Event Notification Report for March 01, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
02/28/2001 - 03/01/2001
EVENT NUMBERS
378033779737791377923779337794
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 37803
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: KEITH VANDERPOOL
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: KEITH VANDERPOOL
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 03/02/2001
Notification Time: 20:58 [ET]
Event Date: 03/01/2001
Event Time: 22:17 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/02/2001
Notification Time: 20:58 [ET]
Event Date: 03/01/2001
Event Time: 22:17 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/02/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
ANTON VEGEL (R3)
JOSEPH HOLONICH (NMSS)
ANTON VEGEL (R3)
JOSEPH HOLONICH (NMSS)
NON-CFR REPORT INVOLVING A VALID ACTUATION OF A "Q" QUALITY CLASS SAFETY SYSTEM
"On 3/1/01 at 2217 hours, Facility Operations Personnel received an alarm indicating that Cascade Automatic Data Processing (CADP) smoke head 'SXE-2783', located inside the housing near the LAW (low assay withdrawal) compressor 'AB', had actuated. Operations Personnel were taking actions to secure the LAW Station at the time of this actuation. Operations Personnel responded immediately to investigate the cause for the alarm. Upon arrival, no source for the alarm could be identified[. The] smoke head reset at 2226 hours. The PSS (plant shift superintendent) requested a firing plot for all smokeheads in the immediate area be printed for this time frame. The firing plots indicate that five (5) smokeheads did recognize activity however, the activity was minimal and did not actuate any other smoke heads. The PSS notified the Facility Operations Personnel of his findings and requested they have the housing panels removed for internal investigation to identify any evidence of out gassing. Upon completion of this investigation, it was identified that a minor out gassing had occurred. With this information this event is reportable due to the valid actuation of a 'Q' Quality Class Safety System."
Operations personnel informed the NRC resident inspector.
"On 3/1/01 at 2217 hours, Facility Operations Personnel received an alarm indicating that Cascade Automatic Data Processing (CADP) smoke head 'SXE-2783', located inside the housing near the LAW (low assay withdrawal) compressor 'AB', had actuated. Operations Personnel were taking actions to secure the LAW Station at the time of this actuation. Operations Personnel responded immediately to investigate the cause for the alarm. Upon arrival, no source for the alarm could be identified[. The] smoke head reset at 2226 hours. The PSS (plant shift superintendent) requested a firing plot for all smokeheads in the immediate area be printed for this time frame. The firing plots indicate that five (5) smokeheads did recognize activity however, the activity was minimal and did not actuate any other smoke heads. The PSS notified the Facility Operations Personnel of his findings and requested they have the housing panels removed for internal investigation to identify any evidence of out gassing. Upon completion of this investigation, it was identified that a minor out gassing had occurred. With this information this event is reportable due to the valid actuation of a 'Q' Quality Class Safety System."
Operations personnel informed the NRC resident inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37797
Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: KEVIN HUJET
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: KEVIN HUJET
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 03/01/2001
Notification Time: 18:37 [ET]
Event Date: 03/01/2001
Event Time: 09:55 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/01/2001
Notification Time: 18:37 [ET]
Event Date: 03/01/2001
Event Time: 09:55 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/01/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
ANTON VEGEL (R3)
ANTON VEGEL (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 96 | Power Operation | 96 | Power Operation |
ALERT NOTIFICATION SYSTEM DISCOVERED INOPERABLE
"At 0955, KNPP was notified by the Kewaunee County Sheriffs Office of a disconnected cable which supplies the siren encoder for the Alert Notification System. Subsequent investigation identified that the transmitter was removed during remodeling, disabling the system from being activated by the Kewaunee County Dispatch Office, potentially as early as Monday, 2/26/01. Normal siren activation would be accomplished from the Algoma Emergency Operations Center, but the Kewaunee Dispatch location would be used in the event of a fast breaking incident. It is believed that processes in place would have lead the Kewaunee Dispatch to pursue alternate methods of activating the sirens, however, it is not clear that this would have been performed in a timely manner. Compensatory measures have been established for the Kewaunee Dispatch/Sheriff to notify the Kewaunee Emergency Director of the need to activate the sirens. The Emergency Director has the capability to activate the sirens remotely and will maintain this activation function manned until the equipment issues at the Kewaunee Dispatch have been resolved."
