Event Notification Report for March 05, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/04/2001 - 03/05/2001
EVENT NUMBERS
37809378103780637815
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37809
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: K BELDEN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: K BELDEN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 03/05/2001
Notification Time: 17:56 [ET]
Event Date: 03/05/2001
Event Time: 16:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/23/2001
Notification Time: 17:56 [ET]
Event Date: 03/05/2001
Event Time: 16:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/23/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1)
RICHARD CONTE (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION DECLARED INOPERABLE.
Control Room Emergency Ventilation was declared inoperable at 1600 hours. This was a result of the Lab carbon sample analysis not meeting Technical Specification 3.4.5.c of greater than 90% radioactive methyl iodine removal capability when tested. This required entering into a 7 day shutdown Limiting Condition for Operation. Carbon sample analysis is required per Technical Specification to be performed once per cycle (2 years). Licensee is in the process of replacing the carbon.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event.
* * * RETRACTED AT 1411 EST ON 3/23/01 BY JOHN PARRISH TO FANGIE JONES * * *
After further testing and calculations it was determined that the value was above the technical specification requirements and the event was not reportable and retracts the event notification.
The licensee intends to notify the NRC Resident Inspector. The R1DO (Kenneth Jenison) has been informed.
Control Room Emergency Ventilation was declared inoperable at 1600 hours. This was a result of the Lab carbon sample analysis not meeting Technical Specification 3.4.5.c of greater than 90% radioactive methyl iodine removal capability when tested. This required entering into a 7 day shutdown Limiting Condition for Operation. Carbon sample analysis is required per Technical Specification to be performed once per cycle (2 years). Licensee is in the process of replacing the carbon.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event.
* * * RETRACTED AT 1411 EST ON 3/23/01 BY JOHN PARRISH TO FANGIE JONES * * *
After further testing and calculations it was determined that the value was above the technical specification requirements and the event was not reportable and retracts the event notification.
The licensee intends to notify the NRC Resident Inspector. The R1DO (Kenneth Jenison) has been informed.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37810
Facility: SEABROOK
Region: 1 State: NH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JIM CROWLEY
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 1 State: NH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JIM CROWLEY
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 03/06/2001
Notification Time: 00:24 [ET]
Event Date: 03/05/2001
Event Time: 23:24 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/07/2001
Notification Time: 00:24 [ET]
Event Date: 03/05/2001
Event Time: 23:24 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/07/2001
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1)
BILL BATEMAN (NRR)
CHARLES MILLER (IRO)
CHARLIE BAGWELL (FEMA)
RICHARD CONTE (R1)
BILL BATEMAN (NRR)
CHARLES MILLER (IRO)
CHARLIE BAGWELL (FEMA)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
DISCRETIONARY UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO A MOMENTARY LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER DURING AN ONGOING SEVERE WINTER STORM AND SUBSEQUENT AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO GRID INSTABILITY
During an ongoing severe winter storm, the 345-kV breakers tripped open and re-closed resulting in a momentary loss of offsite power. An automatic reactor trip also occurred at 2324 on 03/05/01 due to electrical grid instability. (The exact cause of the reactor trip is currently under investigation because there was no first out indication.) All rods fully inserted. The reactor coolant pumps tripped as expected, and one has been placed back in service. Both emergency diesel generators automatically started but did not load. Availability of the condenser was also lost due to the loss of power, and operators closed the main steam isolation valves. There were no radiation releases, and there were no reactor coolant system or steam generator tube leaks. All systems functioned as required with one exception. The steam-driven emergency feedwater pump failed to automatically actuate.
At this time, the unit is in Mode 3. Normal charging and letdown, pressurizer heaters and sprays, and one reactor coolant pump are being utilized for primary system level, pressure, and transport control. Water is being supplied to the steam generators via an electric-driven emergency feedwater pump, and the atmospheric dumps are being utilized as the heat sink. Containment parameters are normal. The grid is currently available for offsite power, and the emergency diesel generators are still running.
Based on a discretionary shift management call, the licensee declared an Unusual Event at 2336 on 03/05/01. The licensee stated that a "Discretionary Event" under item 18A refers to an event in progress (or has occurred) that indicates a potential degradation of the level of safety of the station. The licensee plans to notify the NRC when the Unusual Event has terminated or if conditions degrade.
A severe winter storm is currently ongoing. At the time of the event, the unit was experiencing winds at a rate of approximately 50 miles per hour. The licensee reported that these strong winds were ongoing and that only a few inches of snow had fallen (although up to 2 feet is expected).
The licensee notified the state at 2347 on 03/05/01 and plans to notify the NRC resident inspector as well as applicable local officials. The licensee also plans to issue a press release.
***** UPDATE AT 0222 ON 03/06/01 FROM JIM HILL TO LEIGH TROCINE *****
This update provides both clarifications/corrections to the original event notification and additional information regarding licensee plans.
CLARIFICATIONS/CORRECTIONS: Prior to the event, two of three offsite power lines had been lost in close succession. The remaining offsite line was subsequently lost, and its breaker re-closed within a short duration. This resulted in the momentary loss of offsite power and subsequent plant transient. This initial electrical imbalance was sufficient to result in the automatic starting and loading of both emergency diesel generators.
CURRENT STATUS: The unit remains in the Unusual Event, and winds are currently sustained at a rate of approximately 40 miles per hour. All three offsite power lines have been restored. Both emergency diesel generators remain in operation and continue to provide power to both vital (emergency) buses. The non-vital buses have been re-energized from offsite power. An additional auxiliary pump (the startup feedwater pump) has also been started to provide additional water to the steam generators. This pump is a non-safety related housekeeping pump.
PLANS: Within the next half hour, the licensee plans to commence a discretionary plant cooldown and plans to place the unit in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown). At some point in time, the licensee also plans to secure the electric-driven emergency feedwater pump and rely on the startup feedwater pump to supply water to the steam generators.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and an onsite member of an NRC residual heat removal inspection team. The NRC operations officer notified the R1DO (Conte), NRR EO (Bateman), and IRO (Miller).
***** UPDATE AT 0438 ON 03/06/01 FROM JIM HILL TO LEIGH TROCINE *****
The licensee has commenced a plant cooldown and anticipates that it will take approximately 6 hours for the unit to reach Cold Shutdown. Other than commencement of the cooldown, there has been no change in plant conditions or equipment status.
The licensee stated that the criteria for exiting the Unusual Event have been met. However, the licensee currently plans to remain in the Unusual Event for a while longer because the high line insulators onsite are still arcing and are suspect and because the in-house vital buses are still being powered by the emergency diesel generators.
The licensee notified an onsite member of an NRC residual heat removal inspection team, who in turn notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R1DO (Conte), NRR EO (Bateman), and IRO (Miller).
***** UPDATE AT 0800 ON 03/06/01 FROM JOHN LaVALLEY TO LEIGH TROCINE *****
The licensee called to provide the following status update:
The unit remains in the Unusual Event. The reactor coolant system is currently at 445 degrees F, and the cooldown is still in progress via utilization of boration and the atmospheric steam dumps. The emergency diesel generators are still supplying power to the vital buses.
The licensee currently plans to place the unit in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) and then to restore the secondary side of the plant (assuming that offsite power supplies are stable).
The NRC operations officer notified the R1DO (Conte) and NRR EO (Tappert).
*** UPDATE AT 1509 ET ON 03/06/01 FROM JOHN LaVALLEY TO JOHN MACKINNON *****
The licensee called to provide the following status update:
The unit remains in the Unusual Event. The reactor coolant system is currently 360 degrees F, and cooldown is still in progress. The licensee will reduce reactor coolant system temperature to approximately 240 degrees F. The emergency diesel generators are still supplying power to the vital buses. The licensee is waiting for Load Dispatcher permission to take down one 345kV line at a time to clean the lines bushing. After the bushings for the 3 345kV lines have been cleaned and the grid is stable, the licensee will make a determination whether to exit the Unusual Event.
Additional information: After the reactor trip the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pump failed to start. The licensee thinks that the pump tripped on overspeed. Licensee is investigating this problem.
The NRC operations officer notified the R1DO (Bellamy) and NRR EO (C. Grimes)
****UPDATE AT 1619ET ON 03/06/01 FROM M KILEY TO JOHN MACKINNON*****
The licensee called to provide the following clarification to event write up:
The exact cause of the reactor trip as indicated by the "First Out Light" was "Power Range Negative Flux Rate Hi". Secondly, both Emergency Diesel Generators automatically started and loaded all safety related loads associated with Emergency Electrical Buses 5 and 6.
