Event Notification Report for December 06, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
12/05/2000 - 12/06/2000
EVENT NUMBERS
37576375723757337574
General Information or Other
Event Number: 37576
Rep Org: HUNT VALVE COMPANY, INC.
Licensee: HUNT VALVE COMPANY, INC.
Region: 3
City: SALEM State: OH
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: WAYNE ALDRICH (via fax)
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Licensee: HUNT VALVE COMPANY, INC.
Region: 3
City: SALEM State: OH
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: WAYNE ALDRICH (via fax)
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 12/07/2000
Notification Time: 19:19 [ET]
Event Date: 12/06/2000
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/07/2000
Notification Time: 19:19 [ET]
Event Date: 12/06/2000
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/07/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL PARKER (R3)
KEVIN RAMSEY (fax) (NMSS)
VERN HODGE (fax) (NRR)
MICHAEL PARKER (R3)
KEVIN RAMSEY (fax) (NMSS)
VERN HODGE (fax) (NRR)
10 CFR PART 21 REPORT OF A DEVIATION - IDENTIFICATION OF A DEFECT WITH A COMPONENT ON VALVE ASSEMBLIES SUPPLIED TO USEC
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Hunt Valve Company, Inc.:
"We have discovered a material failure within our manufacturing process for the 1" UF-6 valves manufactured in accordance with ANSI N14.1. During our normal visual inspection[,] a few packing nuts were noted to have cracks located on the hex flats. These cracked packing nuts have been isolated to heat codes AXP and AFD."
"These valves were manufactured and shipped against contract No. 566948 for USEC. Our records indicate that we have shipped Lot Serial [Nos.] 200027-36 through 200027-40 containing the heat code AXP packing nuts, and Lot Serial [Nos.] 200027-5 [and] 200027-19 through 200027-35 containing heat code AFD. The total number of valves included in these shipments is 2,300 of which 1,300 are known to be from the affected heat codes (see attached table). All other inventory has been accounted for and isolated. These valves have been located at USEC and are being returned to Hunt Valve for replacement nuts."
"We are currently undergoing an investigation to determine the source of the defect but feel compelled to inform you by this communication of our preliminary findings. [...]."
"Heat Code Lot Serial [No.] Date Shipped Quantity
(Total Supplied)
AXP (735 pcs) 200027-36 11/22/00 97
200027-37 11/22/00 100
(233 in stock 12/4/00) 200027-38 11/22/00 100
(100 on a shipment in shipping) 200027-39 11/22/00 100
200027-40 11/22/00 100
AFD (972 pcs) 200027-5 5/31/00 10
200027-19 8/14/00 9
(294 in stock 12/4/00) 200027-20 8/14/00 7
200027-21 8/31/00 30
200027-22 8/31/00 44
200027-23 8/31/00 39
200027-24 8/31/00 33
200027-25 8/31/00 29
200027-26 10/5/00 53
200027-27 10/5/00 52
200027-28 10/5/00 67
200027-29 10/5/00 54
200027-30 10/5/00 62
200027-31 11/3/00 58
200027-32 11/3/00 45
200027-33 11/3/00 23
200027-34 11/3/00 35
200027-35 11/3/00 28"
(Call the NRC operations officer for contact information).
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Hunt Valve Company, Inc.:
"We have discovered a material failure within our manufacturing process for the 1" UF-6 valves manufactured in accordance with ANSI N14.1. During our normal visual inspection[,] a few packing nuts were noted to have cracks located on the hex flats. These cracked packing nuts have been isolated to heat codes AXP and AFD."
"These valves were manufactured and shipped against contract No. 566948 for USEC. Our records indicate that we have shipped Lot Serial [Nos.] 200027-36 through 200027-40 containing the heat code AXP packing nuts, and Lot Serial [Nos.] 200027-5 [and] 200027-19 through 200027-35 containing heat code AFD. The total number of valves included in these shipments is 2,300 of which 1,300 are known to be from the affected heat codes (see attached table). All other inventory has been accounted for and isolated. These valves have been located at USEC and are being returned to Hunt Valve for replacement nuts."
"We are currently undergoing an investigation to determine the source of the defect but feel compelled to inform you by this communication of our preliminary findings. [...]."
