Event Notification Report for February 14, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
02/13/2001 - 02/14/2001
EVENT NUMBERS
3774937750377433774437747
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37749
Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BRUCE SCHOENBACH
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BRUCE SCHOENBACH
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 02/14/2001
Notification Time: 17:05 [ET]
Event Date: 02/14/2001
Event Time: 08:51 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/16/2001
Notification Time: 17:05 [ET]
Event Date: 02/14/2001
Event Time: 08:51 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/16/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4)
GREG PICK (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
BOTH TRAINS OF CONTAINMENT COOLERS AND ONE TRAIN OF CONTAINMENT SPRAY INOPERABLE
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"On 2/14/01, the 'A' train containment cooling train was removed from service at 0507 CST for associated circuit breaker work. At 0851 CST the 'B' Train Essential Service Water pump was started to support performance of the 'A' Train SIS/CIS Slave Relay Test.
"The 'B' Essential Service Water pump failed to achieve rated flow and pressure and was declared inoperable at 0851 CST. This resulted in entry into Technical Specification LCO 3.6.6, Required Action F.1 for both trains of containment coolers inoperable and one train ('B') of Containment Spray inoperable. LCO 3.6.6 Required Action F.1 also requires entry into LCO 3.0.3. Technical Specification 3.0.3 was entered at 0851 CST and exited at 1123 CST when the 'A' train of Containment Cooling was returned to service. The plant remains in Technical Specification LCO 3.7.8 Required Action A.1 (72-Hour Action Statement) for one train ('B') of Essential Service Water inoperable.
"This condition at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material or mitigate the consequences for an accident. It was concluded that this event was reportable per 10CFR50.72(b) (3) (v) since:
(1) Both trains of containment cooling were lost as a result of the unanticipated failure of the 'B' train Essential Service Water pump in conjunction with the 'A' train containment coolers being removed from service.
(2) Cascading through technical specification resulted in the loss of 'B' train containment spray system.
"The failure of the 'B' train Essential Service Water pump is under evaluation."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
UPDATE 1706 2/15/2001 VIA FACSIMILE TO STRANSKY * * *
"Upon investigation of the 'B' Essential Service Water pump problem, an obstruction was found in the suction of the pump. The obstruction was subsequently removed and the pump was then started to evaluate the operability condition of 'B' Essential Service Water pump. The pump was evaluated for normal flow, discharge pressure, and vibration. All parameters were found within normal operating limits, the 'B' Essential Service Water pump was declared Operable at 0231 on 2/15/O1 and Technical Specifications 3.7.8.A.1 and 3.8.1.B were exited."
Notified R4DO (Pick).
*** UPDATE AT 0615 ON 02/16/01 - LEIGH TROCINE CALLED SITE (JOHN DAMPS) ***
The obstruction was a 20-foot long piece of tygon tubing. It was reported that the tubing had been hanging from a funnel near a hole in a pre-lube tank for the pump's seals. Apparently, the tubing fell into a drain and made its way to the pump suction.
The licensee stated that the resident inspectors were aware of this information. The NRC operations center notified the R4DO (Pick).
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"On 2/14/01, the 'A' train containment cooling train was removed from service at 0507 CST for associated circuit breaker work. At 0851 CST the 'B' Train Essential Service Water pump was started to support performance of the 'A' Train SIS/CIS Slave Relay Test.
"The 'B' Essential Service Water pump failed to achieve rated flow and pressure and was declared inoperable at 0851 CST. This resulted in entry into Technical Specification LCO 3.6.6, Required Action F.1 for both trains of containment coolers inoperable and one train ('B') of Containment Spray inoperable. LCO 3.6.6 Required Action F.1 also requires entry into LCO 3.0.3. Technical Specification 3.0.3 was entered at 0851 CST and exited at 1123 CST when the 'A' train of Containment Cooling was returned to service. The plant remains in Technical Specification LCO 3.7.8 Required Action A.1 (72-Hour Action Statement) for one train ('B') of Essential Service Water inoperable.
"This condition at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material or mitigate the consequences for an accident. It was concluded that this event was reportable per 10CFR50.72(b) (3) (v) since:
(1) Both trains of containment cooling were lost as a result of the unanticipated failure of the 'B' train Essential Service Water pump in conjunction with the 'A' train containment coolers being removed from service.
(2) Cascading through technical specification resulted in the loss of 'B' train containment spray system.
"The failure of the 'B' train Essential Service Water pump is under evaluation."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
UPDATE 1706 2/15/2001 VIA FACSIMILE TO STRANSKY * * *
"Upon investigation of the 'B' Essential Service Water pump problem, an obstruction was found in the suction of the pump. The obstruction was subsequently removed and the pump was then started to evaluate the operability condition of 'B' Essential Service Water pump. The pump was evaluated for normal flow, discharge pressure, and vibration. All parameters were found within normal operating limits, the 'B' Essential Service Water pump was declared Operable at 0231 on 2/15/O1 and Technical Specifications 3.7.8.A.1 and 3.8.1.B were exited."
