Event Notification Report for March 09, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/08/2001 - 03/09/2001
EVENT NUMBERS
37821378163781737838
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37821
Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: GARY OLMSTEAD
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: GARY OLMSTEAD
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 03/09/2001
Notification Time: 20:46 [ET]
Event Date: 03/09/2001
Event Time: 12:51 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/12/2001
Notification Time: 20:46 [ET]
Event Date: 03/09/2001
Event Time: 12:51 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/12/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION 50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION 50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM JOHNSON (R4)
WILLIAM JOHNSON (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
LOSS OF BOTH CONTROL ROD DRIVE MOTOR GENERATORS CAUSES REACTOR TRIP
During performance of work on the 'B' Rod Drive Motor Generator set, the output breaker for 'A' Rod Drive Motor Generator set opened causing a loss of power to the Rod Control System. The cause of the 'A' Rod Drive Motor Generator set output breaker opening is being investigated. With a loss of power, all rods were de-energized and inserted into the core. Rod K-10 developed an alarm and the problem was determined to be a faulty circuit card. The circuit card was replaced and the problem corrected.
This event resulted in a Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation, when rods were inserted, an Over Temperature delta T (OTdeltaT) trip was generated which generated the RPS actuation. After the RPS system actuated, an Auxiliary Feedwater System actuation was generated.
It was concluded this event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) since:
(1) The actuation of the Reactor Protection System occurred after the rods were at the bottom of the Reactor core (i.e. shut down) as indicated by computer point alarm printout.
The NRC Resident inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
* * * UPDATE 1500EST ON 3/12/01 FROM ROBERT BARTON TO S. SANDIN * * *
The licensee is updating this report with the following information:
"Update to the NRC Notification of Reactor Trip due to Loss of Both Rod Drive Motor Generator Sets at Callaway Event Number 37821.
"This 4-hour call is being made to the NRC 1) to inform the NRC that a Notification was made to the Missouri Public Service Commission reporting the Reactor Trip due to the loss of both Rod Drive Motor Generators which resulted in an outage expected to last longer than 72 hours and 2) to clarify information presented on March 9, 2001 concerning the Reactor Trip due to a loss of electrical power to the Rod Control System at the Callaway Plant.
Time of Notification to NRC Ops Center 1400
Event Number assigned by NRC 37821
NRC staff contacted at Ops Center Steve Sandin
Event Time (time of notification) 1400
Event Date (date of notification) 3/12/0 1
Mode/Power before event 2/1 percent Reactor Power
Mode/Power after event 2/1 percent Reactor Power
Event Classification 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi)
Was NRC Resident notified Yes
Was State notified No
Was other local government agencies notified Yes
Is media press release planned No
Anything unusual or not understood about the event N/A
Did all systems function as required N/A
"1) The following was reported to the Missouri PSC at 1248, 3/12/01:
'The following is a report to the Missouri Public Service Commission (MPSC) involving a Reactor Trip due to a loss of both Rod Drive Motor Generators at the Callaway Plant and is reportable under 4CSR240-20.080(3)(B) because the outage is expected to last longer than 72 hours.
'At 1251 on March 9, 2001, work was commencing on one Rod Drive Motor Generator when the alternate Rod Drive Motor Generator electrical output breaker failed open. This caused the Reactor Control Rods to be de-energized and insert into the Reactor core. Thc rod insertion shut the Reactor down and the plant continues to remain shut down to support repairs on equipment not related to the primary Reactor systems.'
"2) On March 9, 2001, the NRC Ops Center was informed of the Reactor Trip at Callaway that occurred because of a loss of both Rod Control Motor Generators. During the notification, it was mentioned that the press had been notified and a copy of the statement faxed to the NRC Ops Center also reflected this. What was not covered was the time of the news release. The news media was faxed a release at 1645 on 3/9/01. This information is being supplied to ensure clarity that the NRC had been notified of a news release within the required 4-hour time limit.
