Event Notification Report for March 19, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/18/2001 - 03/19/2001
EVENT NUMBERS
37848378493785037851
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37848
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ROBINSON
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ROBINSON
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 03/19/2001
Notification Time: 10:44 [ET]
Event Date: 03/19/2001
Event Time: 08:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/19/2001
Notification Time: 10:44 [ET]
Event Date: 03/19/2001
Event Time: 08:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/19/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
KENNETH JENISON (R1)
KENNETH JENISON (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
SECONDARY CONTAINMENT BYPASS LEAKAGE RATE WAS EXCEEDED
"With Unit 2 in Mode 5 on the 10th day of its 10th Refuel and Inspection Outage, it has been determined that the Secondary Containment Bypass Leakage (SCBL) rate criteria of 9 scfh has been exceeded. During performance of Local Leak Rate Test SE-259-045, a leakage rate of 3,838 sccm was recorded for the Division 2 RHR Drywell Spray Containment Isolation Valve HV251F016B. With this leak rate, the Min Path SCBL leak rate was calculated to be 4,312 sccm (or 9.14 scfh). This leak rate exceeds the Technical Specification 3.6.1.3 criteria of 9 scfh for SCBL. They will rework the valve and retest."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
"With Unit 2 in Mode 5 on the 10th day of its 10th Refuel and Inspection Outage, it has been determined that the Secondary Containment Bypass Leakage (SCBL) rate criteria of 9 scfh has been exceeded. During performance of Local Leak Rate Test SE-259-045, a leakage rate of 3,838 sccm was recorded for the Division 2 RHR Drywell Spray Containment Isolation Valve HV251F016B. With this leak rate, the Min Path SCBL leak rate was calculated to be 4,312 sccm (or 9.14 scfh). This leak rate exceeds the Technical Specification 3.6.1.3 criteria of 9 scfh for SCBL. They will rework the valve and retest."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37849
Facility: TURKEY POINT
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [4] []
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: TODD YOUNG
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [4] []
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: TODD YOUNG
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 03/19/2001
Notification Time: 11:10 [ET]
Event Date: 03/19/2001
Event Time: 10:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/19/2001
Notification Time: 11:10 [ET]
Event Date: 03/19/2001
Event Time: 10:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/19/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
73.71(b)(1) - SAFEGUARDS REPORTS
10 CFR Section:
73.71(b)(1) - SAFEGUARDS REPORTS
Person (Organization):
ROBERT HAAG (R2)
ROBERT HAAG (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 4 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
SECURITY REPORT
UNESCORTED ACCESS GRANTED INAPPROPRIATELY. IMMEDIATE COMPENSATORY MEASURES TAKEN UPON DISCOVERY. THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR HAS BEEN INFORMED.
UNESCORTED ACCESS GRANTED INAPPROPRIATELY. IMMEDIATE COMPENSATORY MEASURES TAKEN UPON DISCOVERY. THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR HAS BEEN INFORMED.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37850
Facility: VERMONT YANKEE
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JAMES KRITZER
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JAMES KRITZER
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 03/19/2001
Notification Time: 14:22 [ET]
Event Date: 03/19/2001
Event Time: 12:32 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/20/2001
Notification Time: 14:22 [ET]
Event Date: 03/19/2001
Event Time: 12:32 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/20/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
KENNETH JENISON (R1)
KENNETH JENISON (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
REACTOR SCRAM
On 3/19/2001, at 1232 a reactor scram signal was received, all rods inserted after the scram. Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) water level dropped below 127" (normal water level is about 160") which actuated primary containment isolation signals for groups 2, 3 and 5. RPV water level is being controlled by feedwater and RPV pressure control is via turbine bypass valves. The plant is stable. The cause of the reactor scram is under investigation.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and will notify the state authorities. A press release may be issued.
* * * UPDATE AT 1257 ON 3/20/01, BY KRITZER RECEIVED BY WEAVER * * *
"The cause of the 3/19/2001 scram has been determined to be faulty auxiliary contacts in Reactor Protection System (RPS) relay 5A-K13D. The auxiliary contacts failed to open during reset of a ½ scram condition on the RPS "B" auto scram channel inserted during surveillance testing earlier in the shift. There were no means available to the operators to detect this failure. Subsequent surveillance testing of RPS "A" inserted a ½ scram on RPS "A" auto scram channel which resulted in the energization of backup scram valve 3-140B. The energization of the backup scram valve vented the scram air header which led to the full reactor scram. Repairs have been completed and the plant is preparing for restart."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The Operations Center notified R1DO (Jenison).
On 3/19/2001, at 1232 a reactor scram signal was received, all rods inserted after the scram. Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) water level dropped below 127" (normal water level is about 160") which actuated primary containment isolation signals for groups 2, 3 and 5. RPV water level is being controlled by feedwater and RPV pressure control is via turbine bypass valves. The plant is stable. The cause of the reactor scram is under investigation.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and will notify the state authorities. A press release may be issued.
* * * UPDATE AT 1257 ON 3/20/01, BY KRITZER RECEIVED BY WEAVER * * *
"The cause of the 3/19/2001 scram has been determined to be faulty auxiliary contacts in Reactor Protection System (RPS) relay 5A-K13D. The auxiliary contacts failed to open during reset of a ½ scram condition on the RPS "B" auto scram channel inserted during surveillance testing earlier in the shift. There were no means available to the operators to detect this failure. Subsequent surveillance testing of RPS "A" inserted a ½ scram on RPS "A" auto scram channel which resulted in the energization of backup scram valve 3-140B. The energization of the backup scram valve vented the scram air header which led to the full reactor scram. Repairs have been completed and the plant is preparing for restart."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The Operations Center notified R1DO (Jenison).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37851
Facility: SOUTH TEXAS
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN CONLY
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN CONLY
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 03/19/2001
Notification Time: 18:02 [ET]
Event Date: 03/19/2001
Event Time: 10:57 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/19/2001
Notification Time: 18:02 [ET]
Event Date: 03/19/2001
Event Time: 10:57 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/19/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
JOHN PELLET (R4)
JOHN PELLET (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
GREATER THAN 1% OF STEAM GENERATOR TUBES DEFECTIVE
"During refueling outage 2RE08, the results of steam generator tube inspections in steam generator 2C were classified as category C-3 in accordance with Technical Specification 4.4.5.2.d) in that 48 tubes out of 4,615 (i.e.,> 1%) have been found to be defective. All defective steam generator tubes will be plugged before the steam generators are returned to service. There were not any adverse safety consequences or implications as a result of this event. This event did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or the health and safety of the public. The cause of the imperfections is outside diameter stress corrosion cracking."
South Texas Project conducted a steam generator tube inspection results conference call with Region IV, the Senior Resident Inspector, and Nuclear Reactor Regulation this afternoon. The occurrence of the C-3 condition was noted during the call.
"During refueling outage 2RE08, the results of steam generator tube inspections in steam generator 2C were classified as category C-3 in accordance with Technical Specification 4.4.5.2.d) in that 48 tubes out of 4,615 (i.e.,> 1%) have been found to be defective. All defective steam generator tubes will be plugged before the steam generators are returned to service. There were not any adverse safety consequences or implications as a result of this event. This event did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or the health and safety of the public. The cause of the imperfections is outside diameter stress corrosion cracking."
South Texas Project conducted a steam generator tube inspection results conference call with Region IV, the Senior Resident Inspector, and Nuclear Reactor Regulation this afternoon. The occurrence of the C-3 condition was noted during the call.