Event Notification Report for December 18, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
12/17/2000 - 12/18/2000
EVENT NUMBERS
3761337614376153761637617
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37613
Facility: SALEM
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RUSS GUMBERT
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RUSS GUMBERT
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 12/18/2000
Notification Time: 09:52 [ET]
Event Date: 12/18/2000
Event Time: 06:40 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/11/2001
Notification Time: 09:52 [ET]
Event Date: 12/18/2000
Event Time: 06:40 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/11/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
JOHN WHITE (R1)
JOHN WHITE (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
CONTAINMENT FAN COOLER UNITS DECLARED INOPERABLE
"At 0640 on 12/18/00, '11' service water accumulator was declared inoperable based on water level low out of specification for Technical Specifications. This condition was identified following calibration of the 'B' level device. The service water accumulators support containment integrity by ensuring the containment fan coils remain properly filled during a design basis accident. Tech Spec 3.6.1.1 and Tech Spec 3.6.2.3 were entered for containment integrity and '11' and '12' containment fan coil unit inoperability. Actions were taken within one hour to comply with containment integrity Tech Spec. The service water accumulator was filled to within specification at 0713 at which time Tech Spec 3.6.1.1 was exited. The '11' and '12' containment fan coil units were restored to operable at 0744 and Tech Spec 3.6.2.3 was exited. Actions are underway to calibrate the 'A' channel of level indication. All power plant parameters remained stable throughout the event and no other safety systems were affected."
The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this notification by the licensee.
* * * UPDATE 1312EST ON 1/11/01 FROM BENSON BINGGELI TO S. SANDIN * * *
The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:
"On December 18, 2000, a four-hour report was made for Salem Unit 1 in accordance with 10CFR50.72(B) (2) (iii) due to the water level for the 11 Service Water accumulator being out of specification low based on readings from the 'B' level device. The service water accumulators support containment integrity by ensuring the containment fan coils remain properly filled during a design basis accident.
"There are two level devices, 'A' and 'B', associated with each SW accumulator. During the time that the 'B' level device indicated that the SW accumulator was out of specification, the 'A' level device continued to show that the accumulator level was within the required level specification.
"Following the calibration of the 'B' level device which showed that level on the 'B' channel was reading low out
of specification, M&TE equipment (differential pressure gauge) was connected to the 11 SW accumulator to provide an independent reading of the tank level. The M&TE equipment confirmed that the 11 SW accumulator level was within 0.5 inches of the level indicated by the 'A' level device. Based on this confirmation, the 'A' level device on the 11 SW accumulator is providing an accurate indication of level in the tank.
"Since the 'A' level device readings were within the required Technical Specification level band for the 11 SW accumulator, the 11 SW accumulator was always operable and capable of performing its design basis function.
Based on this information, the 4-hour report is being retracted."
The licensee will inform the NRC resident inspector. Notified R1DO(Lew).
"At 0640 on 12/18/00, '11' service water accumulator was declared inoperable based on water level low out of specification for Technical Specifications. This condition was identified following calibration of the 'B' level device. The service water accumulators support containment integrity by ensuring the containment fan coils remain properly filled during a design basis accident. Tech Spec 3.6.1.1 and Tech Spec 3.6.2.3 were entered for containment integrity and '11' and '12' containment fan coil unit inoperability. Actions were taken within one hour to comply with containment integrity Tech Spec. The service water accumulator was filled to within specification at 0713 at which time Tech Spec 3.6.1.1 was exited. The '11' and '12' containment fan coil units were restored to operable at 0744 and Tech Spec 3.6.2.3 was exited. Actions are underway to calibrate the 'A' channel of level indication. All power plant parameters remained stable throughout the event and no other safety systems were affected."
The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this notification by the licensee.
* * * UPDATE 1312EST ON 1/11/01 FROM BENSON BINGGELI TO S. SANDIN * * *
The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:
"On December 18, 2000, a four-hour report was made for Salem Unit 1 in accordance with 10CFR50.72(B) (2) (iii) due to the water level for the 11 Service Water accumulator being out of specification low based on readings from the 'B' level device. The service water accumulators support containment integrity by ensuring the containment fan coils remain properly filled during a design basis accident.
"There are two level devices, 'A' and 'B', associated with each SW accumulator. During the time that the 'B' level device indicated that the SW accumulator was out of specification, the 'A' level device continued to show that the accumulator level was within the required level specification.
"Following the calibration of the 'B' level device which showed that level on the 'B' channel was reading low out
of specification, M&TE equipment (differential pressure gauge) was connected to the 11 SW accumulator to provide an independent reading of the tank level. The M&TE equipment confirmed that the 11 SW accumulator level was within 0.5 inches of the level indicated by the 'A' level device. Based on this confirmation, the 'A' level device on the 11 SW accumulator is providing an accurate indication of level in the tank.
"Since the 'A' level device readings were within the required Technical Specification level band for the 11 SW accumulator, the 11 SW accumulator was always operable and capable of performing its design basis function.
Based on this information, the 4-hour report is being retracted."
