Event Notification Report for March 16, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/15/2001 - 03/16/2001
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 37844
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: SPAETH
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: SPAETH
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 03/17/2001
Notification Time: 10:55 [ET]
Event Date: 03/16/2001
Event Time: 11:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/23/2001
Notification Time: 10:55 [ET]
Event Date: 03/16/2001
Event Time: 11:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/23/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
GEOFFREY WRIGHT (R3)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
GEOFFREY WRIGHT (R3)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
24 HOUR 91-01 BULLETIN - GEOMETRY VIOLATION
At 1100 on 3/16/01, a seal test buggy was found without signs or tags as required by NCSA-PLANT_031 (Potable Sampling/Test Buggies and Carts). Upon investigation of the test buggy, the chemical trap was found to have a nominal diameter of four inches and a length of twenty two inches. The four inch diameter violates the passive design control 2(b) which requires a three inch nominal diameter and a thirty three inch length. Nuclear Criticality personnel have determined the maximum loading of the effected trap to be 76 gram U-235 at 3% assay. 76 grams is lower than the 350 gram safe mass limit. The NCSE contingency analysis considers credible, a maximum five inch nominal diameter to remain subcritical.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
Safety significance is considered very low. The NCSA requirement is three, three inch nominal diameter chemical traps. However, the NCSE allows for three, five inch nominal diameter chemical traps and remain subcritical,
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):
Based on the bounding calculations for five inch diameter chemical traps, there no critical pathways involved
CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):
Geometry is the controlled parameter that was violated
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):
The amount of uranium is unknown, however, it is not expected to be above 350 grams U-235 due to the operation performed with this buggy and the fact that the maximum loading of a 4" X 22" chemical trap is only 76 grams U-235 at 3% assay.
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES
The control violated was the geometry control of the chemical trap. The chemical trap was required to be three inch schedule 40 pipe, but it was found to be a nominal four inch diameter pipe.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED;
The test buggy was posted with temporary signs as required by NCSA-PLANT_031. The buggy will remain in the anomalous condition boundary until NDA results are obtained. Disposition of the buggy will be determined based on the NDA results.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. The DOE Representative will be informed.
* * * UPDATE AT 1346 EST ON 3/23/01 BY JIM McCLEARY TO FANGIE JONES * * *
"NDA measurements show the chemical trap described above contains 1.6 +/- 0.8 grams and the pump contains 1 gram of U-235. Total U-235 content including error is 3.4 grams U-235. TSR 3.11.2 requires an NSCE for operations with uranium enriched to 1 wt% and contains 15 grams or higher U-235. Therefore this buggy is not a fissile material operation and not a violation of NCSA-PLANT_031."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the DOE representative. The R3DO (Gary Shear) and NMSS EO (Brian Smith) were notified.
At 1100 on 3/16/01, a seal test buggy was found without signs or tags as required by NCSA-PLANT_031 (Potable Sampling/Test Buggies and Carts). Upon investigation of the test buggy, the chemical trap was found to have a nominal diameter of four inches and a length of twenty two inches. The four inch diameter violates the passive design control 2(b) which requires a three inch nominal diameter and a thirty three inch length. Nuclear Criticality personnel have determined the maximum loading of the effected trap to be 76 gram U-235 at 3% assay. 76 grams is lower than the 350 gram safe mass limit. The NCSE contingency analysis considers credible, a maximum five inch nominal diameter to remain subcritical.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
Safety significance is considered very low. The NCSA requirement is three, three inch nominal diameter chemical traps. However, the NCSE allows for three, five inch nominal diameter chemical traps and remain subcritical,
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):
Based on the bounding calculations for five inch diameter chemical traps, there no critical pathways involved
CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):
Geometry is the controlled parameter that was violated
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):
The amount of uranium is unknown, however, it is not expected to be above 350 grams U-235 due to the operation performed with this buggy and the fact that the maximum loading of a 4" X 22" chemical trap is only 76 grams U-235 at 3% assay.
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES
The control violated was the geometry control of the chemical trap. The chemical trap was required to be three inch schedule 40 pipe, but it was found to be a nominal four inch diameter pipe.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED;
The test buggy was posted with temporary signs as required by NCSA-PLANT_031. The buggy will remain in the anomalous condition boundary until NDA results are obtained. Disposition of the buggy will be determined based on the NDA results.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. The DOE Representative will be informed.
* * * UPDATE AT 1346 EST ON 3/23/01 BY JIM McCLEARY TO FANGIE JONES * * *
"NDA measurements show the chemical trap described above contains 1.6 +/- 0.8 grams and the pump contains 1 gram of U-235. Total U-235 content including error is 3.4 grams U-235. TSR 3.11.2 requires an NSCE for operations with uranium enriched to 1 wt% and contains 15 grams or higher U-235. Therefore this buggy is not a fissile material operation and not a violation of NCSA-PLANT_031."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the DOE representative. The R3DO (Gary Shear) and NMSS EO (Brian Smith) were notified.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 37861
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: TWINING LABS
Region: 4
City: FRESNO State: CA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT GREGGER
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Licensee: TWINING LABS
Region: 4
City: FRESNO State: CA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT GREGGER
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 03/23/2001
Notification Time: 19:02 [ET]
Event Date: 03/16/2001
Event Time: 07:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 03/23/2001
Notification Time: 19:02 [ET]
Event Date: 03/16/2001
Event Time: 07:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 03/23/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JOHN PELLET (R4)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
JOHN PELLET (R4)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The Twining Labs reported a stolen Troxler moisture density gauge, Model 3430, serial # 20467. The sources are nominal 30 millicuries of Cs-137 and 10 millicuries Am-241/Be. The local police were notified (police report # 01-23615) and a reward was posted for the return. The theft occurred on 3/16/01 about 0700 PST.
The Twining Labs reported a stolen Troxler moisture density gauge, Model 3430, serial # 20467. The sources are nominal 30 millicuries of Cs-137 and 10 millicuries Am-241/Be. The local police were notified (police report # 01-23615) and a reward was posted for the return. The theft occurred on 3/16/01 about 0700 PST.