Event Notification Report for December 27, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
12/26/2000 - 12/27/2000
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37634
Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: RANDY HAISLET
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: RANDY HAISLET
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 12/27/2000
Notification Time: 12:47 [ET]
Event Date: 12/27/2000
Event Time: 10:31 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/03/2001
Notification Time: 12:47 [ET]
Event Date: 12/27/2000
Event Time: 10:31 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/03/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(B) - POT RHR INOP
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(B) - POT RHR INOP
Person (Organization):
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1)
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM (RCIC) DECLARED INOPERABLE
The licensee was performing the procedure to reset the RCIC isolation, after a surveillance was completed, when the closed inboard steam isolation valve (MO-1301-16) went to dual indication while opening the outboard steam isolation valve (MO-1301-17). Both steam isolation valves to the RCIC turbine were closed and the RCIC system was declared inoperable. The licensee is investigating the problem.
Active limiting conditions for operation were entered for the RCIC system and the primary containment isolation function of the RCIC inboard steam isolation valve (MO-1301-16).
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTED AT 1414 EDT ON 4/3/01 BY ERIC OLSON TO FANGIE JONES * * *
The licensee is retracting this event notification. The following was submitted as the basis for the retraction.
"On December 27, 2000, the RCIC system was taken out of service to perform routine surveillance in accordance with PNPS procedures 8.M.2-2.6.1 and 8.M.2-2.6.4. After resetting the RCIC isolation after performance of the High Steam Flow surveillance, operations personnel opened valve, MO-1301-17. Approximately 5 seconds into the opening stroke, MO-1301-16, the inboard isolation valve, gave dual indication. During the initial opening of the MO-1301-17 valve, the RCIC turbine inlet steam line began to pressurize due to trapped pressure between the MO-1301-16 and MO-1301-17 valves and increased to approximately 437 psig when it began to decrease at about one pound per two seconds. The Control Room operator then gave MO-1301-16 valve a closed signal after the valve indicated dual indication for 16 seconds and the valve then indicated full closed. The steam line continued to depressurize at the same rate until operations closed the MO-1301-17 valve. This indicated that although MO-1301-16 showed dual Indication, it was closed and the seating surfaces were tight and the containment isolation function was operable.
"The test that was being performed was testing the primary containment isolation system (PCIS) and this surveillance was satisfactory with both inboard and outboard isolation valves closing upon initiation. Additionally, MO-1301-16 was stroke timed in accordance with PNPS procedure 8.5.5.4 and the times were within the expected limits.
"After the initial indication of leakage, the Control Room management conservatively declared MO-1301-16 and the RCIC system inoperable until further investigation could be performed. Troubleshooting was conducted in accordance with PNPS procedure 3.M.1-34. The conclusion was that while dual indication had occurred, the valve had been closed and primary containment isolation was operable.
"For (a)(2)(i) (B): not reportable. The initial indication of leakage through containment Isolation valve MO-1301-16 was evaluated. The source of the pressure was steam trapped between the isolation valves during the previous testing. The valve was subsequently determined to have been closed and containment isolation was maintained.
"For (a)(2)(v): not reportable. There was no component or system failure. The containment isolation function was maintained.
"For (a)(2)(vii): not reportable. It was determined that there was no component or system failure. The containment isolation function was maintained.
"Please note that RCIC was 'made' inoperable by closing the referenced motor-operated valves (MO-1301-16 and MO-1301-17) to perform their primary containment isolation function in accordance with Technical Specification 3/4.7.A.2. After the operability determination, the valves were opened and RCIC was again operable per TS 3/4.5.D."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R1DO (Jack McFadden) was informed.
The licensee was performing the procedure to reset the RCIC isolation, after a surveillance was completed, when the closed inboard steam isolation valve (MO-1301-16) went to dual indication while opening the outboard steam isolation valve (MO-1301-17). Both steam isolation valves to the RCIC turbine were closed and the RCIC system was declared inoperable. The licensee is investigating the problem.
Active limiting conditions for operation were entered for the RCIC system and the primary containment isolation function of the RCIC inboard steam isolation valve (MO-1301-16).
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTED AT 1414 EDT ON 4/3/01 BY ERIC OLSON TO FANGIE JONES * * *
The licensee is retracting this event notification. The following was submitted as the basis for the retraction.
"On December 27, 2000, the RCIC system was taken out of service to perform routine surveillance in accordance with PNPS procedures 8.M.2-2.6.1 and 8.M.2-2.6.4. After resetting the RCIC isolation after performance of the High Steam Flow surveillance, operations personnel opened valve, MO-1301-17. Approximately 5 seconds into the opening stroke, MO-1301-16, the inboard isolation valve, gave dual indication. During the initial opening of the MO-1301-17 valve, the RCIC turbine inlet steam line began to pressurize due to trapped pressure between the MO-1301-16 and MO-1301-17 valves and increased to approximately 437 psig when it began to decrease at about one pound per two seconds. The Control Room operator then gave MO-1301-16 valve a closed signal after the valve indicated dual indication for 16 seconds and the valve then indicated full closed. The steam line continued to depressurize at the same rate until operations closed the MO-1301-17 valve. This indicated that although MO-1301-16 showed dual Indication, it was closed and the seating surfaces were tight and the containment isolation function was operable.
"The test that was being performed was testing the primary containment isolation system (PCIS) and this surveillance was satisfactory with both inboard and outboard isolation valves closing upon initiation. Additionally, MO-1301-16 was stroke timed in accordance with PNPS procedure 8.5.5.4 and the times were within the expected limits.
"After the initial indication of leakage, the Control Room management conservatively declared MO-1301-16 and the RCIC system inoperable until further investigation could be performed. Troubleshooting was conducted in accordance with PNPS procedure 3.M.1-34. The conclusion was that while dual indication had occurred, the valve had been closed and primary containment isolation was operable.
