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Event Notification Report for January 02, 2001

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/01/2001 - 01/02/2001

EVENT NUMBERS
376423764337649

Power Reactor
Event Number: 37642
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1     State: NY
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: PHIL SANTINI
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 01/02/2001
Notification Time: 22:05 [ET]
Event Date: 01/02/2001
Event Time: 15:36 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/03/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JAMES NOGGLE (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 6 Power Operation 5 Power Operation
Event Text
AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP AUTOMATIC START

The plant sustained a main turbine trip on steam generator high level, cause under review. The turbine trip caused a main feedwater trip which caused an automatic start of the 21 and 23 auxiliary feedwater pumps, as designed. The licensee review of the event determined, later in the evening, that the pump starts were reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(ii).

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATED AT 1633 EST ON 01/03/2001 BY ROBERT ALLEN TO FANGIE JONES * * *

"The following is an update to NRC event report 37642: ESF Actuations

"Indian Point Unit 2 sustained inadvertent ESF component actuations following a main turbine trip on high steam generator level that occurred during preparation for admitting steam to roll the main turbine for plant startup. There was no reactor trip nor was one required. The main turbine was latched with the stop valves open and the control valves closed. Steam Generator level control was in manual as is normal at low reactor power levels. A second condensate pump was started which caused an increase in main feedwater pressure which caused increasing steam generator levels. Operator attempts to reduce flow were unsuccessful and a high steam generator level turbine trip signal caused the main turbine stop valves to close (trip) and caused the main feedwater pump to trip. This high level trip signal also resulted in the closing of the main feedwater pump discharge valves (ESF valves), the closing of the steam generator blow down isolation valves (ESF valves) and the starting of the motor driven Auxiliary Feedwater pumps (ESF) as designed."

The licensee intends to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.


Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 37643
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3     State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: M.C. PITTMAN
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 01/03/2001
Notification Time: 15:03 [ET]
Event Date: 01/02/2001
Event Time: 17:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/03/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MELVYN LEACH (R3)
PATRICIA HOLAHAN (NMSS)
Event Text
NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR REPORT

The following is quoted from the written report:

At 1700, on 1/2/01 The Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that the mass of U-235 was incorrectly copied from a Request for Waste Classification (RWC) onto the Waste Consolidation Container Log Sheet and incorrectly independently verified in violation of NCSA.WMO.004. Independent verification of the consolidation drum mass is used to ensure the total mass dose not exceed the 120 gram U-235 limit. The particular drum in question contains less than 15 grams of U-235. [This event actually occurred on 6/21/2000 and was found during a normal review of records on 01/02/2001]

The NRC resident inspector has been notified of this event.

PGDP Problem Report No. ATRC-01-0024; PGDP event Report No, PAD-2001-001 Event Worksheet
Responsible Division: Production Support

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: Even though less than 15 grams of U-235 was involved in this incident, independent verification was not properly performed. This type of administrative control is used throughout the PGDP NCS program.

POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR: In order for a criticality to be possible, multiple drums would have to be incorrectly consolidated and the resulting mass contained within the drum would need to exceed 1500 grams of U-235 at an enrichment of 5.5%. (This all was generated onsite and has an enrichment of less than 2.1 %.)

CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION GEOMETRY CONCENTRATION ETC): Double contingency for this scenario Is established by implementing two independent controls on mass

ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS): Less than 15 grams of U~235 at an enrichment of less than 2.1%.

NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: The first leg of double contingency is based on correctly calculating the cumulative U-235 mass in the consolidation drum to ensure the 120 gram limit is not exceeded. The actual mass was incorrectly copied from the RWC onto the consolidation log sheet, making it impossible to correctly calculate the consolidated mass. Therefore, the control was violated and the first leg of double contingency was lost.

The second leg of double contingency is an administrative control to independently verify that the mass was copied correctly and the cumulative mass total is correct. The independent verification did not identify that the incorrect mass was copied. This control was violated and this leg of double contingency was not maintained.

Since double contingency is based on two controls on mass, double contingency was not maintained.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
The area was immediately roped off and posted to control access and prevent the movement of fissile/potentially fissile material within the area. The actual mess of U-235 in the consolidation drum was verified to be less than 15 grams which reestablished control. The waste consolidation container log sheet was corrected and independently verified prior to removing the ropes and postings.


General Information or Other
Event Number: 37649
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: PACIFIC SOILS ENGINEERING
Region: 4
City: OCEANSIDE   State: CA
County:
License #: 3142
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GREGER
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 01/05/2001
Notification Time: 11:22 [ET]
Event Date: 01/02/2001
Event Time: 00:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 01/05/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM JOHNSON (R4)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
Event Text
STOLEN NUCLEAR MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The licensee reported that a Campbell Pacific Nuclear moisture density gauge was stolen from a storage unit in Oceanside, Ca between 1530 on 12/29/00 and noon on 12/30/00. Model # of the gauge was MC-3 and its serial # is M380504284. The gauge contained approximately 8 millicuries of cesium-137 and 40 millicuries of americium/beryllium. The licensee will offer a reward.