Event Notification Report for March 29, 2001

HIGH LEVEL CONDENSATE PROBES ACTIVATED ON AUTOCLAVE #4

At 1045 hours on 03/29/01, both the "A" and "B" High Level Condensate probes activated on Autoclave #4 in the X-344 UF6 Sampling Facility causing a High Condensate Alarm. The activation of either of these probes will cause the autoclave steam supply valves ( "Q" components) to actuate (close). The steam supply valves closed, as designed, autoclave #4 was in TSR Mode II (HEATING) at the time of the alarm activation. Operations personnel immediately responded to the alarm in accordance with the approved Alarm Response Procedures. The alarm reset when operations personnel drained excess condensate from autoclave drain line, and then acknowledged the alarm at the local autoclave control panel. All autoclave (and cylinder) operating parameters were determined to be within normal ranges. Autoclave #4 was placed in TSR mode VII (Shutdown) by operations personnel and declared inoperable by the Plant Shift Superintendent. Based on the actuation of both High Level Condensate probes, this event is being reported as a valid safety system actuation, a 24 hour NRC event. An Engineering Evaluation has been requested to investigate the circumstances surrounding this safety actuation.

The DOE Representative will be informed. Reg 3 (Monty Phillips) was notified.

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT BYPASS LEAKAGE FAILED TO MEET ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

During the reportability review of Condition Report 01-1582 it was identified that a degraded condition had existed that is required to be reported per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii). It was confirmed that Secondary Containment Bypass leakage did not meet the acceptance criteria of less than or equal to 0.0504 La for Type B and C LLRTs. Specifically the minimum pathway leakage limit is 4340 sccm, however, the as found value was 20,653 sccm (adjusted for instrument accuracy). The dominant leakage (18,110 sccm) was from the High Pressure Core Spray Valve 1 E22-F0012, packing. The penetration for this system credits the 1 E22-F0012 (located outside Containment) as the inboard barrier and the closed system as the outboard barrier, therefore, packing leakage in this case results in minimum pathway leakage. The plant was in Refuel Outage 8 when the leakage was identified. The valve has since been repacked and the current leakage is within limits.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.

* * * RETRACTED AT 0945 EDT ON 4/25/01 BY THOMAS VEITCH TO FANGIE JONES * * *

The licensee is retracting this event notification. After review of the event, it has been determined that the net leakage is within the limits of Technical Specification acceptance criteria of less than or equal to 0.0504 La for Type B and C LLRTs.

"Subsequent to the event notification, it has been determined that the mechanical joint leakage associated with ECCS lines are accounted for in the Primary Coolant Sources Outside Containment program and are not included in the Secondary Containment Bypass Leakage totals due to being closed loop systems outside containment. The result of the net leakage has been determined not to exceed the Technical Specification limit and therefore this condition is not reportable and ENF 37873 is retracted."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R3DO (Thomas Kozak) has been notified.

PART 21 - AN INCORRECT COMPUTER CODE WAS SUPPLIED BY FRAMATOME TO FOUR LICENSEES
FOR CALCULATION OF THE MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)

In the performance of the analysis used to establish the MCPR operating limits, the use of an inappropriate reference temperature resulted in an overprediction of the thermal conductivity of the fuel. This overprediction produced MCPR operating limits that were lower than they should have been. Therefore, the MCPR limits must be raised by up to 0.01 or 0.02, depending on the affected power plants.

The MCPR must be raised by up to 0.01 from the limits previously provided for Dresden Units 2 and 3, and for Quad Cities Units 1 and 2. The MCPR limits for LaSalle Units 1 and 2 must be revised by up to 0.01 for power levels of 60 percent and above and by up to 002 below 60 percent. Calculations for Susquehanna Units 1 and 2 were affected but the MCPR limits were unchanged. Continued compliance with the over-pressurization criteria specified by the ASME code has been demonstrated.

All units, including Susquehanna, have been notified. Compensatory measures have been provided to the affected plants until confirmatory analyses have been completed. The appropriate reference temperature has been installed in the computer code used for the MCPR analysis.

LOSS OF 6 EMERGENCY PLAN SIRENS

The licensee had a problem with the 69 kV power grid in southern Coffey County, which in turn caused the loss of 6 emergency plan sirens at 0220 CST on 3/29/01. At 0320 CST, the criteria for making a 10 CFR 50.72 report on a major loss of emergency communications was met. At 0432 CST the sirens were restored to normal operation.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.