Event Notification Report for January 25, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/24/2001 - 01/25/2001
EVENT NUMBERS
376903769137696376843768837689
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37690
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: STEVE CHRISTIAN
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: STEVE CHRISTIAN
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 01/25/2001
Notification Time: 20:10 [ET]
Event Date: 01/25/2001
Event Time: 16:53 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/25/2001
Notification Time: 20:10 [ET]
Event Date: 01/25/2001
Event Time: 16:53 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/25/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
JAMES CREED (R3)
JAMES CREED (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO A SNUBBER ISSUE
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"A review of compliance with Plant Technical Specifications relative to safety-related snubber operability requirements has revealed that certain elements of the inservice inspection and testing program were not satisfied. The discovery and resultant evaluation has also determined that the 72-hour LCO applicable to snubbers has elapsed. An engineering evaluation to support an operability determination of these snubbers is in progress. In the interim the plant has defaulted to the most restrictive LCO associated with the subject equipment and has commenced an orderly shutdown."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"A review of compliance with Plant Technical Specifications relative to safety-related snubber operability requirements has revealed that certain elements of the inservice inspection and testing program were not satisfied. The discovery and resultant evaluation has also determined that the 72-hour LCO applicable to snubbers has elapsed. An engineering evaluation to support an operability determination of these snubbers is in progress. In the interim the plant has defaulted to the most restrictive LCO associated with the subject equipment and has commenced an orderly shutdown."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37691
Facility: TURKEY POINT
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [] [4] []
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: THOMAS S. WACH
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [] [4] []
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: THOMAS S. WACH
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 01/25/2001
Notification Time: 21:03 [ET]
Event Date: 01/25/2001
Event Time: 19:51 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/30/2001
Notification Time: 21:03 [ET]
Event Date: 01/25/2001
Event Time: 19:51 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/30/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4 | M/R | Y | 50 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO TWO DROPPED RODS IN DIFFERENT BANKS
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"While conducting a plant shutdown due to a dropped rod in shutdown bank 'B' (H-6), another rod in control bank 'D' (H-10) dropped. In accordance with [procedure] 4-ONOP-028.3, 'Dropped RCC,' with two dropped rods in different banks the reactor was manually tripped and [procedure] 4-EOP-E-0 was entered. All equipment operated as expected, and [the] plant is stable in Mode 3. [An] investigation is in progress to determine [the] reason for [the] dropped rods."
The licensee stated that all rods fully inserted. Auxiliary feedwater automatically started as expected and has since been secured. Normal feedwater is currently being utilized to supply water to the steam generators, and the main condenser is available as the heat sink for secondary steam. Normal charging, makeup, and letdown are being utilized for primary system inventory control. Pressurizer heaters and sprays are being utilized for primary system pressure control, and the reactor coolant pumps are being utilized for primary system transport control. Offsite power is available. There were no emergency core cooling system actuations, and none were required.
The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector.
* * * UPDATE ON 1/30/01 @ 1123 BY HICKEY TO GOULD * * *
The H-6 rod drop was determined to be due to a circuit discontinuity In a bulkhead connector. One hundred percent of the bulkhead connectors for the 45 Control Rod Drive Mechanisms (CRDMs) were inspected. Investigation is in progress to determine the cause of the connector discontinuity.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. The Reg 2 RDO(Wert) was notified.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"While conducting a plant shutdown due to a dropped rod in shutdown bank 'B' (H-6), another rod in control bank 'D' (H-10) dropped. In accordance with [procedure] 4-ONOP-028.3, 'Dropped RCC,' with two dropped rods in different banks the reactor was manually tripped and [procedure] 4-EOP-E-0 was entered. All equipment operated as expected, and [the] plant is stable in Mode 3. [An] investigation is in progress to determine [the] reason for [the] dropped rods."
The licensee stated that all rods fully inserted. Auxiliary feedwater automatically started as expected and has since been secured. Normal feedwater is currently being utilized to supply water to the steam generators, and the main condenser is available as the heat sink for secondary steam. Normal charging, makeup, and letdown are being utilized for primary system inventory control. Pressurizer heaters and sprays are being utilized for primary system pressure control, and the reactor coolant pumps are being utilized for primary system transport control. Offsite power is available. There were no emergency core cooling system actuations, and none were required.
