Event Notification Report for March 07, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/06/2001 - 03/07/2001
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 37813
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: KURT SISLER
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: KURT SISLER
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 03/08/2001
Notification Time: 01:03 [ET]
Event Date: 03/07/2001
Event Time: 09:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/08/2001
Notification Time: 01:03 [ET]
Event Date: 03/07/2001
Event Time: 09:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/08/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JOHN MADERA (R3)
DONALD COOL (NMSS)
JOHN MADERA (R3)
DONALD COOL (NMSS)
24 HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT
"On 3-7-01 at 0900 hours , in preparation to implement NCSA-PLANT091 it was discovered that PORTS has a plutonium-239 (Pu-239) source that exceeds the mass control limit of the unimplemented NCSA. This new NCSA was Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) approved but is not activated. NCSA-PLANT091 establishes minimum masses for several fissile isotopes for determining when Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) controls are required. For Pu-239, the control limit is 7.2 grams. The sealed source contains 32 grams of Pu-239. An anomalous condition was entered and a boundary established around the source pending NCS review. Upon further review, NCS determined that there is not an active NCSA/NCSE to control the Pu-239 source. The storage of the Pu-239 source is considered unanalyzed since there is not an active NCSA/NCSE documenting the double contingency of this storage.
"The safety significance of this event is very low. The Pu-239 source is in a storage unit at the X-326 Health Physics (HP) Source Storage Vault. The storage unit provides spacing from other materials and there were no other fissile materials near the storage unit that would require NCSA controls. Spacing from other fissile material is not an issue. NCSA-PLANT021 determined that the safe mass of Pu-239 is 207 grams. The source contains 32 grams Pu-239 and is well below the safe mass value of 207 grams. Double contingency exists, but has not been formally documented in an implemented Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation.
"The discovery of this source is a legacy issue This source was transported to PORTS in 1961 from offsite. This source has not been used since NRC regulation of PORTS.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
"The safety significance of this event is very low. The discovery of this source is a legacy issue. This source was transported to PORTS In 1961 from offsite. The subcritical mass limit for Pu-239 per ANSI/ANS-8.15 is 450 grams.
"This source has not been used since coming under NRC regulation. There are no Radiation Work permits (RWP) or procedures that use this source. There is no reason to believe that the source has been removed from its storage unit. The storage unit provides some spacing from other materials and there were no other fissile materials in the storage area that would require spacing for NCS. Double contingency exists, but it has not been documented in an Implemented Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):
"A violation of an NCSA for other fissile materials in conjunction with placement near the Pu-239 source would be required before criticality would be credible or a much larger mass of Pu-239 would be required.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):
"Although an NCSA was not in place, the mass of Pu-239 was only a fraction of the Pu-239 safe mass and there were no other fissile materials in the storage area that would require spacing for NCS.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):
"The licensed material was 32 grams of Pu-239 in the form of a sealed source. This is approximately 7% of a subcritical mass (450 grams per ANSI/ANS-8.15).
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES
"There were no established controls over this material. However, much less than a safe mass was involved and there were no other fissile materials in the storage area that would require spacing for NCS. Therefore, the significance of this event is very low.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
"Upon discovery, a boundary was established and an anomalous condition entered."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event.
"On 3-7-01 at 0900 hours , in preparation to implement NCSA-PLANT091 it was discovered that PORTS has a plutonium-239 (Pu-239) source that exceeds the mass control limit of the unimplemented NCSA. This new NCSA was Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) approved but is not activated. NCSA-PLANT091 establishes minimum masses for several fissile isotopes for determining when Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) controls are required. For Pu-239, the control limit is 7.2 grams. The sealed source contains 32 grams of Pu-239. An anomalous condition was entered and a boundary established around the source pending NCS review. Upon further review, NCS determined that there is not an active NCSA/NCSE to control the Pu-239 source. The storage of the Pu-239 source is considered unanalyzed since there is not an active NCSA/NCSE documenting the double contingency of this storage.
"The safety significance of this event is very low. The Pu-239 source is in a storage unit at the X-326 Health Physics (HP) Source Storage Vault. The storage unit provides spacing from other materials and there were no other fissile materials near the storage unit that would require NCSA controls. Spacing from other fissile material is not an issue. NCSA-PLANT021 determined that the safe mass of Pu-239 is 207 grams. The source contains 32 grams Pu-239 and is well below the safe mass value of 207 grams. Double contingency exists, but has not been formally documented in an implemented Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation.
