Event Notification Report for February 06, 2001

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT DECLARED INOPERABLE

Primary Containment was declared inoperable at 0148 CST on February 6, 2001, due to the failure of meeting the acceptance criteria for the suppression chamber to drywell vacuum breaker operation.

While performing the 31 day surveillance, PC-AO-NRV30, suppression chamber to drywell vacuum breaker failed to indicate full close. The valve was subsequently stroked a second time and full closure indication was received. Estimated time of 2 minutes and 6 seconds when valve did not indicate full close. During this time frame when the valve was not indicating full close, Primary Containment was inoperable. Upon full closure of the valve, Primary Containment was returned to operable status.

Engineering continues to evaluate the condition. TS action statement of LCO 3.6.1.8 B, requires the vacuum breaker to be closed in 12 hours. Required action not completed in the completion time requires the reactor to be in Mode 3 (Hot Shutdown) in twelve hours in Mode 4 (Cold Shutdown) in thirty-six hours.

The NRC Senior and Resident Inspectors have been notified.

* * * RETRACTED AT 1638 EST ON 2/20/01 BY ANDREW OHRABLO TO FANGIE JONES * * *

"The suppression chamber to drywell vacuum breaker has two types of position indication available. They are a disc position switch, which only provides a red light indication for open, and a hinge position switch, which provides a red light indication for open and a green light indication for closed. Subsequent evaluation determined that the hinge position indication did show the vacuum breaker in the closed position upon the initial stroking and is adequate for making this determination, i.e., proper calibration. The disc position switch did not turn out the red indication light because of the slow closure of the disc due to what is believed to be a faulty non-essential air operator.

"CNS investigation has found that the suppression chamber to drywell vacuum breaker was capable of performing its safety function in the open and close directions during this event. The suppression function of the Primary containment was not degraded as originally thought. Therefore, this event is not reportable under the requirements of 10CFR50.72 and event 37719 is retracted."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R4DO (Linda Smith) was notified.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING A MISSING DENSITY GAGE

The Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety reported that a general license density gauge source used by Best Food in their Summit/Argo facility was missing. The source, a 100 mCi Am-241, was installed in an Industrial Dynamics model CI-2C series density gauge. The device without the source, i.e., detector, was in storage in a vault and not in use at the time. The last known presence of the source was on 11/3/97. State inspectors observed that the source was missing on two separate occasions (12/7/00 and 1/5/01) during construction activities. Best Foods conducted extensive interviews with current employees and was not able to determine the whereabouts of the source. A consultant was hired by the company to assist in the investigation. After surveying about 200,000 sq. ft. the consultants speculated that source was either disposed of as scrap or returned to the manufacturer with no record keeping or possibly stolen. The manufacturer who is located in Torrance, CA was contacted and they too have no record of a source return. Best Foods intends to continue their investigation and the State of Illinois is available to assist, as requested. There are no plans at the present to involve law enforcement at this time. The manufacturer's specification indicates an exposure of 5 mR/hr at 15 inches from this unshielded alpha source. The State of Illinois notified the NRC R3ASO(Lynch).

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING A STOLEN PORTABLE GAUGE

"This is notification of an event in Washington state as reported to the WA
Department of Health, Division of Radiation Protection.

"STATUS: new

Licensee: GeoEngineers
City and state: Redmond, WA
License number: WN-I0204-1
Type of license: Portable Gauge

Date of event: February 6, 2001
Location of Event: North Bend, WA

ABSTRACT: An authorized user had taken his work equipment home with him in preparation for an early start to a temporary job site. At approximately 5:45 AM the authorized user loaded his work truck with his equipment,
including a CPN model MC-3DR portable gauge, serial number MD0069648, which contains 10 millicuries of cesium 137 and 50 millicuries of americium 241/beryllium. The gauge, in its orange transport box, was loaded into the back of an open-bed full-size Chevy pickup and secured to the bed of the truck with a cable and lock. The authorized user left his truck running and went back into the house to finish a cup of coffee; when he came out
again his truck was gone. He reported the theft to the King County Sheriff and to his RSO. The Washington Department of Health was notified about 11:45 AM. The Department advised the licensee to offer a reward. As of this report (2 PM, February 6), the vehicle and gauge are still missing.

What is the notification or reporting criteria involved? WAC 246-221-240
(Reports of stolen, lost or missing radiation sources.)"

WA event report WA-01-004

TURBINE GENERATOR LOCKOUT - REACTOR TRIP

A turbine generator lockout caused a unit 2 reactor trip. All rods fully inserted. A loss of main condenser vacuum caused operators to shut the Main Steam Isolation Valves. Decay heat is being removed by use of the steam generator atmospheric dumps. The steam generators were initially fed by the auxiliary feedpumps, but are now being fed using the normal feedwater system. The plant is stable in mode 3.

The cause of the turbine generator lockout is not known. The loss of condenser vacuum was caused by the cross over steam dumps opening. These valves opened because of a turbine overspeed condition, believed to have occurred as the turbine was unloaded because of the generator trip.

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.