Notified R4DO (Pick).
*** UPDATE AT 0615 ON 02/16/01 - LEIGH TROCINE CALLED SITE (JOHN DAMPS) ***
The obstruction was a 20-foot long piece of tygon tubing. It was reported that the tubing had been hanging from a funnel near a hole in a pre-lube tank for the pump's seals. Apparently, the tubing fell into a drain and made its way to the pump suction.
The licensee stated that the resident inspectors were aware of this information. The NRC operations center notified the R4DO (Pick).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37750
Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: GARY HARRINGTON
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: GARY HARRINGTON
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 02/14/2001
Notification Time: 20:00 [ET]
Event Date: 02/14/2001
Event Time: 16:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/14/2001
Notification Time: 20:00 [ET]
Event Date: 02/14/2001
Event Time: 16:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/14/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3)
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 96 | Power Operation | 96 | Power Operation |
ANALYSES OF AN ELECTRICAL BOX DOES NOT MEET THE FIRE RESISTANCE OF APPENDIX R
The Kewaunee Engineering staff, while conducting a review, recognized that they could provide no analyses to support compliance to 10CFR50, Appendix R, for an electrical wiring pull box. The box provides an enclosure for dedicated safe shutdown equipment wiring, 'A' train equipment. The box is located in an alternate safe shutdown equipment room, 'B' train, where the box provides protection against fire. However, though the analyses of the box provides assurance that the design will protect the 'A' train equipment wiring from a fire, it does not provide a three hour barrier consistent with Appendix R requirements. Therefore, this places the plant in an unanalyzed condition. The box was designed and installed in the early to mid 1980s. Compensatory measures have been taken to ensure continued safe plant operation.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The Kewaunee Engineering staff, while conducting a review, recognized that they could provide no analyses to support compliance to 10CFR50, Appendix R, for an electrical wiring pull box. The box provides an enclosure for dedicated safe shutdown equipment wiring, 'A' train equipment. The box is located in an alternate safe shutdown equipment room, 'B' train, where the box provides protection against fire. However, though the analyses of the box provides assurance that the design will protect the 'A' train equipment wiring from a fire, it does not provide a three hour barrier consistent with Appendix R requirements. Therefore, this places the plant in an unanalyzed condition. The box was designed and installed in the early to mid 1980s. Compensatory measures have been taken to ensure continued safe plant operation.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37743
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MARK LEONE
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MARK LEONE
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 02/14/2001
Notification Time: 02:51 [ET]
Event Date: 02/14/2001
Event Time: 01:50 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/14/2001
Notification Time: 02:51 [ET]
Event Date: 02/14/2001
Event Time: 01:50 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/14/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
CLIFFORD ANDERSON (R1)
JOHN ZWOLINSKI (NRR)
CLIFFORD ANDERSON (R1)
JOHN ZWOLINSKI (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
THE LOSS OF A 480-VOLT BUS DUE TO A PERSONNEL ERROR DURING SURVEILLANCE TESTING RESULTED IN THE AUTOMATIC START OF THREE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS.
At 0150 on 02/14/01, 480-volt bus 3A was lost due to incorrect operation of a switch during performance of a surveillance test. An individual performing the test needed to simultaneously hold a switch in the bypass position while a test button was pressed, and the switch was not held in the correct position. As a result, an undervoltage signal was inserted on the bus when the test button was pushed, and all three emergency diesel generators automatically started as designed.
The licensee stated that the emergency diesel generators do not automatically load on the loss of an internal bus and that all automatic functions operated properly. The licensee also stated that the loss of any 480-volt bus places the unit in a shutdown action statement in accordance with Technical Specification 3.0.1. However, power (via an emergency diesel generator) was restored to the bus in accordance with procedures at 0215, and restoration of power satisfied the action statement requirements in Technical Specification 3.0.1 within 25 minutes. The licensee is currently in the process of restoring normal bus power supply.
The licensee stated that bus 3A is one of the power supplies for the 22 safety injection pump. This bus also supplies power to the 21 residual heat removal pump, 22 and 25 service water pumps, 24 fan cooler unit, 21 auxiliary boiler feed pump, 22 charging pump, 21 backup heater for the pressurizer, and 23 instrument bus (via the 23 battery charger).
The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector and applicable government agencies. The licensee may also issue a press release.
At 0150 on 02/14/01, 480-volt bus 3A was lost due to incorrect operation of a switch during performance of a surveillance test. An individual performing the test needed to simultaneously hold a switch in the bypass position while a test button was pressed, and the switch was not held in the correct position. As a result, an undervoltage signal was inserted on the bus when the test button was pushed, and all three emergency diesel generators automatically started as designed.
The licensee stated that the emergency diesel generators do not automatically load on the loss of an internal bus and that all automatic functions operated properly. The licensee also stated that the loss of any 480-volt bus places the unit in a shutdown action statement in accordance with Technical Specification 3.0.1. However, power (via an emergency diesel generator) was restored to the bus in accordance with procedures at 0215, and restoration of power satisfied the action statement requirements in Technical Specification 3.0.1 within 25 minutes. The licensee is currently in the process of restoring normal bus power supply.