"The discovery of this source is a legacy issue This source was transported to PORTS in 1961 from offsite. This source has not been used since NRC regulation of PORTS.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
"The safety significance of this event is very low. The discovery of this source is a legacy issue. This source was transported to PORTS In 1961 from offsite. The subcritical mass limit for Pu-239 per ANSI/ANS-8.15 is 450 grams.
"This source has not been used since coming under NRC regulation. There are no Radiation Work permits (RWP) or procedures that use this source. There is no reason to believe that the source has been removed from its storage unit. The storage unit provides some spacing from other materials and there were no other fissile materials in the storage area that would require spacing for NCS. Double contingency exists, but it has not been documented in an Implemented Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):
"A violation of an NCSA for other fissile materials in conjunction with placement near the Pu-239 source would be required before criticality would be credible or a much larger mass of Pu-239 would be required.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):
"Although an NCSA was not in place, the mass of Pu-239 was only a fraction of the Pu-239 safe mass and there were no other fissile materials in the storage area that would require spacing for NCS.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):
"The licensed material was 32 grams of Pu-239 in the form of a sealed source. This is approximately 7% of a subcritical mass (450 grams per ANSI/ANS-8.15).
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES
"There were no established controls over this material. However, much less than a safe mass was involved and there were no other fissile materials in the storage area that would require spacing for NCS. Therefore, the significance of this event is very low.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
"Upon discovery, a boundary was established and an anomalous condition entered."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37812
Facility: SEABROOK
Region: 1 State: NH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DENNIS BEMIS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 1 State: NH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DENNIS BEMIS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 03/07/2001
Notification Time: 13:11 [ET]
Event Date: 03/07/2001
Event Time: 11:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/09/2001
Notification Time: 13:11 [ET]
Event Date: 03/07/2001
Event Time: 11:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/09/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
RONALD BELLAMY (R1)
RONALD BELLAMY (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
MOTOR DRIVEN EMERGENCY FEEDWATER (EFW) PUMP STARTED UNEXPECTEDLY
While paralleling the DG-1B with offsite power, the "B" Motor Driven EFW pump started . The start occurred as the Bus 6 Unit Auxiliary Transformer breaker was closed. The licensee verified Emergency Feedwater Flow was not required and secured the Motor Driven EFW pump. The pump ran for 2 minutes and 28 seconds. All four (4) Steam Generator Water Levels increased less than 10% narrow range. The licensee is investigating the cause of the pump start.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
* * * UPDATE 1124EDT ON 4/9/01 FROM DAMON RITTER TO S. SANDIN * * *
"The following is a retraction for event number 37812 dated March 7, 2001:
"On 3/7/2001 at 13:11 (EST), Seabrook Station reported an actuation of the Emergency Feedwater System pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). Since the report was made, an evaluation of the equipment and events has been performed. 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) requires that an eight hour report be submitted for 'Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in [10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B)]...' The Emergency Feedwater System is listed as item (6) of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B). Valid actuations are those events that result from 'valid signals' or from intentional manual initiation, unless it is part of a pre-planned test. Valid signals are those signals that are initiated in response to actual plant conditions or parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of the safety function of the system. An evaluation of the equipment and events has determined that the pump start was due to an invalid signal. Since a valid actuation signal was not present, this event is not reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)."
The licensee will inform the NRC resident inspector. Notified R1DO(Linville).
While paralleling the DG-1B with offsite power, the "B" Motor Driven EFW pump started . The start occurred as the Bus 6 Unit Auxiliary Transformer breaker was closed. The licensee verified Emergency Feedwater Flow was not required and secured the Motor Driven EFW pump. The pump ran for 2 minutes and 28 seconds. All four (4) Steam Generator Water Levels increased less than 10% narrow range. The licensee is investigating the cause of the pump start.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
* * * UPDATE 1124EDT ON 4/9/01 FROM DAMON RITTER TO S. SANDIN * * *
"The following is a retraction for event number 37812 dated March 7, 2001:
"On 3/7/2001 at 13:11 (EST), Seabrook Station reported an actuation of the Emergency Feedwater System pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). Since the report was made, an evaluation of the equipment and events has been performed. 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) requires that an eight hour report be submitted for 'Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in [10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B)]...' The Emergency Feedwater System is listed as item (6) of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B). Valid actuations are those events that result from 'valid signals' or from intentional manual initiation, unless it is part of a pre-planned test. Valid signals are those signals that are initiated in response to actual plant conditions or parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of the safety function of the system. An evaluation of the equipment and events has determined that the pump start was due to an invalid signal. Since a valid actuation signal was not present, this event is not reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)."
The licensee will inform the NRC resident inspector. Notified R1DO(Linville).