The licensee informed local authorities and the NRC resident inspector.
"At 0955, KNPP was notified by the Kewaunee County Sheriffs Office of a disconnected cable which supplies the siren encoder for the Alert Notification System. Subsequent investigation identified that the transmitter was removed during remodeling, disabling the system from being activated by the Kewaunee County Dispatch Office, potentially as early as Monday, 2/26/01. Normal siren activation would be accomplished from the Algoma Emergency Operations Center, but the Kewaunee Dispatch location would be used in the event of a fast breaking incident. It is believed that processes in place would have lead the Kewaunee Dispatch to pursue alternate methods of activating the sirens, however, it is not clear that this would have been performed in a timely manner. Compensatory measures have been established for the Kewaunee Dispatch/Sheriff to notify the Kewaunee Emergency Director of the need to activate the sirens. The Emergency Director has the capability to activate the sirens remotely and will maintain this activation function manned until the equipment issues at the Kewaunee Dispatch have been resolved."
The licensee informed local authorities and the NRC resident inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37791
Facility: SUMMER
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: SIMPSON
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: SIMPSON
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 03/01/2001
Notification Time: 03:19 [ET]
Event Date: 03/01/2001
Event Time: 00:17 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/01/2001
Notification Time: 03:19 [ET]
Event Date: 03/01/2001
Event Time: 00:17 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/01/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
STEPHEN CAHILL (R2)
STEPHEN CAHILL (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M/R | Y | 1 | Startup | 0 | Hot Standby |
REACTOR WAS MANUALLY TRIPPED AT LESS THAN 1% POWER
A manual reactor trip was initiated at 0017 on 3/01/01 due to 2 shutdown control rods remaining on the bottom while initiating control rod withdrawal. This occurred during low power physics testing and a trouble shooting plan for a misaligned Shutdown bank B Control rod (G-9). The rod had already been realigned to the other rods in shutdown bank B @ 43 steps. The Shutdown bank was inserted into the core to zero steps per the trouble shooting plan. After the step counters and rod control were reset and Shutdown bank B rods were being withdrawn, it was discovered that 2 rods had not moved and were still on the bottom with 14 steps demanded. The Shutdown bank was re-inserted to zero steps (fully inserted). After further discussion, the shift supervisor called for a manual reactor trip. The reactor operator tripped the Reactor and the Crew entered the Emergency Operation Procedures (EOP-1.0, Reactor trip/safety injection, and EOP-1.1, Reactor trip recovery). All systems functioned as designed. The problem with the rod control system is not understood and trouble shooting is continuing.
Note: The 2 rods that did not move were rods G-9 and L-5, both in Shutdown bank B.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
A manual reactor trip was initiated at 0017 on 3/01/01 due to 2 shutdown control rods remaining on the bottom while initiating control rod withdrawal. This occurred during low power physics testing and a trouble shooting plan for a misaligned Shutdown bank B Control rod (G-9). The rod had already been realigned to the other rods in shutdown bank B @ 43 steps. The Shutdown bank was inserted into the core to zero steps per the trouble shooting plan. After the step counters and rod control were reset and Shutdown bank B rods were being withdrawn, it was discovered that 2 rods had not moved and were still on the bottom with 14 steps demanded. The Shutdown bank was re-inserted to zero steps (fully inserted). After further discussion, the shift supervisor called for a manual reactor trip. The reactor operator tripped the Reactor and the Crew entered the Emergency Operation Procedures (EOP-1.0, Reactor trip/safety injection, and EOP-1.1, Reactor trip recovery). All systems functioned as designed. The problem with the rod control system is not understood and trouble shooting is continuing.
Note: The 2 rods that did not move were rods G-9 and L-5, both in Shutdown bank B.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37792
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: KICH
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: KICH
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 03/01/2001
Notification Time: 05:42 [ET]
Event Date: 03/01/2001
Event Time: 05:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/01/2001
Notification Time: 05:42 [ET]
Event Date: 03/01/2001
Event Time: 05:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/01/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1)
RICHARD CONTE (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED STATE AND COUNTY OFFICIALS OF A TRANSIT STRIKE IN WESTCHESTER COUNTY.