"For (a)(2)(i) (B): not reportable. The initial indication of leakage through containment Isolation valve MO-1301-16 was evaluated. The source of the pressure was steam trapped between the isolation valves during the previous testing. The valve was subsequently determined to have been closed and containment isolation was maintained.
"For (a)(2)(v): not reportable. There was no component or system failure. The containment isolation function was maintained.
"For (a)(2)(vii): not reportable. It was determined that there was no component or system failure. The containment isolation function was maintained.
"Please note that RCIC was 'made' inoperable by closing the referenced motor-operated valves (MO-1301-16 and MO-1301-17) to perform their primary containment isolation function in accordance with Technical Specification 3/4.7.A.2. After the operability determination, the valves were opened and RCIC was again operable per TS 3/4.5.D."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R1DO (Jack McFadden) was informed.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 37635
Rep Org: NC DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG HOSPITAL AUTHORITY
Region: 2
City: CHARLOTTE State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GEORGE ACCATTATO
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Licensee: CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG HOSPITAL AUTHORITY
Region: 2
City: CHARLOTTE State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GEORGE ACCATTATO
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 12/27/2000
Notification Time: 15:52 [ET]
Event Date: 12/27/2000
Event Time: 14:20 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/27/2000
Notification Time: 15:52 [ET]
Event Date: 12/27/2000
Event Time: 14:20 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/27/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MARK LESSER (R2)
SUSAN SHANKMAN (NMSS)
MARK LESSER (R2)
SUSAN SHANKMAN (NMSS)
DELIVERY VEHICLE WRECK WHILE CARRYING RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL, NO CONTAMINATION
On 12/22/00 a Courier Dispatch was involved in an accident while transporting a Mo-99 generator, incident number ICD-00-47. The accident occurred in Monroe, NC at the intersection of highways 116 and 74, about a half mile from the delivery point, Union Regional Med Center Nuc Med. The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) went to the scene and made a determination of no contamination on the driver, vehicle, or package outside. The package, no apparent damage, was transferred to Union Regional Med Center Nuc Med. There was no other radioactive material in the transport.
The incident has been closed and a written report to the NRC will follow.
On 12/22/00 a Courier Dispatch was involved in an accident while transporting a Mo-99 generator, incident number ICD-00-47. The accident occurred in Monroe, NC at the intersection of highways 116 and 74, about a half mile from the delivery point, Union Regional Med Center Nuc Med. The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) went to the scene and made a determination of no contamination on the driver, vehicle, or package outside. The package, no apparent damage, was transferred to Union Regional Med Center Nuc Med. There was no other radioactive material in the transport.
The incident has been closed and a written report to the NRC will follow.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37636
Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: JEFFREY EASLEY
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: JEFFREY EASLEY
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 12/27/2000
Notification Time: 18:03 [ET]
Event Date: 12/27/2000
Event Time: 13:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/22/2001
Notification Time: 18:03 [ET]
Event Date: 12/27/2000
Event Time: 13:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/22/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
PATRICK HILAND (R3)
PATRICK HILAND (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HIGH PRESSURE CORE INJECTION (HPCI) SYSTEM DISCOVERED INOPERABLE
"On 12/27/00 at 1330 hours QCOS 2300-09 (U-1 HPCI Vent Verification) was in progress following QCOS 2300-11 (CCST/Torus Level Switch Functional Testing). During the process of vent verification of the U-1 HPCI system, the vent valves were open approximately 6.5 minutes prior to receiving water through the vent lines; the U-1 HPCI system was found inoperable. Performance acceptance criteria of QCOS 2300-09 states that venting times >40 seconds could he construed as a preconditioning action per NRC IN 97-16 and as such the U-1 HPCI system possibly could not have performed its' safety function prior to the venting that took place on 12/27/00 at 1330. The last successful vent of the U-1 HPCI system was completed on 11/30/00. An investigation is underway to try to determine the time of the loss of fill and the cause. This 4-hour ENS notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE 2052EST ON 1/22/01 FROM MIKE MacLENNAN TO S. SANDIN * * *
The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:
"This is a retraction of the ENS call made on 12/27/00, event #37636, concerning the inoperability of the Unit One HPCI system due to an inadequate fill and vent of the pump discharge line.
"We have completed our evaluation and have determined that HPCI would have successfully injected coolant to the reactor if the system was initiated in response to a LOCA."
The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector. Notified R3DO(Creed).
"On 12/27/00 at 1330 hours QCOS 2300-09 (U-1 HPCI Vent Verification) was in progress following QCOS 2300-11 (CCST/Torus Level Switch Functional Testing). During the process of vent verification of the U-1 HPCI system, the vent valves were open approximately 6.5 minutes prior to receiving water through the vent lines; the U-1 HPCI system was found inoperable. Performance acceptance criteria of QCOS 2300-09 states that venting times >40 seconds could he construed as a preconditioning action per NRC IN 97-16 and as such the U-1 HPCI system possibly could not have performed its' safety function prior to the venting that took place on 12/27/00 at 1330. The last successful vent of the U-1 HPCI system was completed on 11/30/00. An investigation is underway to try to determine the time of the loss of fill and the cause. This 4-hour ENS notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE 2052EST ON 1/22/01 FROM MIKE MacLENNAN TO S. SANDIN * * *
The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:
"This is a retraction of the ENS call made on 12/27/00, event #37636, concerning the inoperability of the Unit One HPCI system due to an inadequate fill and vent of the pump discharge line.
"We have completed our evaluation and have determined that HPCI would have successfully injected coolant to the reactor if the system was initiated in response to a LOCA."
The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector. Notified R3DO(Creed).