The licensee will inform the NRC resident inspector. Notified R1DO(Lew).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37614
Facility: CLINTON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: ROBERT POWERS
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: ROBERT POWERS
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 12/18/2000
Notification Time: 15:58 [ET]
Event Date: 12/18/2000
Event Time: 13:29 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/19/2000
Notification Time: 15:58 [ET]
Event Date: 12/18/2000
Event Time: 13:29 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/19/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
THOMAS KOZAK (R3)
THOMAS KOZAK (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO ISOLATION OF THE MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF MAINTENANCE/SURVEILLANCE (Refer to event #37616 for details regarding an additional reactor scram.)
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"At 1329 CST, the plant experienced an isolation of the Main Steam Isolation Valves [(MSIV)] which subsequently initiated an automatic reactor SCRAM. The [MSIV] Closure was part of a Group I isolation which is believed to be caused by performance of a maintenance surveillance on the Main Steam Line Tunnel Leak Detection System."
"The plant is stable, and there were no other abnormal occurrences in conjunction with this event."
"Since closure of the [MSIV] is an actuation of the Reactor Protection System, this condition is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii)."
The licensee stated that all control rods fully inserted due to the reactor scram and that the reactor core cooling isolation system was manually actuated and secured during this event. There were no emergency core cooling systems actuations, and none were required. The licensee's investigation is currently ongoing.
The licensee also stated that water is currently being supplied to the reactor vessel via normal condensate and feedwater and that safety relief valves are being utilized for pressure control. Containment parameters were reported to be normal, and offsite power is available. The emergency core cooling systems are also available if required.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and the State.
***** UPDATE AT 1357 EST ON 12/19/00 FROM DALE SHELTON TO LEIGH TROCINE *****
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"This is an Update to [...] provide current status of investigation and repairs."
"Investigation into this event has determined that the cause of the MSIV isolation was performance of a Channel Functional Test of the Division 2 Main Steam Line Tunnel Ambient Temperature channel at the same time that an unidentified failure of a Digital Signal Conditioning (DSC) card in the circuitry for the Division 1 Main Steam Line Tunnel Ambient Temperature channel existed. This resulted in satisfying the 2 out of 4 logic for the MSIV isolation."
"Plans are still being developed for repair the DSC card. Although Technical Specifications would allow entry into Mode 2 prior to repair, a decision has not yet been made if the card will be repaired prior to entry into Mode 2. The Facility Review Group will review any repair plans that would be implemented in [Modes] 1 or 2."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Tom Kozak).
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"At 1329 CST, the plant experienced an isolation of the Main Steam Isolation Valves [(MSIV)] which subsequently initiated an automatic reactor SCRAM. The [MSIV] Closure was part of a Group I isolation which is believed to be caused by performance of a maintenance surveillance on the Main Steam Line Tunnel Leak Detection System."
"The plant is stable, and there were no other abnormal occurrences in conjunction with this event."
"Since closure of the [MSIV] is an actuation of the Reactor Protection System, this condition is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii)."
The licensee stated that all control rods fully inserted due to the reactor scram and that the reactor core cooling isolation system was manually actuated and secured during this event. There were no emergency core cooling systems actuations, and none were required. The licensee's investigation is currently ongoing.
The licensee also stated that water is currently being supplied to the reactor vessel via normal condensate and feedwater and that safety relief valves are being utilized for pressure control. Containment parameters were reported to be normal, and offsite power is available. The emergency core cooling systems are also available if required.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and the State.
***** UPDATE AT 1357 EST ON 12/19/00 FROM DALE SHELTON TO LEIGH TROCINE *****
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"This is an Update to [...] provide current status of investigation and repairs."
"Investigation into this event has determined that the cause of the MSIV isolation was performance of a Channel Functional Test of the Division 2 Main Steam Line Tunnel Ambient Temperature channel at the same time that an unidentified failure of a Digital Signal Conditioning (DSC) card in the circuitry for the Division 1 Main Steam Line Tunnel Ambient Temperature channel existed. This resulted in satisfying the 2 out of 4 logic for the MSIV isolation."
"Plans are still being developed for repair the DSC card. Although Technical Specifications would allow entry into Mode 2 prior to repair, a decision has not yet been made if the card will be repaired prior to entry into Mode 2. The Facility Review Group will review any repair plans that would be implemented in [Modes] 1 or 2."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Tom Kozak).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37615
Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEVE WHEELER
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEVE WHEELER
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 12/18/2000
Notification Time: 19:30 [ET]
Event Date: 12/18/2000
Event Time: 14:36 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/18/2000
Notification Time: 19:30 [ET]
Event Date: 12/18/2000
Event Time: 14:36 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/18/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
BILL JONES (R4)
BILL JONES (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 65 | Power Operation |
TRIP OF A RECIRCULATION PUMP DUE TO LOSS OF A SUPPORT SYSTEM FOLLOWING LOAD SHEDDING FROM AN ESSENTIAL BUS
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"During surveillance testing of the Division I undervoltage logic, a step was performed out of sequence. This resulted in load shedding from the Division I essential bus. Undervoltage actuations occurred as expected including a trip of one reactor [recirculation] pump. Plant operation was stabilized in single loop operation with recovery planning in progress."
