Event Notification Report for January 11, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/10/2001 - 01/11/2001
General Information or Other
Event Number: 37662
Rep Org: TENNESSEE DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: AEROJET ORDNANCE TENNESSEE, INC.
Region: 2
City: JONESBOROUGH State: TN
County:
License #: S-90009
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DEBRA SHULTZ (via fax)
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Licensee: AEROJET ORDNANCE TENNESSEE, INC.
Region: 2
City: JONESBOROUGH State: TN
County:
License #: S-90009
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DEBRA SHULTZ (via fax)
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 01/12/2001
Notification Time: 15:33 [ET]
Event Date: 01/11/2001
Event Time: 11:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/12/2001
Notification Time: 15:33 [ET]
Event Date: 01/11/2001
Event Time: 11:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/12/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
CHARLES R. OGLE (R2)
JOSEPH HOLONICH (NMSS)
CHARLES R. OGLE (R2)
JOSEPH HOLONICH (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING FIRE IN AN INCINERATOR AIR EFFLUENT CLEANING SYSTEM
"Event description: The licensee called to report a fire in their incinerator's air effluent cleaning system. The fire in the baghouse lasted approximately two hours. The building was evacuated, and onsite personnel extinguished the fire. The baghouse filter has not yet been opened to assess the damage. The area is secured and no routine operations are ongoing at this time. Smears taken in the area were maximum of 100-dpm/100 sq. cm. Clean up of the area has not begun. The total release from this event is estimated to be 0.013 microcuries of depleted uranium. Sample results will be available soon.
"These events do not pose a threat to public health and safety but may be reportable under 1200-2-5-.141(2)c.(4).
"Media attention: None"
"Event description: The licensee called to report a fire in their incinerator's air effluent cleaning system. The fire in the baghouse lasted approximately two hours. The building was evacuated, and onsite personnel extinguished the fire. The baghouse filter has not yet been opened to assess the damage. The area is secured and no routine operations are ongoing at this time. Smears taken in the area were maximum of 100-dpm/100 sq. cm. Clean up of the area has not begun. The total release from this event is estimated to be 0.013 microcuries of depleted uranium. Sample results will be available soon.
"These events do not pose a threat to public health and safety but may be reportable under 1200-2-5-.141(2)c.(4).
"Media attention: None"
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37659
Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: ERIC OLSON
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: ERIC OLSON
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 01/11/2001
Notification Time: 17:37 [ET]
Event Date: 01/11/2001
Event Time: 17:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/11/2001
Notification Time: 17:37 [ET]
Event Date: 01/11/2001
Event Time: 17:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/11/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
DAVID LEW (R1)
DAVID LEW (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
DISCOVERY OF CONDITION INVOLVING INABILITY OF THE LOW PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (LPCI) SYSTEM TO PERFORM DESIGN FUNCTION BETWEEN APRIL 1999 AND JANUARY 2001
"On 1/2/01, discovered incorrect relays (27-B2X2 and 27-B2Z2) had been installed in Bus B6 (480 VAC swing bus) during RFO 12 (April, 1999). The bus transfer logic was declared inoperable at the time and entry was made into a 7-day cold shutdown LCO for LPCI.
"Further analysis of the circuit has determined that the B6 Bus would have remained de-energized following a loss of offsite power if the 'A' side power supply became unavailable (i.e., 'A' Emergency Diesel failed or 'A' 125 VDC Battery failed).
"This condition is outside the design in accordance with Pilgrim Station FSAR.
"The relays were replaced with the correct design and the LPCI LCO cleared at approximately 0745 Sunday, January 7, 2001."
The licensee will inform the NRC resident inspector.
"On 1/2/01, discovered incorrect relays (27-B2X2 and 27-B2Z2) had been installed in Bus B6 (480 VAC swing bus) during RFO 12 (April, 1999). The bus transfer logic was declared inoperable at the time and entry was made into a 7-day cold shutdown LCO for LPCI.
"Further analysis of the circuit has determined that the B6 Bus would have remained de-energized following a loss of offsite power if the 'A' side power supply became unavailable (i.e., 'A' Emergency Diesel failed or 'A' 125 VDC Battery failed).
"This condition is outside the design in accordance with Pilgrim Station FSAR.
"The relays were replaced with the correct design and the LPCI LCO cleared at approximately 0745 Sunday, January 7, 2001."
