Event Notification Report for December 19, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
12/18/2000 - 12/19/2000
EVENT NUMBERS
37623376183761937620
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 37623
Rep Org: SOUTHEAST MO STATE UNIVERSITY
Licensee: SOUTHEAST MO STATE UNIVERSITY
Region: 3
City: CAPE GIRARDEAU State: MO
County: CAPE GIRARDEAU
License #: 24-09296-02
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHRIS McGOWEN
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Licensee: SOUTHEAST MO STATE UNIVERSITY
Region: 3
City: CAPE GIRARDEAU State: MO
County: CAPE GIRARDEAU
License #: 24-09296-02
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHRIS McGOWEN
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 12/20/2000
Notification Time: 13:52 [ET]
Event Date: 12/19/2000
Event Time: 13:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/21/2000
Notification Time: 13:52 [ET]
Event Date: 12/19/2000
Event Time: 13:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/21/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
THOMAS KOZAK (R3)
CHERYL TROTTIER (NMSS)
THOMAS KOZAK (R3)
CHERYL TROTTIER (NMSS)
LOST STRONTIUM-90 SOURCE
The school has lost a 20-mCi Sr-90 sealed source. It is unknown how long it has been missing. A search of physical areas and records have been unsuccessful in locating the source. As long as the source remains sealed it presents little of no threat to the public.
The source was used as part of an ionization cell for an ion capture detector. The equipment was sold sometime back at auction. The paperwork for the equipment does not indicate that the source was included in the sale.
The school has been in contact with NRC Region 3 (Kevin Null).
***** UPDATE AT 1151 EST ON 12/21/00 FROM CHRIS McGOWEN TO LEIGH TROCINE *****
A Southeast Missouri State University representative called to provide corrected/clarifying information. There is a possibility that the equipment was previously sold at auction, but the licensee does not know exactly what happened to it. In addition, the source was used as part of an ionization cell for an ion capture detector on a gas chromatograph.
The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Kozak) and NMSS EO (Hickey).
The school has lost a 20-mCi Sr-90 sealed source. It is unknown how long it has been missing. A search of physical areas and records have been unsuccessful in locating the source. As long as the source remains sealed it presents little of no threat to the public.
The source was used as part of an ionization cell for an ion capture detector. The equipment was sold sometime back at auction. The paperwork for the equipment does not indicate that the source was included in the sale.
The school has been in contact with NRC Region 3 (Kevin Null).
***** UPDATE AT 1151 EST ON 12/21/00 FROM CHRIS McGOWEN TO LEIGH TROCINE *****
A Southeast Missouri State University representative called to provide corrected/clarifying information. There is a possibility that the equipment was previously sold at auction, but the licensee does not know exactly what happened to it. In addition, the source was used as part of an ionization cell for an ion capture detector on a gas chromatograph.
The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Kozak) and NMSS EO (Hickey).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37618
Facility: HADDAM NECK
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL BACA
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL BACA
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 12/19/2000
Notification Time: 13:59 [ET]
Event Date: 12/19/2000
Event Time: 11:05 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/19/2000
Notification Time: 13:59 [ET]
Event Date: 12/19/2000
Event Time: 11:05 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/19/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(vi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(vi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1)
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Decommissioned | 0 | Decommissioned |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION REGARDING A 1/2-GALLON HYDRAULIC FLUID SPILL INSIDE THE OWNER CONTROLLER AREA
At 1105 on 12/19/00, a hydraulic line on demolition equipment broke due to a mechanical failure resulting in approximately 1/2 gallon of hydraulic fluid spilling to the ground. The equipment was sitting on top of a 5-foot high mound of rubblized concrete. Therefore, the hydraulic fluid actually spilled onto the concrete, but it was reported as being the ground because the hydraulic fluid had the potential to get to the ground.
The applicable area has been covered, and absorbent material has been placed around the area. Decommissioning personnel currently plan to dig out the area of rubblized concrete and place it in a metal shipping container. The rubblized concrete was part of the previous containment that had been removed. There were no reports of contamination, and there were no liquid or gaseous releases involved.
The licensee notified the State of Connecticut at 1350 on 12/19/00. The licensee also notified the NRC Region 1 office (John Wray and Maria Miller). At this time, it is not known whether or not a press release will be issued.