The licensee stated that the unit was operating at 100% power prior to the event and that it is currently operating at 65% power (in single loop operation). It was reported that the trip of the recirculation pump was not the direct result of the undervoltage condition. It actually occurred due to the loss of a support system because the load shedding resulted in a loss of power to an oil pump that supplied the recirculation pump. All systems functioned as expected, and there was nothing unusual or misunderstood.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"During surveillance testing of the Division I undervoltage logic, a step was performed out of sequence. This resulted in load shedding from the Division I essential bus. Undervoltage actuations occurred as expected including a trip of one reactor [recirculation] pump. Plant operation was stabilized in single loop operation with recovery planning in progress."
The licensee stated that the unit was operating at 100% power prior to the event and that it is currently operating at 65% power (in single loop operation). It was reported that the trip of the recirculation pump was not the direct result of the undervoltage condition. It actually occurred due to the loss of a support system because the load shedding resulted in a loss of power to an oil pump that supplied the recirculation pump. All systems functioned as expected, and there was nothing unusual or misunderstood.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37616
Facility: CLINTON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: MONTY KNAPP
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: MONTY KNAPP
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 12/18/2000
Notification Time: 21:00 [ET]
Event Date: 12/18/2000
Event Time: 18:45 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/18/2000
Notification Time: 21:00 [ET]
Event Date: 12/18/2000
Event Time: 18:45 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/18/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - RPS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - RPS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
THOMAS KOZAK (R3)
THOMAS KOZAK (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM ON REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL (RPV) LOW LEVEL 3 WHILE THE UNIT WAS IN HOT SHUTDOWN (Refer to event #37614 for details regarding a previous reactor scram.)
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"At 1845 CST, the plant was in Mode 3 with the scram reset. Roughly 5 hours earlier the plant had experienced a scram upon a Group 1 isolation. While re-opening the MSIVs to re-establish the main condenser as the heat sink and transfer pressure control, the plant experienced an RPV Low Level 3 and scrammed."
"The MSIVs are now open, the scram reset, and level and pressure are stable."
The licensee stated that RPV Low Level 3 occurs at +8.9 inches narrow range.
It was reported that the unit experienced a problem with the procedure which delayed opening of the MSIVs. As pressure creeped up which caused the pumps that were feeding the vessel to feed less. Therefore, level started creeping down as pressure started creeping up. It is not believed that level went much below RPV Low Level 3 because water would have been injected as a result of the scram. The licensee stated that there were no engineered safety feature actuations or emergency core cooling injections and that none were required.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"At 1845 CST, the plant was in Mode 3 with the scram reset. Roughly 5 hours earlier the plant had experienced a scram upon a Group 1 isolation. While re-opening the MSIVs to re-establish the main condenser as the heat sink and transfer pressure control, the plant experienced an RPV Low Level 3 and scrammed."
"The MSIVs are now open, the scram reset, and level and pressure are stable."
The licensee stated that RPV Low Level 3 occurs at +8.9 inches narrow range.
It was reported that the unit experienced a problem with the procedure which delayed opening of the MSIVs. As pressure creeped up which caused the pumps that were feeding the vessel to feed less. Therefore, level started creeping down as pressure started creeping up. It is not believed that level went much below RPV Low Level 3 because water would have been injected as a result of the scram. The licensee stated that there were no engineered safety feature actuations or emergency core cooling injections and that none were required.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 37617
Rep Org: TENNESSEE DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: GTS DURATEK
Region: 2
City: MEMPHIS State: TN
County:
License #: R-79171
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROGER FENNER
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Licensee: GTS DURATEK
Region: 2
City: MEMPHIS State: TN
County:
License #: R-79171
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROGER FENNER
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 12/19/2000
Notification Time: 11:29 [ET]
Event Date: 12/18/2000
Event Time: 16:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/19/2000
Notification Time: 11:29 [ET]
Event Date: 12/18/2000
Event Time: 16:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/19/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
ROBERT HAAG (R2)
DON COOL (NMSS)
ROBERT HAAG (R2)
DON COOL (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT
A sprinkler actuation in a high bay at the GTS Duratek facility caused radioactive contamination (low levels of Co-60) to be spread throughout a decontamination facility and outside the building onto ground within the owner controlled property. The facility was being used to decontaminate some used steam generators. The state reported that a storm drain is located outside of the building, but that the licensee was able to cover the drain in time to block any flow. The state of Tennessee is continuing their investigation.
A sprinkler actuation in a high bay at the GTS Duratek facility caused radioactive contamination (low levels of Co-60) to be spread throughout a decontamination facility and outside the building onto ground within the owner controlled property. The facility was being used to decontaminate some used steam generators. The state reported that a storm drain is located outside of the building, but that the licensee was able to cover the drain in time to block any flow. The state of Tennessee is continuing their investigation.