Event Notification Report for November 21, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
11/20/2000 - 11/21/2000
EVENT NUMBERS
375463754037541375423754437587
General Information or Other
Event Number: 37546
Rep Org: ILLINOIS DEPT OF NUCLEAR SAFETY
Licensee: JOHNS MANVILLE INTERNATIONAL
Region: 3
City: WAUKEGAN State: IL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TOM SIKES
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Licensee: JOHNS MANVILLE INTERNATIONAL
Region: 3
City: WAUKEGAN State: IL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TOM SIKES
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 11/22/2000
Notification Time: 17:23 [ET]
Event Date: 11/21/2000
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/22/2000
Notification Time: 17:23 [ET]
Event Date: 11/21/2000
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/22/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JAMES CREED (R3)
PHILIP TING (NMSS)
JAMES CREED (R3)
PHILIP TING (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT
The licensee contacted the State of Illinois to request assistance in locating a 20 mCi Cs-137 source. The source was mounted in an Omart model SH-F1 holder, and was licensed under a general license. Representatives of the state surveyed warehouses and other buildings throughout the licensee's facility and other licensee locations, but were unable to locate the source. The licensee is currently investigating whether the source may have been sent to a licensee facility in Colorado; however, the source may have been discarded during renovations to the warehouse in which it had been located. In this instance, the source may have been deposited in a landfill in Wisconsin. The state is continuing its investigation of this matter.
The licensee contacted the State of Illinois to request assistance in locating a 20 mCi Cs-137 source. The source was mounted in an Omart model SH-F1 holder, and was licensed under a general license. Representatives of the state surveyed warehouses and other buildings throughout the licensee's facility and other licensee locations, but were unable to locate the source. The licensee is currently investigating whether the source may have been sent to a licensee facility in Colorado; however, the source may have been discarded during renovations to the warehouse in which it had been located. In this instance, the source may have been deposited in a landfill in Wisconsin. The state is continuing its investigation of this matter.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37540
Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: AMBRAMSKY
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: AMBRAMSKY
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 11/21/2000
Notification Time: 11:03 [ET]
Event Date: 11/21/2000
Event Time: 10:22 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/21/2000
Notification Time: 11:03 [ET]
Event Date: 11/21/2000
Event Time: 10:22 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/21/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(v) - OTHER ASMT/COMM INOP
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(v) - OTHER ASMT/COMM INOP
Person (Organization):
CURTIS COWGILL (R1)
CURTIS COWGILL (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 93 | Power Operation | 93 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF POWER TO THE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY (EOF)
The loss of power to the EOF impairs the ability of the licensee to carry out the plant's emergency plan. A snow storm is being blamed for the loss of power.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
(Refer to event number 37541 for a related event at Nine Mile Point.)
The loss of power to the EOF impairs the ability of the licensee to carry out the plant's emergency plan. A snow storm is being blamed for the loss of power.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
(Refer to event number 37541 for a related event at Nine Mile Point.)
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37541
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: QUINTON HICKS
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: QUINTON HICKS
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 11/21/2000
Notification Time: 11:29 [ET]
Event Date: 11/21/2000
Event Time: 09:50 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/21/2000
Notification Time: 11:29 [ET]
Event Date: 11/21/2000
Event Time: 09:50 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/21/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(v) - OTHER ASMT/COMM INOP
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(v) - OTHER ASMT/COMM INOP
Person (Organization):
CURTIS COWGILL (R1)
CURTIS COWGILL (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF POWER TO THE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY (EOF)
The licensee reported that power was lost to the EOF at 0950 and was restored at 1045. This facility serves both the NMP units as well as Fitzpatrick. The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
(Refer to event number 37540 for a related event at Fitzpatrick.)
The licensee reported that power was lost to the EOF at 0950 and was restored at 1045. This facility serves both the NMP units as well as Fitzpatrick. The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
(Refer to event number 37540 for a related event at Fitzpatrick.)