"Heat Code Lot Serial [No.] Date Shipped Quantity
(Total Supplied)
AXP (735 pcs) 200027-36 11/22/00 97
200027-37 11/22/00 100
(233 in stock 12/4/00) 200027-38 11/22/00 100
(100 on a shipment in shipping) 200027-39 11/22/00 100
200027-40 11/22/00 100
AFD (972 pcs) 200027-5 5/31/00 10
200027-19 8/14/00 9
(294 in stock 12/4/00) 200027-20 8/14/00 7
200027-21 8/31/00 30
200027-22 8/31/00 44
200027-23 8/31/00 39
200027-24 8/31/00 33
200027-25 8/31/00 29
200027-26 10/5/00 53
200027-27 10/5/00 52
200027-28 10/5/00 67
200027-29 10/5/00 54
200027-30 10/5/00 62
200027-31 11/3/00 58
200027-32 11/3/00 45
200027-33 11/3/00 23
200027-34 11/3/00 35
200027-35 11/3/00 28"
(Call the NRC operations officer for contact information).
General Information or Other
Event Number: 37572
Rep Org: ARIZONA RADIATION REGULATORY AGENCY
Licensee: DAMES AND MOORE
Region: 4
City: TUCSON State: AZ
County:
License #: 07-228
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: AUBREY GODWIN (VIA FAX)
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Licensee: DAMES AND MOORE
Region: 4
City: TUCSON State: AZ
County:
License #: 07-228
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: AUBREY GODWIN (VIA FAX)
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 12/06/2000
Notification Time: 11:38 [ET]
Event Date: 12/06/2000
Event Time: 00:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 12/12/2000
Notification Time: 11:38 [ET]
Event Date: 12/06/2000
Event Time: 00:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 12/12/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING TWO STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGES
"This First Notice constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety or public interest significance. The information is as initially received WITHOUT verification or evaluation, and is basically all that is known by the Agency Staff at this time.
"Date: December 6, 2000
Time: 9:00 AM (MST)
First Notice: 00-16
"Arizona Licensee: Dames and Moore
License No. 07-228
7500 North Dreamy Draw Drive
Phoenix, AZ 857020
"At approximately 2:00 PM, December 5, 2000, the Agency received a report advising that 2 Troxler Model 3440 moisture/density gauges were missing. This information was supplied by the Dames and Moore Radiation Safety Officer. The information supplied indicated that the LICENSEE was unsure when the gauges were taken. They were last seen on December 4, 2000 in a locked storage building at 1790 East River Road, Tucson, AZ. Each gauge contains a 8 millicurie cesium 137 source and a 44 millicuries Americium 241 :Beryllium source. The serial numbers for the gauges are 13024 and 17318. The storage building was locked and had 24 hour security guard surveillance. The lock had been cut. Tucson PD is investigating this matter. The LICENSEE is offering a $500.00 reward. The Agency will be issuing a press release.
"The LICENSEE and the Agency continue to investigate this event.
"The states of Utah, California, Colorado, New Mexico, and Nevada together with the U.S. NRC, the U.S. FBI and Mexico are being notified of this event."
* * * UPDATE AT 1632 ON 12/12/00 BY FAX * * *
Text of Fax provided by the Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency.
"The Agency Duty Officer received a call from the DPS Duty Officer at about 7:00 PM indicating that a teenage boy had found one of the Soil Density Moisture Gauges and had taken it to his home. Arrangements were made by the Agency to dispatch two people to pick up the gauge. The first gauge was discovered by three teenage boys in Tucson and brought to the boys' home. The condition of this gauge (SN: 17315) was excellent. The second gauge (SN: 13024) was discovered on a dirt road at the East end of Linda Vista Rd. approximately 5 miles north of the first site. Again, this gauge was in excellent condition. Leak tests were taken of both gauges and are being evaluated by the agency. The gauge carrying cases were both intact. However, the gauges could not be secured with locks through the gauge handles. Also, at the second site were found two additional pieces of equipment that had been taken from the original storage shed. The gauges were released to a Dames and Moore representative."
The operations center informed the R4DO (Cain) and NMSS EO (Greeves).
"This First Notice constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety or public interest significance. The information is as initially received WITHOUT verification or evaluation, and is basically all that is known by the Agency Staff at this time.