At 1105 on 12/19/00, a hydraulic line on demolition equipment broke due to a mechanical failure resulting in approximately 1/2 gallon of hydraulic fluid spilling to the ground. The equipment was sitting on top of a 5-foot high mound of rubblized concrete. Therefore, the hydraulic fluid actually spilled onto the concrete, but it was reported as being the ground because the hydraulic fluid had the potential to get to the ground.
The applicable area has been covered, and absorbent material has been placed around the area. Decommissioning personnel currently plan to dig out the area of rubblized concrete and place it in a metal shipping container. The rubblized concrete was part of the previous containment that had been removed. There were no reports of contamination, and there were no liquid or gaseous releases involved.
The licensee notified the State of Connecticut at 1350 on 12/19/00. The licensee also notified the NRC Region 1 office (John Wray and Maria Miller). At this time, it is not known whether or not a press release will be issued.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37619
Facility: OCONEE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: RANDY TODD
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: RANDY TODD
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 12/19/2000
Notification Time: 14:55 [ET]
Event Date: 12/19/2000
Event Time: 13:52 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/19/2000
Notification Time: 14:55 [ET]
Event Date: 12/19/2000
Event Time: 13:52 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/19/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(i)(A) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(i)(A) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2)
MIKE ERNSTES (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation |
INITIATION OF A TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO BOTH TRAINS OF THE CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM BEING DECLARED INOPERABLE
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"At 1305 on 12/19/00 during Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) testing on Unit 1, an alarm was received on the operating 'A' Control Room Ventilation System chiller. Upon investigation, it was determined that the 'A' chiller had tripped due to a loss of service water flow to the chiller condenser. The chiller service water pumps take suction from a Condenser Cooling Water (CCW) line, which also supplies suction to the LPSW pumps. The LPSW testing was aborted, and a normal alignment for CCW was completed. Several attempts were made by Operations and Maintenance to restart the 'A' chiller with no success. An attempt was then made to start the 'B' chiller, and it also tripped. At 1352, the [Operations Shift Manager (OSM)] determined that no chillers were operable and declared both trains of Control Room Ventilation System inoperable. [TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO)] 3.0.3 was entered at 1352 on [Units] 2 and 3 per [TS] 3.7.16."
"At [1452] hours, Operations began a controlled shutdown of both Units 2 and 3. Units 2 and 3 were operating at 100% power in Mode 1 at the start of the event. Unit 1 was in Mode 6 as part of a refueling outage."
"The temperature in the shared Unit 1 and 2 Control Room is currently 75°F. Actions have been taken to restore service water to one of the chillers. One chiller is currently in operation but [has] not yet been declared operable."
The licensee stated that the 'A' and 'B' chillers supply the control room ventilation system for all three units. Units 1 and 2 share a common control room. Unit 3 is located in a separate control room, but it is served by the same chilled water system and chillers.
The licensee also stated that the TS LCO requires that at least one control room ventilation system train be returned to service or that the units be placed in Mode 3 within 12 hours. The licensee anticipates exiting this LCO within the required time frame.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
***** UPDATE AT 1609 ON 12/19/00 FROM RANDY TODD TO LEIGH TROCINE *****
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"At 1455 on 12/19/00, Oconee Nuclear Station reported initiation of a shutdown required by [TS] 3.7.16 which invokes TS 3.0.3. The TS affected both Units 2 and 3."
"This shutdown was due to loss of both chillers associated with the chilled water system that serves the
Control Room Ventilation System. Units 2 and 3 began reducing power from 100% in Mode 1 at 1452 (not
1352 as initially reported)."
"Following the initial notification, the NRC residents were informed."
"At 1521, the 'B' chiller was declared operable, allowing Units 2 and 3 to exit TS 3.0.3 and to stop power reduction at approximately 99%."
"An investigation into the cause of the chiller trips is continuing."
"Unit 1 was in Mode 6 for a refueling outage and was not in the mode of applicability for TS 3.7.16."
The licensee stated that power ascension was commenced at 1521 and that the Units 2 and 3 are currently operating at 100% power.
The NRC operations officer notified the R2DO (Mike Ernstes).
