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Event Notification Report for November 16, 2000

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
11/15/2000 - 11/16/2000

EVENT NUMBERS
3753137527375283752937600

Power Reactor
Event Number: 37531
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1     State: NY
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: KEVIN DONNELLY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 11/17/2000
Notification Time: 15:21 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2000
Event Time: 15:54 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/17/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
ERIC REBER (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling
Event Text
SITE ACCESS INAPPROPRIATELY GRANTED TO UTILITY EMPLOYEE

During a QA Audit it was determined that one (1) utility employee may have been granted access inappropriately following offsite drug testing conducted on 9/99. The employee was recalled to the site today for retesting.

The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 37527
Facility: FARLEY
Region: 2     State: AL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: BRAD MOORE
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 11/16/2000
Notification Time: 05:10 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2000
Event Time: 03:23 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/16/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 A/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby
Event Text
AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP ON HIGH-HIGH STEAM GENERATOR WATER LEVEL FOLLOWING A MASTER STEAM GENERATOR FEEDWATER PUMP CONTROLLER FAILURE AND SLUGGISH CONTROLS AFTER SWITCHING TO MANUAL

The master steam generator feedwater pump controller failed low and caused feedwater pump speeds to slow down. (Both pumps dropped to 3,200 rpm.) In an attempt to regain feedwater pump speed and steam generator water level in manual, a high-high level was reached in the 2A steam generator. This caused a turbine trip and subsequent reactor trip. All control rods fully inserted. Auxiliary feedwater actuation and feedwater isolation occurred as expected. All systems functioned as required.

It was reported that the controller was sluggish after manual control was taken and that operators were not able to terminate the rising level in the 2A steam generator before the high-high level trip setpoint was reached. The lowest steam generator water level attained was approximately 27%. The low level trip occurs at 25%. The cause of the controller failure is currently under investigation.

The unit is currently stable in Hot Standby. Pressurizer heaters and sprays, normal charging and letdown, and the reactor coolant pumps are currently being utilized for primary system pressure, level, and transport control. Secondary steam is being dumped to the main condenser, and auxiliary feedwater is supplying water to the steam generators. All containment parameters are normal.

The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 37528
Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2     State: FL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: JAMES HURCHALLA
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 11/16/2000
Notification Time: 13:06 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2000
Event Time: 12:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/16/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
UNIT 1 PRESSURIZER LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION MAY NOT MEET CABLE SEPARATION CRITERIA

"During development of a cable separation modification package for the upcoming 2001 Unit 1 Outage SL1-17, a re-evaluation of the Unit 1 Containment Shutdown Safety Assessment was performed. The re-evaluation identified a separation issue with the cables for pressurizer level instruments LT-1110X and LT-1110Y in the annulus area. At certain locations, these cables are not separated as required by 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix R, Section lll.G.2 as required by the plant design basis as delineated in the FSAR.

"Fire protection for nuclear plants is based on the defense in depth concept with three primary barriers - prevention, detection and control, and protection of safe shutdown capabilities. The above concern is considered a degradation of the protection of safe shutdown capability. The affect of this concern on the fire protection program does not eliminate the ability to achieve safe shutdown. The remaining two 'defense in depth' barriers remain intact - (prevention of fires and prompt detection and control of fires that due occur). In an area such as containment (large volume, high ceilings, minimal ignition sources, limited combustibles, limited access, etc.) the potential for a fire of consequence during operation is highly unlikely. In the particular area described, the potential for a fire is even more remote since the combustible loading is negligible. The location where the separation issue exists (at the end of the annulus area near the pipe chase) does not contain significant equipment, significant exposed combustible materials or significant ignition sources. The cable trays routed in this area (between radius lines 1 and 3) are relatively lightly loaded since most cables have previously exited the tray enroute to their respective equipment (e.g., only one tray continues past radius line 2 to radius line 1).

"The probability of a fire in Containment is very low. The probability of a fire causing significant damage such that required function is impaired is very low. Therefore, the equipment and system affected by this condition is considered degraded but operable. Based on the guidance provided in GL 91-18 a reasonable assurance of safety is provided."

The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector.


Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 37529
Rep Org: USAF RADIOISOTOPE COMMITTEE
Licensee: U.S. AIR FORCE
Region: 2
City: SARASOTA   State: FL
County:
License #: 42-23539-01AF
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LT. COL. SWENSON
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 11/16/2000
Notification Time: 21:32 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2000
Event Time: 17:20 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/16/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2)
LINDA HOWELL (R4)
E. WILLIAM BRACH (NMSS)
Event Text
LOSS OF TWO AMERICIUM-241 SOURCES (4 MICROCURIES EACH) DUE TO THE CRASH OF AN F-16 NEAR SARASOTA, FLORIDA

An F-16 crashed near Sarasota, Florida which may have been carrying two (2) Am-241 sources used in the LANTIRN (Low Altitude Navigation Targeting Infrared for Night) pod. The Air Force will followup to determine whether the sources were onboard and, if so, attempt recovery from the crash scene.


Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 37600
Rep Org: U.S. ARMY
Licensee: U.S. ARMY
Region: 3
City: ROCK ISLAND   State: IL
County:
License #: 12-00722-06
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JEFF HAVENNER
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 12/15/2000
Notification Time: 09:59 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2000
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/15/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
Person (Organization):
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
BRIAN SMITH (NMSS)
Event Text
DISCOVERY THAT A LEVEL VIAL CONTAINING 75 MILLICURIES OF TRITIUM WAS MISSING FROM AN M-18 GUNNERS QUADRANT AT FORT POLK, LOUISIANA

During an audit at Fort Polk (near Alexandria, Louisiana) on 11/16/00, the licensee discovered that a level vial was missing from an M-18 gunners quadrant. Fort Polk reported this event to Rock Island, Illinois, on 12/05/00.

The licensee stated that the missing level vial contained both 75 millicuries of tritium and some amount of alcohol. Apparently, the alcohol portion of the level vial can be broken without breaking the tritium source. In addition, the vial did not have a serial number, and there is no way to specifically identify it.

The licensee currently believes that the Army still has possession of the missing source, and it is not believed that the source is in the public domain. The licensee also believes that this event represents an undocumented transfer from one gun to another. It was hypothesized that the alcohol portion of a level vial may have been broken, the broken level vial may have been replaced with an intact level vial from another M-18 gunners quadrant, and the broken vial may have been placed in radioactive waste.

The gun crew was interviewed and stated that they were out doing drills on one day. They went out again the next day, and the level vial was missing. The guns had not been moved out of the motor pool, and therefore, the vial did not disappear along the road anywhere.

The licensee stated that this was a 30-day report to the NRC. In addition to this notification, the licensee plans to submit a written report to the NRC Region 3 office.

(Call the NRC operations officer for a licensee contact telephone number.)