"Date: December 6, 2000
Time: 9:00 AM (MST)
First Notice: 00-16
"Arizona Licensee: Dames and Moore
License No. 07-228
7500 North Dreamy Draw Drive
Phoenix, AZ 857020
"At approximately 2:00 PM, December 5, 2000, the Agency received a report advising that 2 Troxler Model 3440 moisture/density gauges were missing. This information was supplied by the Dames and Moore Radiation Safety Officer. The information supplied indicated that the LICENSEE was unsure when the gauges were taken. They were last seen on December 4, 2000 in a locked storage building at 1790 East River Road, Tucson, AZ. Each gauge contains a 8 millicurie cesium 137 source and a 44 millicuries Americium 241 :Beryllium source. The serial numbers for the gauges are 13024 and 17318. The storage building was locked and had 24 hour security guard surveillance. The lock had been cut. Tucson PD is investigating this matter. The LICENSEE is offering a $500.00 reward. The Agency will be issuing a press release.
"The LICENSEE and the Agency continue to investigate this event.
"The states of Utah, California, Colorado, New Mexico, and Nevada together with the U.S. NRC, the U.S. FBI and Mexico are being notified of this event."
* * * UPDATE AT 1632 ON 12/12/00 BY FAX * * *
Text of Fax provided by the Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency.
"The Agency Duty Officer received a call from the DPS Duty Officer at about 7:00 PM indicating that a teenage boy had found one of the Soil Density Moisture Gauges and had taken it to his home. Arrangements were made by the Agency to dispatch two people to pick up the gauge. The first gauge was discovered by three teenage boys in Tucson and brought to the boys' home. The condition of this gauge (SN: 17315) was excellent. The second gauge (SN: 13024) was discovered on a dirt road at the East end of Linda Vista Rd. approximately 5 miles north of the first site. Again, this gauge was in excellent condition. Leak tests were taken of both gauges and are being evaluated by the agency. The gauge carrying cases were both intact. However, the gauges could not be secured with locks through the gauge handles. Also, at the second site were found two additional pieces of equipment that had been taken from the original storage shed. The gauges were released to a Dames and Moore representative."
The operations center informed the R4DO (Cain) and NMSS EO (Greeves).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37573
Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: CURT STEFFES
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: CURT STEFFES
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 12/06/2000
Notification Time: 11:48 [ET]
Event Date: 12/06/2000
Event Time: 09:42 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/06/2000
Notification Time: 11:48 [ET]
Event Date: 12/06/2000
Event Time: 09:42 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/06/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - RPS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - RPS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL PARKER (R3)
MICHAEL PARKER (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
REACTOR SCRAM - LOW REACTOR VESSEL WATER LEVEL
An automatic reactor scram occurred on low reactor vessel water level. All systems responded as expected. Operators noted lowering reactor vessel water level and were attempting to respond to the problem when the low reactor vessel water scram setpoint was reached. The lowest water level seen during the transient was
-10", neither HPCI nor RCIC started. Reactor feedwater was maintained throughout the event. Recirculation pumps are running and decay heat is being removed by steaming to the main condenser. The cause of the feedwater transient is under investigation.
The licensee notified NRC resident inspector.
An automatic reactor scram occurred on low reactor vessel water level. All systems responded as expected. Operators noted lowering reactor vessel water level and were attempting to respond to the problem when the low reactor vessel water scram setpoint was reached. The lowest water level seen during the transient was
-10", neither HPCI nor RCIC started. Reactor feedwater was maintained throughout the event. Recirculation pumps are running and decay heat is being removed by steaming to the main condenser. The cause of the feedwater transient is under investigation.
The licensee notified NRC resident inspector.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 37574
Facility: GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL - AMERICAS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2)
LEU FABRICATION
LWR COMMERICAL FUEL
NRC Notified By: PAULSON
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2)
LEU FABRICATION
LWR COMMERICAL FUEL
NRC Notified By: PAULSON
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 12/07/2000
Notification Time: 11:43 [ET]
Event Date: 12/06/2000
Event Time: 19:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/07/2000
Notification Time: 11:43 [ET]
Event Date: 12/06/2000
Event Time: 19:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/07/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
BRIAN SMITH (NMSS)
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
BRIAN SMITH (NMSS)
24-HOUR NRC 91-01 BULLETIN REPORT INVOLVING LOSS OF MASS AND DENSITY CONTROLS IN TWO CARRYOVER STORAGE TANKS
"At approximately 1900 hours on December 6, 2000 GNF-A Operations identified that two tanks, believed to
be empty, contained liquid bearing very low concentrations of uranium. The tanks involved are V-109B and V-
113.