"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee."
Notified R4DO (Johnson).
During performance of work on the 'B' Rod Drive Motor Generator set, the output breaker for 'A' Rod Drive Motor Generator set opened causing a loss of power to the Rod Control System. The cause of the 'A' Rod Drive Motor Generator set output breaker opening is being investigated. With a loss of power, all rods were de-energized and inserted into the core. Rod K-10 developed an alarm and the problem was determined to be a faulty circuit card. The circuit card was replaced and the problem corrected.
This event resulted in a Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation, when rods were inserted, an Over Temperature delta T (OTdeltaT) trip was generated which generated the RPS actuation. After the RPS system actuated, an Auxiliary Feedwater System actuation was generated.
It was concluded this event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) since:
(1) The actuation of the Reactor Protection System occurred after the rods were at the bottom of the Reactor core (i.e. shut down) as indicated by computer point alarm printout.
The NRC Resident inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
* * * UPDATE 1500EST ON 3/12/01 FROM ROBERT BARTON TO S. SANDIN * * *
The licensee is updating this report with the following information:
"Update to the NRC Notification of Reactor Trip due to Loss of Both Rod Drive Motor Generator Sets at Callaway Event Number 37821.
"This 4-hour call is being made to the NRC 1) to inform the NRC that a Notification was made to the Missouri Public Service Commission reporting the Reactor Trip due to the loss of both Rod Drive Motor Generators which resulted in an outage expected to last longer than 72 hours and 2) to clarify information presented on March 9, 2001 concerning the Reactor Trip due to a loss of electrical power to the Rod Control System at the Callaway Plant.
Time of Notification to NRC Ops Center 1400
Event Number assigned by NRC 37821
NRC staff contacted at Ops Center Steve Sandin
Event Time (time of notification) 1400
Event Date (date of notification) 3/12/0 1
Mode/Power before event 2/1 percent Reactor Power
Mode/Power after event 2/1 percent Reactor Power
Event Classification 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi)
Was NRC Resident notified Yes
Was State notified No
Was other local government agencies notified Yes
Is media press release planned No
Anything unusual or not understood about the event N/A
Did all systems function as required N/A
"1) The following was reported to the Missouri PSC at 1248, 3/12/01:
'The following is a report to the Missouri Public Service Commission (MPSC) involving a Reactor Trip due to a loss of both Rod Drive Motor Generators at the Callaway Plant and is reportable under 4CSR240-20.080(3)(B) because the outage is expected to last longer than 72 hours.
'At 1251 on March 9, 2001, work was commencing on one Rod Drive Motor Generator when the alternate Rod Drive Motor Generator electrical output breaker failed open. This caused the Reactor Control Rods to be de-energized and insert into the Reactor core. Thc rod insertion shut the Reactor down and the plant continues to remain shut down to support repairs on equipment not related to the primary Reactor systems.'
"2) On March 9, 2001, the NRC Ops Center was informed of the Reactor Trip at Callaway that occurred because of a loss of both Rod Control Motor Generators. During the notification, it was mentioned that the press had been notified and a copy of the statement faxed to the NRC Ops Center also reflected this. What was not covered was the time of the news release. The news media was faxed a release at 1645 on 3/9/01. This information is being supplied to ensure clarity that the NRC had been notified of a news release within the required 4-hour time limit.
"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee."
Notified R4DO (Johnson).
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37816
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: TIM ROGERS
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: TIM ROGERS
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 03/09/2001
Notification Time: 04:30 [ET]
Event Date: 03/09/2001
Event Time: 01:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 05/15/2001
Notification Time: 04:30 [ET]
Event Date: 03/09/2001
Event Time: 01:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 05/15/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JOHN MADERA (R3)
JOHN MADERA (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
MODE CHANGE DUE TO LITERAL INTERPRETATION OF REQUIREMENTS
"To meet compliance with literal interpretation of Tech Spec 3.7.A.5 and 3.8.B.6, containment venting and purging using SBGT is required above 'Cold Shutdown.' Plant is < 212°, all rods in BUT mode switch was in 'Refuel.' To comply with Tech Specs, a Tech Spec shutdown with mode switch was performed. All rods were already in but it wasn't a preplanned shutdown evolution. Other similar 'Cold Shutdown' Tech Spec compliance issues are being looked at."