The licensee stated that bus 3A is one of the power supplies for the 22 safety injection pump. This bus also supplies power to the 21 residual heat removal pump, 22 and 25 service water pumps, 24 fan cooler unit, 21 auxiliary boiler feed pump, 22 charging pump, 21 backup heater for the pressurizer, and 23 instrument bus (via the 23 battery charger).
The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector and applicable government agencies. The licensee may also issue a press release.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 37744
Facility: HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE PRODUCTION
NRC Notified By: HUGH ROBERTS
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE PRODUCTION
NRC Notified By: HUGH ROBERTS
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 02/14/2001
Notification Time: 07:44 [ET]
Event Date: 02/14/2001
Event Time: 02:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/14/2001
Notification Time: 07:44 [ET]
Event Date: 02/14/2001
Event Time: 02:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/14/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
40.60(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
10 CFR Section:
40.60(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3)
FRED BROWN (NMSS)
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3)
FRED BROWN (NMSS)
SANITARY WELL WATER FAILURE DUE TO A LINE RUPTURE (24-Hour Report involving the potential inability to mitigate the circumstances of an accident)
Honeywell Metropolis Works is a fuel cycle facility that performs UF6 conversion.
At approximately 0230 CST, a 6-inch diameter sanitary process line ruptured. As a result, the licensee secured (shut down) both the safety showers and the process. The ruptured line has been isolated, and process water has been valved into the safety showers. However, the licensee has not yet brought up the process. Repair planning is underway.
The licensee plans to notify the NRC Region 3 office, an onsite NRC inspector (Mary Thomas), and the NRC resident inspector at Paducah (Courtney Blanchard). (The USEC Paducah facility is located across the river.)
Call the NRC operations officer for a licensee contact telephone number.
Honeywell Metropolis Works is a fuel cycle facility that performs UF6 conversion.
At approximately 0230 CST, a 6-inch diameter sanitary process line ruptured. As a result, the licensee secured (shut down) both the safety showers and the process. The ruptured line has been isolated, and process water has been valved into the safety showers. However, the licensee has not yet brought up the process. Repair planning is underway.
The licensee plans to notify the NRC Region 3 office, an onsite NRC inspector (Mary Thomas), and the NRC resident inspector at Paducah (Courtney Blanchard). (The USEC Paducah facility is located across the river.)
Call the NRC operations officer for a licensee contact telephone number.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37747
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: PHIL SANTINI
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: PHIL SANTINI
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 02/14/2001
Notification Time: 10:49 [ET]
Event Date: 02/14/2001
Event Time: 04:08 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/14/2001
Notification Time: 10:49 [ET]
Event Date: 02/14/2001
Event Time: 04:08 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/14/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
CLIFFORD ANDERSON (R1)
TAD MARSH (NRR)
CLIFFORD ANDERSON (R1)
TAD MARSH (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HIGH PRESSURE FIRE HEADER IMPAIRMENT AND SURVEILLANCE PER STATION ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER (SAO) 703 (24-Hour Report in accordance with the license)
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"The high pressure Fire Water Protection System is degraded due to planned maintenance work. The inner and outer high-pressure fire headers are split to provide protection for work on the valves for [the] 12 Fire Main Booster Pump. [The] 12 Fire Main Booster Pump is inoperable during this tag-out. The diesel fire pump is in service as the alternate fire protection for the outside fire header. [The] 11 Fire Main Booster Pump is in service for the inside header. SAO-703 states [that] one fire main booster pump out of service is a 7-day action statement to return it to operable status. The headers being separated or any part of the fire protection piping or valves not being able to perform [their] function other than the specific instances described in SAO-703 [require] an alternate fire protection system shall be established. This was established within 24 hours to ensure compliance with SAO-703 as described above. A special report shall be submitted to the NRC Regional Administrator of the Region 1 Office outlining this issue within 14 days."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and plans to notify the NRC Region 1 office (Pete Eselgroth).
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"The high pressure Fire Water Protection System is degraded due to planned maintenance work. The inner and outer high-pressure fire headers are split to provide protection for work on the valves for [the] 12 Fire Main Booster Pump. [The] 12 Fire Main Booster Pump is inoperable during this tag-out. The diesel fire pump is in service as the alternate fire protection for the outside fire header. [The] 11 Fire Main Booster Pump is in service for the inside header. SAO-703 states [that] one fire main booster pump out of service is a 7-day action statement to return it to operable status. The headers being separated or any part of the fire protection piping or valves not being able to perform [their] function other than the specific instances described in SAO-703 [require] an alternate fire protection system shall be established. This was established within 24 hours to ensure compliance with SAO-703 as described above. A special report shall be submitted to the NRC Regional Administrator of the Region 1 Office outlining this issue within 14 days."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and plans to notify the NRC Region 1 office (Pete Eselgroth).