The licensee was notified that transit employees of the Liberty Bus Company in Westchester County will be going on strike. The licensee made the offsite notifications to assure that the contingency plans are in effect to deal with the strike.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.
The licensee was notified that transit employees of the Liberty Bus Company in Westchester County will be going on strike. The licensee made the offsite notifications to assure that the contingency plans are in effect to deal with the strike.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37793
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [3] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: YOUNG
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [3] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: YOUNG
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 03/01/2001
Notification Time: 06:33 [ET]
Event Date: 03/01/2001
Event Time: 05:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/01/2001
Notification Time: 06:33 [ET]
Event Date: 03/01/2001
Event Time: 05:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/01/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1)
RICHARD CONTE (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED STATE AND COUNTY OFFICIALS OF A TRANSIT STRIKE IN WESTCHESTER COUNTY.
The licensee was notified that transit employees of the Liberty Bus Company in Westchester County will be going on strike. The licensee made the offsite notifications to assure that the contingency plans are in effect to deal with the strike.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
The licensee was notified that transit employees of the Liberty Bus Company in Westchester County will be going on strike. The licensee made the offsite notifications to assure that the contingency plans are in effect to deal with the strike.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37794
Facility: SOUTH TEXAS
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ROBERT BRINKLEY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ROBERT BRINKLEY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 03/01/2001
Notification Time: 12:55 [ET]
Event Date: 03/01/2001
Event Time: 08:22 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/01/2001
Notification Time: 12:55 [ET]
Event Date: 03/01/2001
Event Time: 08:22 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/01/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
LINDA HOWELL (R4)
LINDA HOWELL (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | M/R | Y | 95 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOSS OF OPERATING CIRCULATING WATER PUMPS
"South Texas Project Unit 2 makes the following report in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A):
"At 08:22 CST on 3/01/01, a manual Reactor Trip was initiated due to failure of a switchyard breaker and subsequent loss of all operating Circulating Water Pumps. All Control Rods fully inserted into the Reactor Core. The Auxiliary Feedwater system actuated on low-low Steam Generator Water Level and a Feedwater isolation signal occurred as expected on a trip from 95% power. Pressurizer heater group 'A' did not energize on low RCS pressure as required. Cause of the heater group to fail to energize is not known at this time. All four (4) Reactor Coolant pumps remain in operation and decay heat is currently being removed via the atmospheric steam dumps. No radiation above state, federal, and plant operational limits was measured by South Texas Project's radiation monitoring system."
The licensee is presently making efforts to restore an operating Circulating Water Pump so as to establish Main Condenser vacuum. Three Circulating Water Pumps were operating at the time with the fourth out-of-service. The licensee has a measured 20gpd Steam Generator tube leakage. The offsite rad release is within allowable limits. No other safety equipment is out of service. The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector.
"South Texas Project Unit 2 makes the following report in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A):
"At 08:22 CST on 3/01/01, a manual Reactor Trip was initiated due to failure of a switchyard breaker and subsequent loss of all operating Circulating Water Pumps. All Control Rods fully inserted into the Reactor Core. The Auxiliary Feedwater system actuated on low-low Steam Generator Water Level and a Feedwater isolation signal occurred as expected on a trip from 95% power. Pressurizer heater group 'A' did not energize on low RCS pressure as required. Cause of the heater group to fail to energize is not known at this time. All four (4) Reactor Coolant pumps remain in operation and decay heat is currently being removed via the atmospheric steam dumps. No radiation above state, federal, and plant operational limits was measured by South Texas Project's radiation monitoring system."
The licensee is presently making efforts to restore an operating Circulating Water Pump so as to establish Main Condenser vacuum. Three Circulating Water Pumps were operating at the time with the fourth out-of-service. The licensee has a measured 20gpd Steam Generator tube leakage. The offsite rad release is within allowable limits. No other safety equipment is out of service. The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector.