Event Notification Report for January 05, 2001

REACTOR MANUALLY TRIPPED FROM 80% POWER LEVEL DUE TO EXCESSIVE MAIN TURBINE GENERATOR HYDROGEN LEAK.

"At 0848 CT on 01/05/01 ANO Unit 1 reactor was manually tripped due to excessive hydrogen leakage on the main turbine generator. Reactor power was reduced from 100% to 80% prior to the manual reactor trip. No ESF actuations occurred following the trip. The unit is currently stable at Hot Shutdown conditions."

Hydrogen leak on the main turbine generator was first noticed around 2100 hours CT on 01/04/01. Normal hydrogen pressure in the main turbine generator is 70 psi. The licensee stated that they were losing approximately 3 psi per hour. The licensee evacuated the Turbine Building as a precaution. After reactor power had been reduced to 80% power the hydrogen leak increased at which point the licensee manually tripped the reactor. All rods fully inserted into the core. Once Through Steam Generator atmospheric valves operated properly. The licensee stated that they have a 0.17 gallon per day primary leak to secondary system leak. All Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Emergency Generators are fully operable if needed. Once Through Steam Generator water levels are being maintained using main feedwater, one main feedwater pump operating. At the time of the notification the licensee had not located the source of the hydrogen leak.

The licensee notified Arkansas Department of Health.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.

* * * UPDATE ON 01/05/01 AT 1734 ET BY REX KNIGHT TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * *

When the reactor was tripped, discharge canal temperature dropped from 52 degrees F to 37 degrees F. This caused a large number of Thread Fin Shad to die. A member of the public called the Arkansas Game and Fish (AG&F) Commission about the Shad. ANO has contacted the AG&F Commission and explained the situation. A Press Release is not planned at this time. NRC R4DO (Bill Johnson) notified.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of the event update by the licensee.

THE MOTOR FOR MS-V-1C HAS BEEN DECLARED INOPERABLE

TMI identified a condition that is outside the design basis of the facility at 0620 hours on January 5, 2001. The condition is that MS-V-1C may not be capable of being closed within 120 seconds as described in the bases for Technical Specification 4.8.2 and FSAR Section 10.3. The bases for TS 4.8.2 and FSAR Section 10.3 both state that the valve is capable of being remotely closed within 120 seconds from the Control Room. With the motor inoperable, the valve cannot be remotely closed within 120 seconds. The condition was found during routine surveillance testing and subsequent evaluation. During the surveillance testing the valve is stroke closed 10% and then returned to its normal operation position of full open. The valve stroke closed to the 10% closed position without incident. During the return of the valve to the full open position sparks were observed and a burning odor was present. However, the sparking ceased and the motor successfully traveled to the fail open position (verified by visual observation of the valve stern position). Subsequent visual inspection of the valve and motor, interviews with the technicians, the system engineer and the Electrical Foreman resulted in the declaration of the inoperability of the motor for MS-V-1C.

This deficient condition has been documented in the TMI Corrective Action program. Troubleshooting of the motor for MS-V-1C is in progress. Interim action has been taken to provide for the expeditious manual closure of the valve and those actions are contained in an approved plant procedure.

The Resident Inspector will be informed.

* * * RETRACTION ON 01/17/01 AT 1729ET BY J. SCHORK TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * *


Based on additional information gathered during trouble shooting and repair of MS-V-IC conducted on January 5, 2001, subsequent to the submittal of the immediate notification, it was determined that there is reasonable assurance that MS-V-IC would have performed its intended safety function to remotely close from the control room when demanded. Therefore, no condition outside the design basis for the facility existed and the immediate report made on January 5, 2001 is being withdrawn. The basis for the reasonable assurance that the valve would have performed its intended safety function is described below.

During the partial stroke surveillance test, the spark and burn smell occurred very briefly while the valve was traveling open. The sparking immediately stopped and the valve continued to travel uninterrupted until it was full open. The surveillance was completed satisfactorily.

The breaker for the valve motor did not trip and no fuses were blown. Power remained available to stroke the valve after the event. Based on the short duration of the spark and the fact that the motor continued to operate, there was no reason to believe the stroke time would have changed.

Prior to opening or disturbing the motor terminal box, the breaker was manually opened and the resistance from each phase to ground was checked from the breaker. A high voltage Meggar was used to perform the test. The Meggar results showed that neither the power cables, termination, nor motor windings were grounded. This indicated that the motor and cables were in working condition.

The motor terminal box was opened without disturbing the power cables inside the box. There was clear evidence that a bare point on one of the ring lug terminations had made contact with the aluminum terminal box. A small portion of a ring connector was bare. There was a burn mark on the ring connector and on the terminal box. A small piece of the aluminum terminal box was missing at the point where the lug would have contacted the box. The as-found gap between what were the contact points was approximately 0.25". Based on this evidence, it was clear that a sharp corner of the ring lug had rubbed against the terminal box until it wore through the insulating tape that was wrapped around the lug. The metal lug then contacted the aluminum terminal box, which temporarily shorted the phase to ground. The resulting spark knocked off a small piece of the terminal box at the contact point creating a gap that immediately cleared the short. The duration of the short was not long enough to cause the breaker to open.

Based on the above, there is reasonable certainty that the component would have performed its function when commanded. Therefore, from a past operability perspective, the component was always capable of performing its design basis function. When the component was declared out of service, the plant entered a maintenance evolution to determine and correct the cause of the spark. Entering the maintenance evolution to trouble shoot and correct the cause of the spark was not a condition prohibited by the Technical Specifications. There is no time clock associated with removing the remote closing capability from service for maintenance.
NRC Region 1 RDO (Barkley) notified.


The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction by the licensee.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MOLYBDENUM-99/TECHNETIUM-99m GENERATOR LOST WHILE IN SHIPMENT

DUPONT PHARMACEUTICALS SHIPPED A 750 MILLICURIE MOLYBDENUM/TECHNETIUM GENERATOR VIA FEDEX TO THE SAN LUIS VALLEY REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER IN ALAMOSA, CO ON 12/28/00. AS OF THIS DATE THE SHIPMENT HAS NOT BEEN RECEIVED. THERE WAS NO FEDEX TRACKING NUMBER AND DUPONT COULD NOT GIVE THE STATE ANY INFORMATION BECAUSE THEIR COMPUTERS WERE DOWN.

* * * UPDATE ON 1/5/01 @ 1037 BY PENTECOST TO GOULD * * *

THE GENERATOR WAS LOCATED @ 0830MST AT THE FEDEX DENVER FACILITY AND IT IS IN TRANSIT TO THE MEDICAL FACILITY.

NOTIFIED REG 4 RDO(JOHNSON) AND NMSS(SMITH) WERE NOTIFIED