Event Notification Report for December 09, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
12/08/2000 - 12/09/2000
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37583
Facility: VOGTLE
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: CECIL H. WILLIAMS, JR.
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: CECIL H. WILLIAMS, JR.
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 12/09/2000
Notification Time: 12:40 [ET]
Event Date: 12/09/2000
Event Time: 10:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/09/2000
Notification Time: 12:40 [ET]
Event Date: 12/09/2000
Event Time: 10:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/09/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DURING PERFORMANCE OF A REVISED PROCEDURE FOR A SOLID STATE PROTECTION SYSTEM (SSPS) AND REACTOR TRIP BREAKER OPERABILITY TEST
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"While performing a new revision to [procedure] 14421-1, 'SOLID STATE PROTECTION SYSTEM AND REACTOR TRIP BREAKER TRAIN B OPERABILITY TEST,' a reactor trip occurred from Intermediate Range High Flux while performing section 5.3, SAFETY INJECTION RESET TIMING CIRCUIT TEST. Both trains of [the] reactor protection system functioned as expected. A feedwater isolation was received as expected from P4-Low Tavg, but only from SSPS Train A due to SSPS Train B being in 'TEST' for the surveillance in progress. Also, an [auxiliary feedwater] actuation signal (AFWAS) was received from Steam Generator Lo-Lo level in all four steam generators, but only the [turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump] pump and [motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump] pump A started, again due to SSPS Train B being in 'TEST.' The steam generator blowdown system also isolated properly on the AFWAS signal. The plant is currently stable in Mode 3, and an Event Review Team is currently being formed. At 1207, Train B SSPS was restored to [its] normal configuration. No estimated restart date is currently available."
The licensee stated that all control rods fully inserted as a result of the trip. It was also reported that all systems functioned as required based on the configuration of the plant at the time of the event (SSPS Train B in test) and that there was nothing unusual or misunderstood. The root cause of the reactor trip is currently under investigation.
The unit is currently stable in Mode 3 (Hot Standby). Normal charging and letdown, pressurizer heaters and sprays, and the reactor coolant pumps are being utilized for primary system inventory, pressure, and transport control. Secondary steam is being dumped to the condenser, and auxiliary feedwater is being supplied to the steam generators. All containment parameters are normal, and offsite power is available.
The NRC resident inspector was in the control room watching performance of the surveillance procedure at the time of the event.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"While performing a new revision to [procedure] 14421-1, 'SOLID STATE PROTECTION SYSTEM AND REACTOR TRIP BREAKER TRAIN B OPERABILITY TEST,' a reactor trip occurred from Intermediate Range High Flux while performing section 5.3, SAFETY INJECTION RESET TIMING CIRCUIT TEST. Both trains of [the] reactor protection system functioned as expected. A feedwater isolation was received as expected from P4-Low Tavg, but only from SSPS Train A due to SSPS Train B being in 'TEST' for the surveillance in progress. Also, an [auxiliary feedwater] actuation signal (AFWAS) was received from Steam Generator Lo-Lo level in all four steam generators, but only the [turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump] pump and [motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump] pump A started, again due to SSPS Train B being in 'TEST.' The steam generator blowdown system also isolated properly on the AFWAS signal. The plant is currently stable in Mode 3, and an Event Review Team is currently being formed. At 1207, Train B SSPS was restored to [its] normal configuration. No estimated restart date is currently available."
The licensee stated that all control rods fully inserted as a result of the trip. It was also reported that all systems functioned as required based on the configuration of the plant at the time of the event (SSPS Train B in test) and that there was nothing unusual or misunderstood. The root cause of the reactor trip is currently under investigation.
The unit is currently stable in Mode 3 (Hot Standby). Normal charging and letdown, pressurizer heaters and sprays, and the reactor coolant pumps are being utilized for primary system inventory, pressure, and transport control. Secondary steam is being dumped to the condenser, and auxiliary feedwater is being supplied to the steam generators. All containment parameters are normal, and offsite power is available.
The NRC resident inspector was in the control room watching performance of the surveillance procedure at the time of the event.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37584
Facility: GRAND GULF
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: FRANK WEAVER
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: FRANK WEAVER
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 12/09/2000
Notification Time: 13:23 [ET]
Event Date: 12/09/2000
Event Time: 11:55 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/09/2000
Notification Time: 13:23 [ET]
Event Date: 12/09/2000
Event Time: 11:55 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/09/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
DISCOVERY OF A DEFICIENCY THAT COULD POTENTIALLY COMPROMISE THE ABILITY OF A FIRE BARRIER TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROTECTION IN THE EVENT OF A FIRE
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"During destructive examination of the Kaowool fire barrier system used to protect Appendix R raceways, a deficiency was identified that could potentially compromise the ability of the fire barrier to provide adequate protection for at least one train of redundant safe shutdown capability in the event of a fire. The affected plant area is the Division 2 [engineered safety feature] switchgear room, where redundant functions of both the Division 1 and 2 Standby Service Water systems could be affected. Fire protection program compensatory actions, i.e., [an] hourly firewatch has been in place since the deficiencies as identified in SECY 99-204 were documented at Grand Gulf. The area has detection and automatic fire suppression [systems] that are OPERABLE. Additionally, because of the outcome of the above mentioned examination, a continuous firewatch has been established as an additional compensatory measure."
The licensee stated that the hourly fire watch has been in place since 09/01/99. The hourly fire watch is required be technical specifications; however, the continuous fire watch has been established as an additional conservative measure.
The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"During destructive examination of the Kaowool fire barrier system used to protect Appendix R raceways, a deficiency was identified that could potentially compromise the ability of the fire barrier to provide adequate protection for at least one train of redundant safe shutdown capability in the event of a fire. The affected plant area is the Division 2 [engineered safety feature] switchgear room, where redundant functions of both the Division 1 and 2 Standby Service Water systems could be affected. Fire protection program compensatory actions, i.e., [an] hourly firewatch has been in place since the deficiencies as identified in SECY 99-204 were documented at Grand Gulf. The area has detection and automatic fire suppression [systems] that are OPERABLE. Additionally, because of the outcome of the above mentioned examination, a continuous firewatch has been established as an additional compensatory measure."
The licensee stated that the hourly fire watch has been in place since 09/01/99. The hourly fire watch is required be technical specifications; however, the continuous fire watch has been established as an additional conservative measure.
The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector.