Event Notification Report for January 30, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/29/2001 - 01/30/2001
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37701
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: TEMPOE
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: TEMPOE
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 01/30/2001
Notification Time: 01:34 [ET]
Event Date: 01/30/2001
Event Time: 00:15 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/30/2001
Notification Time: 01:34 [ET]
Event Date: 01/30/2001
Event Time: 00:15 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/30/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3)
DAVID HILLS (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation |
SAFETY RELIEF VALVES WERE DECLARED INOPERABLE
A Technical Specification shutdown was initiated as required by T.S. 3.6.E.2 following the discovery that not all of Section XI requirements were met with respect to the safety relief valves. The safety relief valves were declared inoperable @ 1830 on 1/29/01. The reactor conditions shall be as follows within 24 hrs: reactor pressure <110 psig and reactor temperature <345°F.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
* * * UPDATE ON 1/30/01 @ 1049 BY CORRIGAN TO GOULD * * *
"At 0126 CST, January 30, 2001, NRC approved the Licensee's verbal request for a notice of enforcement discretion (NOED) concerning Technical Specification 3.15.A. 1. Specifically, this allows us to use the corrective action process, including consideration of Generic Letter 91-18, to resolve non-conformances with Section Xl of the ASME code. In the case of SRVs, a favorable operability determination will allow us to consider SRVs operable in spite of existing non-conformances with Section Xl of the ASME code. Further, the NOED allows us to assess operability of any additional identified non-conformances with Section Xl through our condition report process rather than to immediately declare the affected component inoperable as required by Technical Specification 3.15.A.1. Continuance of this NOED is contingent on NRC receipt, by close of business on February 1, 2001, of our written NOED request and a license amendment request to move inservice inspection requirements to a licensee controlled program. The NOED remains in effect until the license amendment request is dispositioned (expected about March 5, 2001)."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
The Reg 3 RDO(Hills) was notified.
A Technical Specification shutdown was initiated as required by T.S. 3.6.E.2 following the discovery that not all of Section XI requirements were met with respect to the safety relief valves. The safety relief valves were declared inoperable @ 1830 on 1/29/01. The reactor conditions shall be as follows within 24 hrs: reactor pressure <110 psig and reactor temperature <345°F.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
* * * UPDATE ON 1/30/01 @ 1049 BY CORRIGAN TO GOULD * * *
"At 0126 CST, January 30, 2001, NRC approved the Licensee's verbal request for a notice of enforcement discretion (NOED) concerning Technical Specification 3.15.A. 1. Specifically, this allows us to use the corrective action process, including consideration of Generic Letter 91-18, to resolve non-conformances with Section Xl of the ASME code. In the case of SRVs, a favorable operability determination will allow us to consider SRVs operable in spite of existing non-conformances with Section Xl of the ASME code. Further, the NOED allows us to assess operability of any additional identified non-conformances with Section Xl through our condition report process rather than to immediately declare the affected component inoperable as required by Technical Specification 3.15.A.1. Continuance of this NOED is contingent on NRC receipt, by close of business on February 1, 2001, of our written NOED request and a license amendment request to move inservice inspection requirements to a licensee controlled program. The NOED remains in effect until the license amendment request is dispositioned (expected about March 5, 2001)."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
The Reg 3 RDO(Hills) was notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37702
Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: RANDY HAISLET
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: RANDY HAISLET
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 01/30/2001
Notification Time: 19:40 [ET]
Event Date: 01/30/2001
Event Time: 17:25 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/30/2001
Notification Time: 19:40 [ET]
Event Date: 01/30/2001
Event Time: 17:25 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/30/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
DANIEL HOLODY (R1)
DANIEL HOLODY (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOW CONTROL ROOM PRESSURE WHEN CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION IN OPERATION
During testing of CRHEAFS (Control Room High Efficiency Air Filtration System) the licensee was not able to maintain the control room at a positive pressure as required. CRHEAFS was inoperable at the time the problem was noted due to planned maintenance (but still available). The area outside the control room is at a higher pressure causing air inflow into the control room while CRHEAFS is operating. When the ventilation in the area outside the control is secured, the proper positive pressure is maintained in the control room.
Procedures are being revised to require securing of the outside ventilation system if CRHEAFS operation is required. The licensee is continuing to investigate this problem and has notified the NRC resident inspector.
During testing of CRHEAFS (Control Room High Efficiency Air Filtration System) the licensee was not able to maintain the control room at a positive pressure as required. CRHEAFS was inoperable at the time the problem was noted due to planned maintenance (but still available). The area outside the control room is at a higher pressure causing air inflow into the control room while CRHEAFS is operating. When the ventilation in the area outside the control is secured, the proper positive pressure is maintained in the control room.
Procedures are being revised to require securing of the outside ventilation system if CRHEAFS operation is required. The licensee is continuing to investigate this problem and has notified the NRC resident inspector.