An automatic scram signal was generated when the mode switch was taken to the 'Shutdown' position. Although all control rods were already inserted, the licensee considers this action to be reportable as a valid safety system actuation. The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this event by the licensee.
**** RETRACTION RECEIVED AT 1641 EDT ON 05/15/01 FROM PATRICK DECKER TO LEIGH TROCINE ****
The licensee is retracting this event notification. The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"[...] On [03/09/01], we reported the failure to literally comply with [Technical] Specification 3.7.A and 3.8.B.6. This event is being retracted since 1) the requirement to use SBGT 'above' Cold Shutdown does not apply to plant conditions where the plant is below the Cold Shutdown temperature of 212 degrees F with the mode switch in 'refuel,' and 2) moving the mode switch back to shutdown from 'refuel' was required to comply with a prerequisite of an approved plant procedure. Therefore, this was part of a preplanned sequence."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Parker).
"To meet compliance with literal interpretation of Tech Spec 3.7.A.5 and 3.8.B.6, containment venting and purging using SBGT is required above 'Cold Shutdown.' Plant is < 212°, all rods in BUT mode switch was in 'Refuel.' To comply with Tech Specs, a Tech Spec shutdown with mode switch was performed. All rods were already in but it wasn't a preplanned shutdown evolution. Other similar 'Cold Shutdown' Tech Spec compliance issues are being looked at."
An automatic scram signal was generated when the mode switch was taken to the 'Shutdown' position. Although all control rods were already inserted, the licensee considers this action to be reportable as a valid safety system actuation. The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this event by the licensee.
**** RETRACTION RECEIVED AT 1641 EDT ON 05/15/01 FROM PATRICK DECKER TO LEIGH TROCINE ****
The licensee is retracting this event notification. The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"[...] On [03/09/01], we reported the failure to literally comply with [Technical] Specification 3.7.A and 3.8.B.6. This event is being retracted since 1) the requirement to use SBGT 'above' Cold Shutdown does not apply to plant conditions where the plant is below the Cold Shutdown temperature of 212 degrees F with the mode switch in 'refuel,' and 2) moving the mode switch back to shutdown from 'refuel' was required to comply with a prerequisite of an approved plant procedure. Therefore, this was part of a preplanned sequence."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Parker).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37817
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: FRANK KICH
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: FRANK KICH
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 03/09/2001
Notification Time: 07:18 [ET]
Event Date: 03/09/2001
Event Time: 01:45 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/09/2001
Notification Time: 07:18 [ET]
Event Date: 03/09/2001
Event Time: 01:45 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/09/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
RONALD BELLAMY (R1)
ED GOODWIN (NRR)
RONALD BELLAMY (R1)
ED GOODWIN (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
24 Hour Notification of High Pressure Fire Water Fire Protection System Impairment per Station Administration Order (SAO) 124 Item 64 and SAO-703 Addendum I Item 2.b.1.b.i.
"At 0145 on March 9, 2001, the high pressure Fire Water Protection System is degraded due to planned maintenance work. The inner and outer high-pressure fire headers are split to provide protection for work on the valves for 12 Fire Main Booster Pump. 12 Fire Main Booster Pump is inoperable during this tag-out. The Diesel Fire Pump is in service to maintain header pressure for the outside fire header. 11 Fire Main Booster Pump is in operation providing fire header pressure for the inside fire header. Contingency hoses have been staged to provide fire water supply to cross connect the inside and outside headers in the event of a failure on either header. SAO-703 Addendum I Item 2.a.1.a states one fire main booster pump out of service is a 7-day action statement to return it to operable status. The headers being separated or any part of the fire protection piping or valves not being able to perform its function other than the specific instances described in SAO-703 requires an alternate fire protection system shall be established. The alternate fire protection system was established within 24 hours to ensure compliance with SAO-703 as described above. A special report will be submitted to the NRC Regional Administrator of the Region 1 Office outlining this event within 14 Days."
