2)
LARRY CAMPER (NMSS)
KEN BARR (R2)
LARRY CAMPER (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT CONCERNING STOLEN GAUGE
"On the morning of April 4, 2001, the Alabama Office of Radiation Control was advised that a CPN model AC-2 asphalt content gauge (serial number A29099099) had been stolen from the facilities of Jackson Paving and Construction, Inc. located in Scottsboro, AL. Jackson Paving and Construction, Inc. is authorized to possess and use the device under Alabama Radioactive Material License No. 1167. The device contains 100 millicuries of Am-241/Be and the theft was discovered at approximately 7:00 am CDT on April 4, 2001. Along with the gauge, other items such as a generator, torches, radio, etc. were also stolen. The theft is being investigated by the Scottsboro City Police. The device was not in the transport container at the time of the theft.
"The licensee's building located in Skyline, Alabama was also broken into and the two incidents may or may not be related. Local Emergency Management Agency personnel were advised to inform the Jackson County Sheriff and local police that stolen radioactive devices are typically abandoned quickly by the thief because they have no sale value."
"On the morning of April 4, 2001, the Alabama Office of Radiation Control was advised that a CPN model AC-2 asphalt content gauge (serial number A29099099) had been stolen from the facilities of Jackson Paving and Construction, Inc. located in Scottsboro, AL. Jackson Paving and Construction, Inc. is authorized to possess and use the device under Alabama Radioactive Material License No. 1167. The device contains 100 millicuries of Am-241/Be and the theft was discovered at approximately 7:00 am CDT on April 4, 2001. Along with the gauge, other items such as a generator, torches, radio, etc. were also stolen. The theft is being investigated by the Scottsboro City Police. The device was not in the transport container at the time of the theft.
"The licensee's building located in Skyline, Alabama was also broken into and the two incidents may or may not be related. Local Emergency Management Agency personnel were advised to inform the Jackson County Sheriff and local police that stolen radioactive devices are typically abandoned quickly by the thief because they have no sale value."
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 37891
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: JIM McCLEERY
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: JIM McCLEERY
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 04/04/2001
Notification Time: 18:35 [ET]
Event Date: 04/04/2001
Event Time: 08:27 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/04/2001
Notification Time: 18:35 [ET]
Event Date: 04/04/2001
Event Time: 08:27 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/04/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL JORDAN (R3)
LARRY CAMPER (NMSS)
MICHAEL JORDAN (R3)
LARRY CAMPER (NMSS)
NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR REPORT
The following is a portion of a faxed report:
"At 0827 Pressure in 33-5-4 was found to be 13.80 psia. The pressure requirement in 33-5-4 is 14 psia when not in a fluorinating environment as required in NCSA PLANT 333-15.A05. The Plant Shift Superintendent directed the facility to enter an anomalous condition. Pressure was regained in the equipment and the facility exited the anomalous condition."
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:"
"Safety significance of this event is low. The deposit size in the cell is less than H/U=4 safe mass and the cell is isolated from the operating cascade. If the unbuffered condition were permitted to continue for a long period of time, the H/U of the deposit could eventually reach a maximum of 4. However, since the mass of the deposit is known to be less than or equal to the safe mass at H/U=4, a criticality could not occur."
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):"
"For a criticality to occur the deposit in the cell would have to be moderated the mass of the deposit would have to increase and the deposit would have to be reflected."
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):"
"Mass and Moderation"
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):"
"The estimated enrichment of the cell is 1.27% U-235, the mass is less than safe mass."
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:"
"The NCS control was a dry air buffer to >14 psia. The control was established by pressuring the cell to 16.5 psia. The cell was found to be at 13.8 psia."
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:"
"The cell was restored to a pressure >14 psia at 0850."
Portsmouth personnel notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the DOE representative.
The following is a portion of a faxed report:
"At 0827 Pressure in 33-5-4 was found to be 13.80 psia. The pressure requirement in 33-5-4 is 14 psia when not in a fluorinating environment as required in NCSA PLANT 333-15.A05. The Plant Shift Superintendent directed the facility to enter an anomalous condition. Pressure was regained in the equipment and the facility exited the anomalous condition."
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:"
"Safety significance of this event is low. The deposit size in the cell is less than H/U=4 safe mass and the cell is isolated from the operating cascade. If the unbuffered condition were permitted to continue for a long period of time, the H/U of the deposit could eventually reach a maximum of 4. However, since the mass of the deposit is known to be less than or equal to the safe mass at H/U=4, a criticality could not occur."
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):"
"For a criticality to occur the deposit in the cell would have to be moderated the mass of the deposit would have to increase and the deposit would have to be reflected."
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):"
"Mass and Moderation"
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):"
"The estimated enrichment of the cell is 1.27% U-235, the mass is less than safe mass."
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:"
"The NCS control was a dry air buffer to >14 psia. The control was established by pressuring the cell to 16.5 psia. The cell was found to be at 13.8 psia."
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:"
"The cell was restored to a pressure >14 psia at 0850."
Portsmouth personnel notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the DOE representative.