The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector.
* * * UPDATE ON 1/30/01 @ 1123 BY HICKEY TO GOULD * * *
The H-6 rod drop was determined to be due to a circuit discontinuity In a bulkhead connector. One hundred percent of the bulkhead connectors for the 45 Control Rod Drive Mechanisms (CRDMs) were inspected. Investigation is in progress to determine the cause of the connector discontinuity.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. The Reg 2 RDO(Wert) was notified.
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 37696
Rep Org: CITIZENS GENERAL HOSPITAL
Licensee: CITIZENS GENERAL HOSPITAL
Region: 1
City: NEW KENSINGTON State: PA
County: ALLEGHENY
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ANDREW BUKOVITZ
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Licensee: CITIZENS GENERAL HOSPITAL
Region: 1
City: NEW KENSINGTON State: PA
County: ALLEGHENY
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ANDREW BUKOVITZ
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 01/26/2001
Notification Time: 17:58 [ET]
Event Date: 01/25/2001
Event Time: 16:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/30/2001
Notification Time: 17:58 [ET]
Event Date: 01/25/2001
Event Time: 16:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/30/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
Person (Organization):
STEVEN DENNIS (R1)
C.W. (BILL) REAMER (NMSS)
DALE POWERS (R4)
FRANK CONGEL (IRO)
STEVEN DENNIS (R1)
C.W. (BILL) REAMER (NMSS)
DALE POWERS (R4)
FRANK CONGEL (IRO)
DISCOVERY OF THE POSSIBLE LOSS OF TWO GADOLINIUM-153 SOURCES AT CITIZENS GENERAL HOSPITAL IN NEW KENSINGTON, PENNSYLVANIA
Due to an ongoing merger with Allegheny Valley Hospital, Citizens General Hospital ceased nuclear medical activities and properly transferred all sources (except for two gadolinium-153 sources) to Allegheny Valley Hospital (located within approximately 2 miles). The gadolinium sources were not included because Allegheny Valley Hospital was not licensed for gadolinium-153. (A license amendment has been requested.) Accordingly, the gadolinium-153 sources were being kept in Hot Lab at Citizens General Hospital in the meantime.
Approximately 3 weeks ago, a closeout survey was preformed of the Nuclear Medicine Department at Citizens General Hospital (where the gamma camera was located and recorded were done). The results indicated that there were no activities. There was also documentation in place to prohibit use of the Hot Lab because it had not yet been closed out.
It was reported that an unknown individual made arrangements to de-install and sell the gamma camera and other equipment. Two individuals (middlemen for other companies) arrived yesterday (01/25/01) with a crew. The individuals were told that they could take the gamma camera and other items but not to touch the gadolinium sources, which were located in the Hot Lab.
This morning (01/26/01), it was discovered that the gadolinium sources were missing. Apparently, the de-installation crew left a mess and took more than they were authorized to take including a refrigerator, survey meters, signs off the walls, etc. The Director of Materials Management did not have a list. It is currently believed that the sources were removed at approximately 1600 EST on 01/25/01 by an individual who worked for BC Technical, and it was reported that the sources may currently be in Salt Lake City, Utah.
The other individual worked as an independent for Jet Services and was believed to be involved with removal of the gamma camera. The licensee was able to contact this individual, who in turn informed the licensee that the other individual's company (BC Technical in Salt Lake City) had a license to transfer radioactive materials. Therefore, there was an impression that they were doing the hospital a favor by getting rid of sources for the hospital.
The licensee also contacted the company based in Salt Lake City, Utah. The individual who actually removed the sources was not available because he was performing a de-installation at another hospital.
The missing gadolinium sources had an activity of 200 millicuries each approximately 2 years ago. The current activity level was conservatively estimated to be approximately 50 millicuries each.
The licensee has notified the NRC Region 1 office (Michelle Beardsley).