The NRC operations officer notified the R1DO (Bellamy) and NRR EO (Tad Marsh).
* * * UPDATE 1055 EST ON 03/07/01 FROM RON STRICKLAND TAKEN BY BOB STRANSKY * * *
The licensee terminated the Unusual Event at 1040 EST on 03/07/01. The offsite electrical grid is stable with two independent sources available. Offsite power has been restored to emergency bus (E-5), and the licensee is preparing to realign the other emergency bus to offsite power as well. The unit remains stable in Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown). The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update by the licensee.
Notified R1DO (Bellamy), NRR EO (Marsh) and FEMA (Steindurf).
During an ongoing severe winter storm, the 345-kV breakers tripped open and re-closed resulting in a momentary loss of offsite power. An automatic reactor trip also occurred at 2324 on 03/05/01 due to electrical grid instability. (The exact cause of the reactor trip is currently under investigation because there was no first out indication.) All rods fully inserted. The reactor coolant pumps tripped as expected, and one has been placed back in service. Both emergency diesel generators automatically started but did not load. Availability of the condenser was also lost due to the loss of power, and operators closed the main steam isolation valves. There were no radiation releases, and there were no reactor coolant system or steam generator tube leaks. All systems functioned as required with one exception. The steam-driven emergency feedwater pump failed to automatically actuate.
At this time, the unit is in Mode 3. Normal charging and letdown, pressurizer heaters and sprays, and one reactor coolant pump are being utilized for primary system level, pressure, and transport control. Water is being supplied to the steam generators via an electric-driven emergency feedwater pump, and the atmospheric dumps are being utilized as the heat sink. Containment parameters are normal. The grid is currently available for offsite power, and the emergency diesel generators are still running.
Based on a discretionary shift management call, the licensee declared an Unusual Event at 2336 on 03/05/01. The licensee stated that a "Discretionary Event" under item 18A refers to an event in progress (or has occurred) that indicates a potential degradation of the level of safety of the station. The licensee plans to notify the NRC when the Unusual Event has terminated or if conditions degrade.
A severe winter storm is currently ongoing. At the time of the event, the unit was experiencing winds at a rate of approximately 50 miles per hour. The licensee reported that these strong winds were ongoing and that only a few inches of snow had fallen (although up to 2 feet is expected).
The licensee notified the state at 2347 on 03/05/01 and plans to notify the NRC resident inspector as well as applicable local officials. The licensee also plans to issue a press release.
***** UPDATE AT 0222 ON 03/06/01 FROM JIM HILL TO LEIGH TROCINE *****
This update provides both clarifications/corrections to the original event notification and additional information regarding licensee plans.
CLARIFICATIONS/CORRECTIONS: Prior to the event, two of three offsite power lines had been lost in close succession. The remaining offsite line was subsequently lost, and its breaker re-closed within a short duration. This resulted in the momentary loss of offsite power and subsequent plant transient. This initial electrical imbalance was sufficient to result in the automatic starting and loading of both emergency diesel generators.
CURRENT STATUS: The unit remains in the Unusual Event, and winds are currently sustained at a rate of approximately 40 miles per hour. All three offsite power lines have been restored. Both emergency diesel generators remain in operation and continue to provide power to both vital (emergency) buses. The non-vital buses have been re-energized from offsite power. An additional auxiliary pump (the startup feedwater pump) has also been started to provide additional water to the steam generators. This pump is a non-safety related housekeeping pump.
PLANS: Within the next half hour, the licensee plans to commence a discretionary plant cooldown and plans to place the unit in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown). At some point in time, the licensee also plans to secure the electric-driven emergency feedwater pump and rely on the startup feedwater pump to supply water to the steam generators.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and an onsite member of an NRC residual heat removal inspection team. The NRC operations officer notified the R1DO (Conte), NRR EO (Bateman), and IRO (Miller).
***** UPDATE AT 0438 ON 03/06/01 FROM JIM HILL TO LEIGH TROCINE *****
The licensee has commenced a plant cooldown and anticipates that it will take approximately 6 hours for the unit to reach Cold Shutdown. Other than commencement of the cooldown, there has been no change in plant conditions or equipment status.