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"At 1305 on 12/19/00 during Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) testing on Unit 1, an alarm was received on the operating 'A' Control Room Ventilation System chiller. Upon investigation, it was determined that the 'A' chiller had tripped due to a loss of service water flow to the chiller condenser. The chiller service water pumps take suction from a Condenser Cooling Water (CCW) line, which also supplies suction to the LPSW pumps. The LPSW testing was aborted, and a normal alignment for CCW was completed. Several attempts were made by Operations and Maintenance to restart the 'A' chiller with no success. An attempt was then made to start the 'B' chiller, and it also tripped. At 1352, the [Operations Shift Manager (OSM)] determined that no chillers were operable and declared both trains of Control Room Ventilation System inoperable. [TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO)] 3.0.3 was entered at 1352 on [Units] 2 and 3 per [TS] 3.7.16."
"At [1452] hours, Operations began a controlled shutdown of both Units 2 and 3. Units 2 and 3 were operating at 100% power in Mode 1 at the start of the event. Unit 1 was in Mode 6 as part of a refueling outage."
"The temperature in the shared Unit 1 and 2 Control Room is currently 75°F. Actions have been taken to restore service water to one of the chillers. One chiller is currently in operation but [has] not yet been declared operable."
The licensee stated that the 'A' and 'B' chillers supply the control room ventilation system for all three units. Units 1 and 2 share a common control room. Unit 3 is located in a separate control room, but it is served by the same chilled water system and chillers.
The licensee also stated that the TS LCO requires that at least one control room ventilation system train be returned to service or that the units be placed in Mode 3 within 12 hours. The licensee anticipates exiting this LCO within the required time frame.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
***** UPDATE AT 1609 ON 12/19/00 FROM RANDY TODD TO LEIGH TROCINE *****
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"At 1455 on 12/19/00, Oconee Nuclear Station reported initiation of a shutdown required by [TS] 3.7.16 which invokes TS 3.0.3. The TS affected both Units 2 and 3."
"This shutdown was due to loss of both chillers associated with the chilled water system that serves the
Control Room Ventilation System. Units 2 and 3 began reducing power from 100% in Mode 1 at 1452 (not
1352 as initially reported)."
"Following the initial notification, the NRC residents were informed."
"At 1521, the 'B' chiller was declared operable, allowing Units 2 and 3 to exit TS 3.0.3 and to stop power reduction at approximately 99%."
"An investigation into the cause of the chiller trips is continuing."
"Unit 1 was in Mode 6 for a refueling outage and was not in the mode of applicability for TS 3.7.16."
The licensee stated that power ascension was commenced at 1521 and that the Units 2 and 3 are currently operating at 100% power.
The NRC operations officer notified the R2DO (Mike Ernstes).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37620
Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: TIM SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: TIM SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 12/19/2000
Notification Time: 17:05 [ET]
Event Date: 12/19/2000
Event Time: 13:40 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/19/2000
Notification Time: 17:05 [ET]
Event Date: 12/19/2000
Event Time: 13:40 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/19/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
THOMAS KOZAK (R3)
THOMAS KOZAK (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 96 | Power Operation | 96 | Power Operation |
UNPLANNED CLOSURE OF STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN ISOLATION VALVES DURING FUNCTIONAL TESTING OF A STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN TANK LEVEL CONTROL VALVE AND ITS ASSOCIATED SOLENOID VALVE
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"Instrumentation and control personnel were functionally testing the steam generator blowdown tank level control valve, BT-106, and its associated solenoid valve, SV-33029. A non-ESF temperature switch, TS-16218, was manually actuated to test SV-33029. This resulted in an unplanned closure of steam generator blowdown isolation valves BT-2A/MV-32077 and BT-3B/MV-32080. These valves have containment isolation functions for a steam line break inside containment and are also required to close on auxiliary feedwater system actuation."
The licensee stated that all systems functioned as required and that there was nothing unusual or misunderstood. The licensee also stated that this event did not place the unit in a technical specification limiting condition for operation. The steam generator blowdown isolation valves have been returned to their normal configuration.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"Instrumentation and control personnel were functionally testing the steam generator blowdown tank level control valve, BT-106, and its associated solenoid valve, SV-33029. A non-ESF temperature switch, TS-16218, was manually actuated to test SV-33029. This resulted in an unplanned closure of steam generator blowdown isolation valves BT-2A/MV-32077 and BT-3B/MV-32080. These valves have containment isolation functions for a steam line break inside containment and are also required to close on auxiliary feedwater system actuation."
The licensee stated that all systems functioned as required and that there was nothing unusual or misunderstood. The licensee also stated that this event did not place the unit in a technical specification limiting condition for operation. The steam generator blowdown isolation valves have been returned to their normal configuration.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.