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 37542
Rep Org: BEST INDUSTRIES
Licensee: BEST INDUSTRIES
Region: 2
City: SPRINGFIELD State: VA
County:
License #: 45-19757-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOE WANG
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Licensee: BEST INDUSTRIES
Region: 2
City: SPRINGFIELD State: VA
County:
License #: 45-19757-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOE WANG
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 11/21/2000
Notification Time: 12:02 [ET]
Event Date: 11/21/2000
Event Time: 10:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/21/2000
Notification Time: 12:02 [ET]
Event Date: 11/21/2000
Event Time: 10:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/21/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
MIKE ERNSTES (R2)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
10 CFR PART 20.1906(d) REPORT
One of three Type A shipping packages received from Baylor University exceeded the limit for surface radiation readings (200 mR/hr). The licensee reported that the package was reading 2.7 R/hr at the surface of the package, and 65 mR/hr at 1 meter. The package has been placed in safe storage. The licensee will contact Baylor University and the shipper (FedEx).
One of three Type A shipping packages received from Baylor University exceeded the limit for surface radiation readings (200 mR/hr). The licensee reported that the package was reading 2.7 R/hr at the surface of the package, and 65 mR/hr at 1 meter. The package has been placed in safe storage. The licensee will contact Baylor University and the shipper (FedEx).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37544
Facility: HOPE CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ART BREADY
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ART BREADY
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 11/21/2000
Notification Time: 16:12 [ET]
Event Date: 11/21/2000
Event Time: 13:08 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/21/2000
Notification Time: 16:12 [ET]
Event Date: 11/21/2000
Event Time: 13:08 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/21/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
CURTIS COWGILL (R1)
CURTIS COWGILL (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
BOTH TRAINS OF CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRATION INOPERABLE SIMULTANEOUSLY
"At 1308 hours, the 'B' Control Room Chiller tripped on an apparent high bearing oil temperature condition, rendering the 'B' Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) train inoperable. At the time that the 'B' CREF train tripped, the 'A' CREF train was out of service for scheduled maintenance. With both trains of CREF inoperable, Technical Specification 3.0.3 was entered. Preparations were made to commence plant shutdown in parallel with restoration of the 'A' train from maintenance. The 'A' CREF train was returned to operable status at 1402 hours and Technical Specification 3.0.3 was exited. A seven-day action statement remains in effect for the inoperability of the 'B' CREF train.
"The Control Room Ventilation System provides heating, cooling, ventilation, and environmental control for the control room and adjacent areas. Under accident conditions, the Control Room Emergency Filtration Unit ensures that the control room will remain habitable during and following all design basis accidents. Because the CREF system is required to automatically respond in the event of a design basis accident, having both trains of CREF inoperable at the same time impacted the ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Therefore, this event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D).
"All other safety related equipment is operable with the exception of the 'C' Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor, which is in the tripped condition due to a surveillance test failure. A root cause investigation team has been assembled to determine required corrective actions."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification by the licensee.
"At 1308 hours, the 'B' Control Room Chiller tripped on an apparent high bearing oil temperature condition, rendering the 'B' Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) train inoperable. At the time that the 'B' CREF train tripped, the 'A' CREF train was out of service for scheduled maintenance. With both trains of CREF inoperable, Technical Specification 3.0.3 was entered. Preparations were made to commence plant shutdown in parallel with restoration of the 'A' train from maintenance. The 'A' CREF train was returned to operable status at 1402 hours and Technical Specification 3.0.3 was exited. A seven-day action statement remains in effect for the inoperability of the 'B' CREF train.
"The Control Room Ventilation System provides heating, cooling, ventilation, and environmental control for the control room and adjacent areas. Under accident conditions, the Control Room Emergency Filtration Unit ensures that the control room will remain habitable during and following all design basis accidents. Because the CREF system is required to automatically respond in the event of a design basis accident, having both trains of CREF inoperable at the same time impacted the ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Therefore, this event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D).
"All other safety related equipment is operable with the exception of the 'C' Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor, which is in the tripped condition due to a surveillance test failure. A root cause investigation team has been assembled to determine required corrective actions."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification by the licensee.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 37587
Rep Org: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: TRANSALTA CENTRALIA MINING LLC
Region: 4
City: CENTRALIA State: WA
County:
License #: WN-I0241-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TERRY FRAZEE
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Licensee: TRANSALTA CENTRALIA MINING LLC
Region: 4
City: CENTRALIA State: WA
County:
License #: WN-I0241-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TERRY FRAZEE
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 12/11/2000
Notification Time: 19:00 [ET]
Event Date: 11/21/2000
Event Time: 12:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 12/11/2000
Notification Time: 19:00 [ET]
Event Date: 11/21/2000
Event Time: 12:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 12/11/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
THOMAS ESSIG (NMSS)
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
THOMAS ESSIG (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT
This is notification of an event in Washington state as reported to the WA Department of
Health Division of Radiation Protection.
STATUS: new (related to events #WA-00-054 and #WA-00-046)
Licensee: Transalta Centralia Mining LLC
City and state: Centralia, WA
License number: WN-I0241-1
Type of license: Fixed Gauge
Date of event: November 21 & 23, 2000 Location of Event; Centralia, WA
ABSTRACT: (where, when, how, why; cause. contributing factors, corrective actions, consequences, DOH on-site investigation; media attention) The licensee notified the WA Department of Health, Division of Radiation Protection, that replacement rods (installed after source rod failures documented in Washington event reports #WA-00-046 and WA-00-054) had failed on November 21 and November 22.
As reported previously, the Ronan Engineering Company Model SA-4 gauging device (containing up to 74 gigabecquerels of cesium-137 in an Amersham Model CDC.711M source) is operated by lowering the source at the end of an approximately six foot source rod into a dry well. The gauge is removed from service by pulling up on the source rod until the source enters the shielded body of the gauge. The source rod was originally constructed in several screw-together sections. Failure number 1 (September 13) was the apparent result of mechanical vibration loosening the upper screw joint until it came apart as the source rod was being lifted. Failure number 2 (October 5) was presumed to be metal fatigue in that the male threaded portion of the lower screw joint snapped off from the rod as it was being lifted. Since an exact replacement rod was no longer available from Ronan, the actual replacement consisted of two rod sections connected at each joint by a spring-loaded brass pin and a short manufactured adapter that was tooled for the pin connector at one end and a threaded male connector at the other.
Failure number 3 (November 21) and failure number 4 (November 23) also occurred while lifting the source rod. In both instances, the lower pin-connected joint failed apparently as a result of the increased tension as the source enters the shield overcoming the spring tension on the brass pin, thus 'popping' the connector loose. After the second failure of this type, the gauge was taken out of service and the manufacturer requested to provide an exact replacement rod. The 'old style' screw-together sections were installed December 7. The 'new' pin-connected rods provided for the other three gauges had not been installed because no problems had occurred. The licensee plans to replace all four gauges by the end of 2001 when new process equipment is installed.
This is notification of an event in Washington state as reported to the WA Department of
Health Division of Radiation Protection.
STATUS: new (related to events #WA-00-054 and #WA-00-046)
Licensee: Transalta Centralia Mining LLC
City and state: Centralia, WA
License number: WN-I0241-1
Type of license: Fixed Gauge
Date of event: November 21 & 23, 2000 Location of Event; Centralia, WA
ABSTRACT: (where, when, how, why; cause. contributing factors, corrective actions, consequences, DOH on-site investigation; media attention) The licensee notified the WA Department of Health, Division of Radiation Protection, that replacement rods (installed after source rod failures documented in Washington event reports #WA-00-046 and WA-00-054) had failed on November 21 and November 22.
As reported previously, the Ronan Engineering Company Model SA-4 gauging device (containing up to 74 gigabecquerels of cesium-137 in an Amersham Model CDC.711M source) is operated by lowering the source at the end of an approximately six foot source rod into a dry well. The gauge is removed from service by pulling up on the source rod until the source enters the shielded body of the gauge. The source rod was originally constructed in several screw-together sections. Failure number 1 (September 13) was the apparent result of mechanical vibration loosening the upper screw joint until it came apart as the source rod was being lifted. Failure number 2 (October 5) was presumed to be metal fatigue in that the male threaded portion of the lower screw joint snapped off from the rod as it was being lifted. Since an exact replacement rod was no longer available from Ronan, the actual replacement consisted of two rod sections connected at each joint by a spring-loaded brass pin and a short manufactured adapter that was tooled for the pin connector at one end and a threaded male connector at the other.
Failure number 3 (November 21) and failure number 4 (November 23) also occurred while lifting the source rod. In both instances, the lower pin-connected joint failed apparently as a result of the increased tension as the source enters the shield overcoming the spring tension on the brass pin, thus 'popping' the connector loose. After the second failure of this type, the gauge was taken out of service and the manufacturer requested to provide an exact replacement rod. The 'old style' screw-together sections were installed December 7. The 'new' pin-connected rods provided for the other three gauges had not been installed because no problems had occurred. The licensee plans to replace all four gauges by the end of 2001 when new process equipment is installed.