The licensee stated that the criteria for exiting the Unusual Event have been met. However, the licensee currently plans to remain in the Unusual Event for a while longer because the high line insulators onsite are still arcing and are suspect and because the in-house vital buses are still being powered by the emergency diesel generators.
The licensee notified an onsite member of an NRC residual heat removal inspection team, who in turn notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R1DO (Conte), NRR EO (Bateman), and IRO (Miller).
***** UPDATE AT 0800 ON 03/06/01 FROM JOHN LaVALLEY TO LEIGH TROCINE *****
The licensee called to provide the following status update:
The unit remains in the Unusual Event. The reactor coolant system is currently at 445 degrees F, and the cooldown is still in progress via utilization of boration and the atmospheric steam dumps. The emergency diesel generators are still supplying power to the vital buses.
The licensee currently plans to place the unit in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) and then to restore the secondary side of the plant (assuming that offsite power supplies are stable).
The NRC operations officer notified the R1DO (Conte) and NRR EO (Tappert).
*** UPDATE AT 1509 ET ON 03/06/01 FROM JOHN LaVALLEY TO JOHN MACKINNON *****
The licensee called to provide the following status update:
The unit remains in the Unusual Event. The reactor coolant system is currently 360 degrees F, and cooldown is still in progress. The licensee will reduce reactor coolant system temperature to approximately 240 degrees F. The emergency diesel generators are still supplying power to the vital buses. The licensee is waiting for Load Dispatcher permission to take down one 345kV line at a time to clean the lines bushing. After the bushings for the 3 345kV lines have been cleaned and the grid is stable, the licensee will make a determination whether to exit the Unusual Event.
Additional information: After the reactor trip the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pump failed to start. The licensee thinks that the pump tripped on overspeed. Licensee is investigating this problem.
The NRC operations officer notified the R1DO (Bellamy) and NRR EO (C. Grimes)
****UPDATE AT 1619ET ON 03/06/01 FROM M KILEY TO JOHN MACKINNON*****
The licensee called to provide the following clarification to event write up:
The exact cause of the reactor trip as indicated by the "First Out Light" was "Power Range Negative Flux Rate Hi". Secondly, both Emergency Diesel Generators automatically started and loaded all safety related loads associated with Emergency Electrical Buses 5 and 6.
The NRC operations officer notified the R1DO (Bellamy) and NRR EO (Tad Marsh).
* * * UPDATE 1055 EST ON 03/07/01 FROM RON STRICKLAND TAKEN BY BOB STRANSKY * * *
The licensee terminated the Unusual Event at 1040 EST on 03/07/01. The offsite electrical grid is stable with two independent sources available. Offsite power has been restored to emergency bus (E-5), and the licensee is preparing to realign the other emergency bus to offsite power as well. The unit remains stable in Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown). The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update by the licensee.
Notified R1DO (Bellamy), NRR EO (Marsh) and FEMA (Steindurf).
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37806
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BRUCE BUTLER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BRUCE BUTLER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 03/05/2001
Notification Time: 12:25 [ET]
Event Date: 03/05/2001
Event Time: 10:13 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/24/2001
Notification Time: 12:25 [ET]
Event Date: 03/05/2001
Event Time: 10:13 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/24/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
Person (Organization):
STEPHEN CAHILL (R2)
STEPHEN CAHILL (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) TRIPPED UNEXPECTEDLY DURING TESTING.
Received RCIC "B" logic isolation signal causing RCIC in-board isolation valve, 2E51-F007, to close resulting in RCIC trip signal. I&C personnel were performing 57SV-CAL-003-25 ATTS transmitter calibration for RCIC "B" steam line differential pressure transmitter 2E51-N057B when the isolation occurred and this instrument caused the isolation. Investigation is in progress to determine the cause. Received isolation signal at 1013 ET, I&C backed out of the procedure returning 2E51-N057B transmitter to service and RCIC isolation was reset and RCIC returned to standby at 1105 ET.