"The total mass of uranium involved is 282 grams U, well below the established safe mass limit of 22,036 grams U at 5% enrichment. No unsafe condition existed.
"The accumulation occurred due to carryover via a common Vent Off-Gas (VOG) system from V-104 to the two tanks found to contain liquid. The independent mass and density controls on V-104 remained fully functional. The potential for carryover via the VOG system was not anticipated and represents an unanalyzed condition.
"The solution in both V-109B and V-113 was sampled and pumped back into V-104 under the direction of Nuclear Safety. The total solution volume in V-109B was 2960 gallons with a concentration of 22 ppm U (~247 grams U). The total solution volume in V-113 was 1,507 gallons with a concentration of 6.1 ppm U (~35 grams U). The VOG header has been isolated to prevent reoccurrence. Investigation and additional corrective actions are pending.
"This event is reported pursuant to NRC Bulletin 91-01 (within 24 hours) due to identification of an unanalyzed condition involving less than a safe mass of uranium."
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
Low safety significance - low concentration
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):
Multiple failure modes required before a criticality accident could occur. Incident involves less than a safe mass of uranium.
CONTROLLED PARAMETER(S) (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):
Mass: V-104 process vessel limited to safe mass by upstream active engineered controls on uranium concentration in material feed (independent uranium monitor and pipe detector NDA measurement).
Density: independent differential pressure density control tied to particulate removal (centrifugation) and air sparging.
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST BASE CRITICAL MASS):
Affected equipment Contained < 300 grams of uranium (total). Established safe heterogeneous mass limit for U02 enriched to 5% is 25 kgs (or 22. 036 grams U).
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
The 4-inch overflow line located on tank V-104 beneath the VOG header failed to prevent carryover into the VOG header.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
1. Solution in V-109B and V-113 sampled for U concentration, results acceptable.
2. Solution in V-109B and V-113 pumped back into V-104; VOG header tie-in blank flanged to prevent reoccurrence.
3. Investigation and additional corrective actions pending.
"At approximately 1900 hours on December 6, 2000 GNF-A Operations identified that two tanks, believed to
be empty, contained liquid bearing very low concentrations of uranium. The tanks involved are V-109B and V-
113.
"The total mass of uranium involved is 282 grams U, well below the established safe mass limit of 22,036 grams U at 5% enrichment. No unsafe condition existed.
"The accumulation occurred due to carryover via a common Vent Off-Gas (VOG) system from V-104 to the two tanks found to contain liquid. The independent mass and density controls on V-104 remained fully functional. The potential for carryover via the VOG system was not anticipated and represents an unanalyzed condition.
"The solution in both V-109B and V-113 was sampled and pumped back into V-104 under the direction of Nuclear Safety. The total solution volume in V-109B was 2960 gallons with a concentration of 22 ppm U (~247 grams U). The total solution volume in V-113 was 1,507 gallons with a concentration of 6.1 ppm U (~35 grams U). The VOG header has been isolated to prevent reoccurrence. Investigation and additional corrective actions are pending.
"This event is reported pursuant to NRC Bulletin 91-01 (within 24 hours) due to identification of an unanalyzed condition involving less than a safe mass of uranium."
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
Low safety significance - low concentration
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):
Multiple failure modes required before a criticality accident could occur. Incident involves less than a safe mass of uranium.
CONTROLLED PARAMETER(S) (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):
Mass: V-104 process vessel limited to safe mass by upstream active engineered controls on uranium concentration in material feed (independent uranium monitor and pipe detector NDA measurement).
Density: independent differential pressure density control tied to particulate removal (centrifugation) and air sparging.
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST BASE CRITICAL MASS):
Affected equipment Contained < 300 grams of uranium (total). Established safe heterogeneous mass limit for U02 enriched to 5% is 25 kgs (or 22. 036 grams U).
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
The 4-inch overflow line located on tank V-104 beneath the VOG header failed to prevent carryover into the VOG header.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
1. Solution in V-109B and V-113 sampled for U concentration, results acceptable.
2. Solution in V-109B and V-113 pumped back into V-104; VOG header tie-in blank flanged to prevent reoccurrence.
3. Investigation and additional corrective actions pending.