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Event Notification Report for November 30, 2000

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
11/29/2000 - 11/30/2000

EVENT NUMBERS
37557375583755937589

!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37557
Facility: CRYSTAL RIVER
Region: 2     State: FL
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: CHARLES MORRIS
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 11/30/2000
Notification Time: 12:03 [ET]
Event Date: 11/30/2000
Event Time: 08:44 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/06/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
EDWARD MCALPINE (R2)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
LOSS OF SAFETY FUNCTION OF THE NUCLEAR SERVICES SEA WATER SYSTEM

At 0843 on November 30, 2000, RWP-2B. Nuclear Services Sea Water Pump, was started and observed to develop low discharge pressure, rendering the pump INOPERABLE. This condition was caused by diversion of flow via a failed open check valve upon shutdown of pump, RWP-1 which shares a common discharge header with pump RWP-2B.

RWP-2A, Nuclear Services Sea Water Pump, discharge is also common to RWP-2B. Consequently, RWP--2A would likely not have developed adequate discharge pressure, and therefore, adequate flow could not have been provided by either Nuclear Services Sea Water Pump.

Although allowed by design, this single failure defeats the safety function of the Nuclear Services Sea Water System.

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.

* * * RETRACTION ON 12/06/00 AT 1920 ET BY BILL BANDHAUER TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * *

On December 6, 2000, FPC performed further evaluation of the required safety function and the pertinent plant conditions observed during this event. Even with the partially stuck open check valve, sufficient capacity of system pumps and heat exchangers remained to remove design basis heat loads. FPC has concluded that the Nuclear Services Sea Water System would have performed the required heat removal safety function, if called upon.

Additionally, FPC considered the impact of increased electrical loading on the Emergency Diesel Generators caused by increased pump flow rate. FPC concluded that the electrical diesel generators remained capable of supporting the required electrical loads.

Based upon these additional evaluations, FPC determined that this condition in not reportable and therefore, retracts this event. R2DO (Paul Fredrickson) notified.


The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this retraction by the licensee.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 37558
Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3     State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: RICHARD GADBOIS
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 11/30/2000
Notification Time: 17:42 [ET]
Event Date: 11/30/2000
Event Time: 15:50 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/30/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL JORDAN (R3)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 A/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Shutdown
Event Text
LOAD REJECT - REACTOR SCRAM

The reactor scrammed at 1550 due to generator load reject. The main generator ouput circuit breaker 2-7 was being closed after maintenance when a bus to phase differential trip was received causing both output circuit breakers 2-3 and 2-7 to open. With both output circuit breakers open, the reactor scrammed due to load reject.

The response to the reactor scram was normal, all rods inserted. Steam is being dumped to the main condenser for decay heat removal.

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.


!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37559
Facility: SALEM
Region: 1     State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVE SAUER
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 11/30/2000
Notification Time: 20:55 [ET]
Event Date: 11/30/2000
Event Time: 17:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/27/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
ANIELLO DELLA GRECA (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
SERVICE WATER ACCUMULATOR LEVEL HIGH OUT OF SPECIFICATION

At 1700 on 11/30/00, it was identified that the 11B service water accumulator level was higher than that allowed by technical specifications. This was identified following a level device calibration. The service water accumulators support containment integrity by ensuring the containment fan coils remain properly filled during a design basis accident. Tech Spec 3.6.1.1 and 3.6.2.3 were entered for containment integrity and the inoperability of 11 and 12 containment fan coil units. Actions were taken within the one hour time requirement to comply with the containment integrity LCO. The service water accumulator was subsequently drained to within specification at 1742. Tech Spec 3.6.11 was exited at this time. The 11 and 12 containment fan coils were restored to operable at 1745 and Tech Spec 3.6.2.3 was exited. Actions are underway to calibrate the redundant instrumentation and to investigate the cause of the instrument drift. All power plant parameters remained stable throughout this event and no other safety systems were affected.

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.

* * * RETRACTION ON 12/27/00 AT 1053ET BY BASHORE TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * *

A review of the actual service water accumulator parameters that existed when the 11 service water accumulator level was high out of specification was performed. Based on the actual service water accumulator pressure, level and temperature and the service water inlet temperature that existed, engineering has determined that the 11 service water accumulator would have been able to perform its design basis function if called upon to do so during the time that the accumulator level was high out of specification.

Since the 11 service water accumulator was capable of performing its design basis function, the above report is being retracted. NRC R1DO (L. Doerflein) notified.


The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction by the licensee.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 37589
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1     State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: FRED RINGWALD
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 12/12/2000
Notification Time: 13:23 [ET]
Event Date: 11/30/2000
Event Time: 14:19 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/12/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
JOHN WHITE (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
REACTOR BUILDING DOOR NOT FULLY SHUT - CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY VIOLATED

"On November 30, 2000, at 1419, operators discovered that Secondary Containment was breached with the inner rollup door in the Reactor Building track bay not fully closed, and the outer door was inoperable. The Station Shift Supervisor entered Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operations, 3.4.1.a.2 and 3.4.1.b, which required the initiation of a shutdown if Secondary Containment was not restored within 4 hours. At 1440, operators verified that the inner rollup door was closed with a properly inflated door seal. The Station Shift Supervisor subsequently exited Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation 3.4.1.a.2 and 3.4.1.b. The available information at the time indicated that the door had only been open for 2 hours, 39 minutes.

"After completion of an investigation that was delayed due to repairs on the inoperable outer door, on December 12, 2000, at 1215, it was determined that the earlier information about the door being closed was not credible. Based on this conclusion, the door was actually open for 24 hours, 10 minutes. This resulted in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of secondary containment, that affects the control of the release of radioactive material."

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.