The licensee will inform the NRC resident inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37665
Facility: OCONEE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: GAMBRELL
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: GAMBRELL
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 01/17/2001
Notification Time: 11:43 [ET]
Event Date: 01/11/2001
Event Time: 11:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/17/2001
Notification Time: 11:43 [ET]
Event Date: 01/11/2001
Event Time: 11:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/17/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
WALTER RODGERS (R2)
WALTER RODGERS (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 18 | Power Operation | 18 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
DURING A SMALL BREAK LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT PEAK CLADDING TEMPERATURES COULD EXCEED 2200 DEGREES F.
B&W Owners Group Preliminary Safety Concern (PSC) was written on July 28, 2000 to document a concern with RELAPS analyses of Core Flood Tank (CFT) line break LOCAs. The issue involves the impact of a 2 minute delay in tripping reactor coolant pumps (RCPs). In the event of a small break loss of cooling accident involving the core flood line, peak cladding temperatures could exceed 2200 degrees F. However, this issue does not impact Oconee during normal operation since Oconee has three high pressure injection (HPI) pumps. The Oconee design basis includes starting a second HPI pump within 10 minutes, which would prevent excessive peak clad temperatures.
On January 17, 2001, at 1100 hours, preliminary analyses revealed that plant conditions, allowed by Oconee Technical Specifications 3.5.2.B and 3.5.2.C may necessitate either reducing reactor power to approximately 50% (versus 75%) or tripping RCPs within 1 minute versus 2 minutes of loss of subcooling margin to maintain clad temperatures less than 2200 degrees F. In these specific plant conditions, the single failure of the second HPI pump or failure of an HPI train would prevent starting a second HPI pump and injecting within 10 minutes.
This is being conservatively reported as a condition that alone could prevent the fulfillment of a safety function. This condition is only a concern during extended operation with one HPI pump or train out of service. Procedural guidance in place requires turning off the RCPs as an immediate manual action in response to loss of subcooling margin. Operators in training typically secure the RCPs well within 1 minute of loss of subcooling margin during unannounced casualty scenarios. Operators are evaluated on the time critical action of securing the ROPs within two minutes; however, the time critical action of securing the RCPs within 1 minute has not yet been validated using our appropriate processes. Therefore, as an interim measure, Oconee intends to reduce thermal power to <50% rated thermal power (RTP) instead of <75% RTP whenever TS 3.5.2.B or 3.5.2.0 is entered. This action ensures that the acceptance criteria of 10CFR50.46 are satisfied.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
Problems encountered during the event: None.
B&W Owners Group Preliminary Safety Concern (PSC) was written on July 28, 2000 to document a concern with RELAPS analyses of Core Flood Tank (CFT) line break LOCAs. The issue involves the impact of a 2 minute delay in tripping reactor coolant pumps (RCPs). In the event of a small break loss of cooling accident involving the core flood line, peak cladding temperatures could exceed 2200 degrees F. However, this issue does not impact Oconee during normal operation since Oconee has three high pressure injection (HPI) pumps. The Oconee design basis includes starting a second HPI pump within 10 minutes, which would prevent excessive peak clad temperatures.
On January 17, 2001, at 1100 hours, preliminary analyses revealed that plant conditions, allowed by Oconee Technical Specifications 3.5.2.B and 3.5.2.C may necessitate either reducing reactor power to approximately 50% (versus 75%) or tripping RCPs within 1 minute versus 2 minutes of loss of subcooling margin to maintain clad temperatures less than 2200 degrees F. In these specific plant conditions, the single failure of the second HPI pump or failure of an HPI train would prevent starting a second HPI pump and injecting within 10 minutes.
This is being conservatively reported as a condition that alone could prevent the fulfillment of a safety function. This condition is only a concern during extended operation with one HPI pump or train out of service. Procedural guidance in place requires turning off the RCPs as an immediate manual action in response to loss of subcooling margin. Operators in training typically secure the RCPs well within 1 minute of loss of subcooling margin during unannounced casualty scenarios. Operators are evaluated on the time critical action of securing the ROPs within two minutes; however, the time critical action of securing the RCPs within 1 minute has not yet been validated using our appropriate processes. Therefore, as an interim measure, Oconee intends to reduce thermal power to <50% rated thermal power (RTP) instead of <75% RTP whenever TS 3.5.2.B or 3.5.2.0 is entered. This action ensures that the acceptance criteria of 10CFR50.46 are satisfied.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
Problems encountered during the event: None.