Event Notification Report for February 01, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/31/2001 - 02/01/2001
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37708
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID T. WALSH
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID T. WALSH
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 02/01/2001
Notification Time: 11:12 [ET]
Event Date: 02/01/2001
Event Time: 07:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/01/2001
Notification Time: 11:12 [ET]
Event Date: 02/01/2001
Event Time: 07:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/01/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
DANIEL HOLODY (R1)
DANIEL HOLODY (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
DISCOVERY THAT THE MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE (MSIV) MAX PATH LIMIT COULD HAVE BEEN EXCEEDED DUE TO INABILITY TO DEPRESSURIZE THE STEAM LINE
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"[The] Unit 2 [Reactor Core Isolation Cooling] System was removed from service to perform scheduled maintenance. Control Room operators closed the inboard containment isolation valve, HV249F007, to depressurize the steam line. The steam line did not depressurize as expected. Operators then closed the outboard containment isolation valve, HV249F008, and were successful in isolating the pathway and depressurizing the steam piping. At 07:30, the inboard isolation valves were declared inoperable. Due to the inability to depressurize the steam line and following a technical review of the system response and supporting data, it appears that the MSIV max path limit could have been exceeded, and therefore, this event is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"[The] Unit 2 [Reactor Core Isolation Cooling] System was removed from service to perform scheduled maintenance. Control Room operators closed the inboard containment isolation valve, HV249F007, to depressurize the steam line. The steam line did not depressurize as expected. Operators then closed the outboard containment isolation valve, HV249F008, and were successful in isolating the pathway and depressurizing the steam piping. At 07:30, the inboard isolation valves were declared inoperable. Due to the inability to depressurize the steam line and following a technical review of the system response and supporting data, it appears that the MSIV max path limit could have been exceeded, and therefore, this event is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 37709
Rep Org: ROSEMOUNT NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTS, INC.
Licensee: ROSEMOUNT NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTS, INC.
Region: 3
City: EDEN PRAIRIE State: MN
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JEFFREY W. SCHMITT
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Licensee: ROSEMOUNT NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTS, INC.
Region: 3
City: EDEN PRAIRIE State: MN
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JEFFREY W. SCHMITT
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 02/01/2001
Notification Time: 13:11 [ET]
Event Date: 02/01/2001
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/01/2001
Notification Time: 13:11 [ET]
Event Date: 02/01/2001
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/01/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3)
VERN HODGE (NRR)
DAVID HILLS (R3)
VERN HODGE (NRR)
10 CFR PART 21 REPORT FOR MODEL 353C AND 353C1 CONDUIT SEALS
"This notification relates to Model 353C and 353C1 conduit seals which exhibit an electrical short condition. Any model 353C and 353C1 conduit seal which does not indicate a short condition is deemed acceptable and this notification is not applicable to such units.
"This notification is not applicable to units which are currently operational, or have successfully completed a functional test by the customer that would verify the insulation resistance of the lead wires.
"RNII [Rosemount Nuclear Instruments, Inc.] does not have sufficient information to determine the safety impact related to plant applications. Licensees must determine the impact on plant operations and plant safety and take action as deemed necessary."
"This notification relates to Model 353C and 353C1 conduit seals which exhibit an electrical short condition. Any model 353C and 353C1 conduit seal which does not indicate a short condition is deemed acceptable and this notification is not applicable to such units.
"This notification is not applicable to units which are currently operational, or have successfully completed a functional test by the customer that would verify the insulation resistance of the lead wires.
"RNII [Rosemount Nuclear Instruments, Inc.] does not have sufficient information to determine the safety impact related to plant applications. Licensees must determine the impact on plant operations and plant safety and take action as deemed necessary."