(Call the NRC operations officer for licensee contact information and contact information regarding the individuals involved in the de-installation and removal of equipment.)
* * * UPDATE AT 1330 ON 1/30/01 BY BUKOVITZ, RECEIVED BY WEAVER * * *
The sources were returned to the hospital on 1/27/01. The sources had been shielded the entire time and the radiation field on the exterior of the shielding was less than 1 mr/hr. The licensee has notified the NRC Region 1 office (Michelle Beardsley). The Operations Center notified the R1DO (Holody).
Due to an ongoing merger with Allegheny Valley Hospital, Citizens General Hospital ceased nuclear medical activities and properly transferred all sources (except for two gadolinium-153 sources) to Allegheny Valley Hospital (located within approximately 2 miles). The gadolinium sources were not included because Allegheny Valley Hospital was not licensed for gadolinium-153. (A license amendment has been requested.) Accordingly, the gadolinium-153 sources were being kept in Hot Lab at Citizens General Hospital in the meantime.
Approximately 3 weeks ago, a closeout survey was preformed of the Nuclear Medicine Department at Citizens General Hospital (where the gamma camera was located and recorded were done). The results indicated that there were no activities. There was also documentation in place to prohibit use of the Hot Lab because it had not yet been closed out.
It was reported that an unknown individual made arrangements to de-install and sell the gamma camera and other equipment. Two individuals (middlemen for other companies) arrived yesterday (01/25/01) with a crew. The individuals were told that they could take the gamma camera and other items but not to touch the gadolinium sources, which were located in the Hot Lab.
This morning (01/26/01), it was discovered that the gadolinium sources were missing. Apparently, the de-installation crew left a mess and took more than they were authorized to take including a refrigerator, survey meters, signs off the walls, etc. The Director of Materials Management did not have a list. It is currently believed that the sources were removed at approximately 1600 EST on 01/25/01 by an individual who worked for BC Technical, and it was reported that the sources may currently be in Salt Lake City, Utah.
The other individual worked as an independent for Jet Services and was believed to be involved with removal of the gamma camera. The licensee was able to contact this individual, who in turn informed the licensee that the other individual's company (BC Technical in Salt Lake City) had a license to transfer radioactive materials. Therefore, there was an impression that they were doing the hospital a favor by getting rid of sources for the hospital.
The licensee also contacted the company based in Salt Lake City, Utah. The individual who actually removed the sources was not available because he was performing a de-installation at another hospital.
The missing gadolinium sources had an activity of 200 millicuries each approximately 2 years ago. The current activity level was conservatively estimated to be approximately 50 millicuries each.
The licensee has notified the NRC Region 1 office (Michelle Beardsley).
(Call the NRC operations officer for licensee contact information and contact information regarding the individuals involved in the de-installation and removal of equipment.)
* * * UPDATE AT 1330 ON 1/30/01 BY BUKOVITZ, RECEIVED BY WEAVER * * *
The sources were returned to the hospital on 1/27/01. The sources had been shielded the entire time and the radiation field on the exterior of the shielding was less than 1 mr/hr. The licensee has notified the NRC Region 1 office (Michelle Beardsley). The Operations Center notified the R1DO (Holody).
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37684
Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: M ADRAMSKI
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: M ADRAMSKI
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 01/25/2001
Notification Time: 06:53 [ET]
Event Date: 01/25/2001
Event Time: 02:47 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/23/2001
Notification Time: 06:53 [ET]
Event Date: 01/25/2001
Event Time: 02:47 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/23/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
STEVEN DENNIS (R1)
STEVEN DENNIS (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) DECLARED INOPERABLE.
At 0247 ET on 01/25/01, the flow transmitter controller for HPCI system spiked from zero to approximately 1500 gpm. The HPCI system was in standby lineup at the time. The flow indication has been slowly drifting down.
A similar event occurred on 01/23/01 at 0725ET. HPCI was declared inoperable. The flow transmitter, 23FT-82, and flow switch, 23FS-78, were vented and a small amount of air was noted. The flow indication returned to zero (normal standby indication). After a HPCI operability surveillance test, HPCI was declared operable at 1332 ET on 01/24/01.
After the second flow indication perturbation on 01/25/01, HPCI was again declared inoperable with an LCO start date of 01/23/01 at 0725 ET (7 days to returned HPCI to operable status). The cause of this condition is still under investigation. All other systems are operable.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
* * * RETRACTED AT 1528 EST ON 3/23/01 BY MARK ABRAMSKI TO FANGIE JONES * * *
"Engineering evaluation subsequent to this event has determined that the HPCI system would have performed its' intended function as credited in the LOCA analysis and therefore this 10 CFR 50.72 notification is retracted."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R1DO (Kenneth Jenison) has been notified.
At 0247 ET on 01/25/01, the flow transmitter controller for HPCI system spiked from zero to approximately 1500 gpm. The HPCI system was in standby lineup at the time. The flow indication has been slowly drifting down.
A similar event occurred on 01/23/01 at 0725ET. HPCI was declared inoperable. The flow transmitter, 23FT-82, and flow switch, 23FS-78, were vented and a small amount of air was noted. The flow indication returned to zero (normal standby indication). After a HPCI operability surveillance test, HPCI was declared operable at 1332 ET on 01/24/01.
After the second flow indication perturbation on 01/25/01, HPCI was again declared inoperable with an LCO start date of 01/23/01 at 0725 ET (7 days to returned HPCI to operable status). The cause of this condition is still under investigation. All other systems are operable.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
* * * RETRACTED AT 1528 EST ON 3/23/01 BY MARK ABRAMSKI TO FANGIE JONES * * *
"Engineering evaluation subsequent to this event has determined that the HPCI system would have performed its' intended function as credited in the LOCA analysis and therefore this 10 CFR 50.72 notification is retracted."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R1DO (Kenneth Jenison) has been notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37688
Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: JIM TOTTON
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: JIM TOTTON
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 01/25/2001
Notification Time: 15:02 [ET]
Event Date: 01/25/2001
Event Time: 15:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/25/2001
Notification Time: 15:02 [ET]
Event Date: 01/25/2001
Event Time: 15:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/25/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION REGARDING A STRANDED SEA TURTLE
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"At 1500 on 01/25/01, notification of a sea turtle stranding was made to the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission. [The sea] turtle has minor injuries and require[s] rehabilitation and transport to [the] Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission. Notification [to the NRC was] made due to notification of other government agencies."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"At 1500 on 01/25/01, notification of a sea turtle stranding was made to the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission. [The sea] turtle has minor injuries and require[s] rehabilitation and transport to [the] Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission. Notification [to the NRC was] made due to notification of other government agencies."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37689
Facility: COMANCHE PEAK
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVEN SEWELL
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVEN SEWELL
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 01/25/2001
Notification Time: 17:29 [ET]
Event Date: 01/25/2001
Event Time: 07:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/25/2001
Notification Time: 17:29 [ET]
Event Date: 01/25/2001
Event Time: 07:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/25/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4)
DALE POWERS (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 86 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
FITNESS-FOR-DUTY REPORT REGARDING A CONTRACT SUPERVISOR WHO TESTED POSITIVE FOR ALCOHOL DURING A RANDOM TEST
At 0700 CST on 01/25/01, the licensee received confirmatory results indicating that a contract employee supervisor tested positive for alcohol during a random test. The individual's access has been pulled, and a review of the individual's work has been performed. (Contact the NRC operations officer for additional details.)
HOO NOTE: The licensee stated that the load reduction on Unit 1 (100% power to 86% power) was not related to this event notification. (Contact the NRC operations officer for additional details.)
At 0700 CST on 01/25/01, the licensee received confirmatory results indicating that a contract employee supervisor tested positive for alcohol during a random test. The individual's access has been pulled, and a review of the individual's work has been performed. (Contact the NRC operations officer for additional details.)
HOO NOTE: The licensee stated that the load reduction on Unit 1 (100% power to 86% power) was not related to this event notification. (Contact the NRC operations officer for additional details.)