The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector.
"At 0145 on March 9, 2001, the high pressure Fire Water Protection System is degraded due to planned maintenance work. The inner and outer high-pressure fire headers are split to provide protection for work on the valves for 12 Fire Main Booster Pump. 12 Fire Main Booster Pump is inoperable during this tag-out. The Diesel Fire Pump is in service to maintain header pressure for the outside fire header. 11 Fire Main Booster Pump is in operation providing fire header pressure for the inside fire header. Contingency hoses have been staged to provide fire water supply to cross connect the inside and outside headers in the event of a failure on either header. SAO-703 Addendum I Item 2.a.1.a states one fire main booster pump out of service is a 7-day action statement to return it to operable status. The headers being separated or any part of the fire protection piping or valves not being able to perform its function other than the specific instances described in SAO-703 requires an alternate fire protection system shall be established. The alternate fire protection system was established within 24 hours to ensure compliance with SAO-703 as described above. A special report will be submitted to the NRC Regional Administrator of the Region 1 Office outlining this event within 14 Days."
The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37838
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: HARRY RUSSELL
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: HARRY RUSSELL
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 03/14/2001
Notification Time: 16:37 [ET]
Event Date: 03/09/2001
Event Time: 06:45 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/14/2001
Notification Time: 16:37 [ET]
Event Date: 03/09/2001
Event Time: 06:45 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/14/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
ROBERT HAAG (R2)
ROBERT HAAG (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HIGH PRESSURE COOLING INJECTION (HPCI) RENDERED INOPERABLE DUE TO FAULTY BATTERY CHARGER
"Investigation of the failure of battery charger 1R42-S031 on 3/9/2001 (reference Condition Report 2001001827) has determined that the Unit 1 HPCI system was inoperable from the time of receipt of the first 'HPCI System Inverter Circuit Failure' annunciator until the time charger 1R42-S031 was removed from service. During this time (approximately 15 to 20 minutes), the HPCI system inverter was tripping on high voltage and resetting automatically when voltage levels returned to normal. The voltage fluctuations causing the inverter to trip and reset were caused by an internal fault in charger 1R42-S031: a bad fuse was making intermittent connection resulting in intermittent firing of the charger's silicon-controlled rectifiers (SCRs) and rapidly changing current and voltage outputs. These fluctuations and the random tripping of the HPCI system inverter rendered the HPCI system unreliable, and hence inoperable, until the cause of the fluctuations was corrected, that is, until the charger was removed from service. Determined to be reportable 3-14-2001 @ 1338 EST."
The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector.
"Investigation of the failure of battery charger 1R42-S031 on 3/9/2001 (reference Condition Report 2001001827) has determined that the Unit 1 HPCI system was inoperable from the time of receipt of the first 'HPCI System Inverter Circuit Failure' annunciator until the time charger 1R42-S031 was removed from service. During this time (approximately 15 to 20 minutes), the HPCI system inverter was tripping on high voltage and resetting automatically when voltage levels returned to normal. The voltage fluctuations causing the inverter to trip and reset were caused by an internal fault in charger 1R42-S031: a bad fuse was making intermittent connection resulting in intermittent firing of the charger's silicon-controlled rectifiers (SCRs) and rapidly changing current and voltage outputs. These fluctuations and the random tripping of the HPCI system inverter rendered the HPCI system unreliable, and hence inoperable, until the cause of the fluctuations was corrected, that is, until the charger was removed from service. Determined to be reportable 3-14-2001 @ 1338 EST."
The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector.