Event Notification Report for December 17, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
12/16/2000 - 12/17/2000
EVENT NUMBERS
37609376103761137612
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37609
Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: D. THRONE
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: D. THRONE
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 12/17/2000
Notification Time: 06:18 [ET]
Event Date: 12/17/2000
Event Time: 03:12 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/17/2000
Notification Time: 06:18 [ET]
Event Date: 12/17/2000
Event Time: 03:12 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/17/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(B) - POT RHR INOP
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(B) - POT RHR INOP
Person (Organization):
RONALD GARDNER (R3)
RONALD GARDNER (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 85 | Power Operation | 85 | Power Operation |
RHR INOPERABLE DUE TO LOGIC FAILURE
"Logic for shutdown cooling would have prevented placing the shutdown cooling system in service. System not currently required. A component in the logic system experienced high resistance which simulated a high temperature condition."
The licensee has declared the shutdown cooling system inoperable. The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this event by the licensee.
"Logic for shutdown cooling would have prevented placing the shutdown cooling system in service. System not currently required. A component in the logic system experienced high resistance which simulated a high temperature condition."
The licensee has declared the shutdown cooling system inoperable. The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this event by the licensee.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37610
Facility: PEACH BOTTOM
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [3] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TODD STRAYER
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [3] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TODD STRAYER
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 12/17/2000
Notification Time: 06:35 [ET]
Event Date: 12/17/2000
Event Time: 05:45 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/17/2000
Notification Time: 06:35 [ET]
Event Date: 12/17/2000
Event Time: 05:45 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/17/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JOHN WHITE (R1)
JOHN WHITE (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 18 | Power Operation | 18 | Power Operation |
PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION DUE TO LIGHTNING STRIKE
"During the performance of Primary Containment venting for a planned Primary Containment (Drywell) entry, an invalid ESF actuation occurred. A lightning strike at the Main Offgas Stack caused the B Main Stack Radiation Monitor to lose communications and initiate a Primary Containment Isolation Signal to all Outboard Primary Containment ventilation valves 6" and greater. The Primary Containment Isolation Valves open at the time of Primary Containment venting were the 18" Torus vent valves. The Outboard 18" Torus vent valve was the only ESF actuation. Since the ESF signal was invalid, but caused an actuation of an ESF, this event is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii)."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification by the licensee.
"During the performance of Primary Containment venting for a planned Primary Containment (Drywell) entry, an invalid ESF actuation occurred. A lightning strike at the Main Offgas Stack caused the B Main Stack Radiation Monitor to lose communications and initiate a Primary Containment Isolation Signal to all Outboard Primary Containment ventilation valves 6" and greater. The Primary Containment Isolation Valves open at the time of Primary Containment venting were the 18" Torus vent valves. The Outboard 18" Torus vent valve was the only ESF actuation. Since the ESF signal was invalid, but caused an actuation of an ESF, this event is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii)."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification by the licensee.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37611
Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: DAVID YOUNG
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: DAVID YOUNG
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 12/17/2000
Notification Time: 13:01 [ET]
Event Date: 12/17/2000
Event Time: 08:23 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/17/2000
Notification Time: 13:01 [ET]
Event Date: 12/17/2000
Event Time: 08:23 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/17/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
AUTOMATIC ESF ACTUATION - SUPPRESSION POOL CLEANUP ISOLATION
"Received isolation of Suppression Pool Cleanup (SPC) System while performing I&C surveillance testing.
"A Division 1 RHR/RCIC area temperature isolation signal was input for the test. The actual isolation is normally bypassed during the surveillance. Upon receiving the isolation, the surveillance was secured.
"Upon investigation, the screws connecting the terminal block of the isolation bypass switch were found to have backed out such that with the keylock switch taken to the bypass position the contacts of the switch did not change status.
"All isolations took place as designed The Division I SPC suction valve (RHS-A0V63) and discharge valve (RHS-A0V64) closed. All RHR valves which receive an isolation on this signal are normally closed valves. The Division I RCIC isolation did not take place due to the isolation signal being removed prior to a time delay relay timing out.
"The suppression pool cleanup system was secured."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"Received isolation of Suppression Pool Cleanup (SPC) System while performing I&C surveillance testing.
"A Division 1 RHR/RCIC area temperature isolation signal was input for the test. The actual isolation is normally bypassed during the surveillance. Upon receiving the isolation, the surveillance was secured.
"Upon investigation, the screws connecting the terminal block of the isolation bypass switch were found to have backed out such that with the keylock switch taken to the bypass position the contacts of the switch did not change status.
"All isolations took place as designed The Division I SPC suction valve (RHS-A0V63) and discharge valve (RHS-A0V64) closed. All RHR valves which receive an isolation on this signal are normally closed valves. The Division I RCIC isolation did not take place due to the isolation signal being removed prior to a time delay relay timing out.
"The suppression pool cleanup system was secured."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37612
Facility: SALEM
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN KONOVALCHICK
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN KONOVALCHICK
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 12/17/2000
Notification Time: 17:43 [ET]
Event Date: 12/17/2000
Event Time: 16:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/17/2000
Notification Time: 17:43 [ET]
Event Date: 12/17/2000
Event Time: 16:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/17/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(v) - OTHER ASMT/COMM INOP
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(v) - OTHER ASMT/COMM INOP
Person (Organization):
JOHN WHITE (R1)
JOHN WHITE (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF OFFSITE COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY
The licensee determined that the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) was unavailable as of 1615 EST on 12/17/00. The Salem TSC lost normal power at 0954 EST and the diesel generator started as designed and supplied power as designed. On loss of normal power to the TSC, the phone line to transmit date from the ERDS system is supplied by a backup battery system with an expected life of 8 hours. At 1615 EST the batteries were down powered and the capability to transmit ERDS to the NRC was loss. Troubleshooting and repairs are proceeding, but the time for restoration is unknown at this time.
The licensee intends to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
The licensee determined that the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) was unavailable as of 1615 EST on 12/17/00. The Salem TSC lost normal power at 0954 EST and the diesel generator started as designed and supplied power as designed. On loss of normal power to the TSC, the phone line to transmit date from the ERDS system is supplied by a backup battery system with an expected life of 8 hours. At 1615 EST the batteries were down powered and the capability to transmit ERDS to the NRC was loss. Troubleshooting and repairs are proceeding, but the time for restoration is unknown at this time.
The licensee intends to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.