All other Emergency Core Cooling systems were fully operable during the time period RCIC was declared inoperable.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
* * * RETRACTION ON 04/24/01 AT 1453 ET BY S. HOWARD TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * *
Plant Hatch FSAR has been revised such that the Control Rod Drop accident limiting event path evaluated in the safety analysis (subsection 15.3.2) does not rely on RCIC to mitigate this Design Basis Accident (DBA). None of the DBAs, as evaluated in the safety analysis (section 15.3), rely on RCIC for event mitigation. RCIC will no longer be an NRC notification when declared inoperable. Therefore, this NRC notification is being retracted.
R2DO (Paul Fredrickson) notified.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction by the licensee.
Received RCIC "B" logic isolation signal causing RCIC in-board isolation valve, 2E51-F007, to close resulting in RCIC trip signal. I&C personnel were performing 57SV-CAL-003-25 ATTS transmitter calibration for RCIC "B" steam line differential pressure transmitter 2E51-N057B when the isolation occurred and this instrument caused the isolation. Investigation is in progress to determine the cause. Received isolation signal at 1013 ET, I&C backed out of the procedure returning 2E51-N057B transmitter to service and RCIC isolation was reset and RCIC returned to standby at 1105 ET.
All other Emergency Core Cooling systems were fully operable during the time period RCIC was declared inoperable.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
* * * RETRACTION ON 04/24/01 AT 1453 ET BY S. HOWARD TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * *
Plant Hatch FSAR has been revised such that the Control Rod Drop accident limiting event path evaluated in the safety analysis (subsection 15.3.2) does not rely on RCIC to mitigate this Design Basis Accident (DBA). None of the DBAs, as evaluated in the safety analysis (section 15.3), rely on RCIC for event mitigation. RCIC will no longer be an NRC notification when declared inoperable. Therefore, this NRC notification is being retracted.
R2DO (Paul Fredrickson) notified.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction by the licensee.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37815
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: PAT DECKER
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: PAT DECKER
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 03/08/2001
Notification Time: 13:04 [ET]
Event Date: 03/05/2001
Event Time: 16:08 [CST]
Last Update Date: 05/15/2001
Notification Time: 13:04 [ET]
Event Date: 03/05/2001
Event Time: 16:08 [CST]
Last Update Date: 05/15/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
JOHN MADERA (R3)
JOHN MADERA (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
LOW PRESSURE CORE SPRAY STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS DID NOT CONSIDER ALL POSSIBLE FLOW CONDITIONS
"On March 5, 2001, it was discovered that the structural analysis of in-vessel Core Spray piping did not consider all applicable flow conditions. A notification should have been made at that time because the effect of the unanalyzed condition on degradation of plant safety was not considered with respect to all plant operating conditions (i.e., the plant was shut down at the time of discovery). Preliminary analysis results indicated that previous analyses are bounding."
This issue will be resolved before the next plant startup.
The licensee will notify the NRC resident inspector.
**** RETRACTION RECEIVED AT 1641 EDT ON 05/15/01 FROM PATRICK DECKER TO LEIGH TROCINE ****
The licensee is retracting this event notification. The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"[...] On [03/08/01], we reported that structural analysis of the in-core spray piping did not consider all the applicable flow conditions. Upon re-evaluation, this is not reportable since: 1) this condition only affected one train of core spray piping, and 2) the flaw condition believed to have been overlooked was determined [analytically] to be bounded by [existing] analyses."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Parker).
"On March 5, 2001, it was discovered that the structural analysis of in-vessel Core Spray piping did not consider all applicable flow conditions. A notification should have been made at that time because the effect of the unanalyzed condition on degradation of plant safety was not considered with respect to all plant operating conditions (i.e., the plant was shut down at the time of discovery). Preliminary analysis results indicated that previous analyses are bounding."
This issue will be resolved before the next plant startup.
The licensee will notify the NRC resident inspector.
**** RETRACTION RECEIVED AT 1641 EDT ON 05/15/01 FROM PATRICK DECKER TO LEIGH TROCINE ****
The licensee is retracting this event notification. The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"[...] On [03/08/01], we reported that structural analysis of the in-core spray piping did not consider all the applicable flow conditions. Upon re-evaluation, this is not reportable since: 1) this condition only affected one train of core spray piping, and 2) the flaw condition believed to have been overlooked was determined [analytically] to be bounded by [existing] analyses."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Parker).