Event Notification Report for November 07, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
11/06/2000 - 11/07/2000
EVENT NUMBERS
375053749837499375013750237575
General Information or Other
Event Number: 37505
Rep Org: ALABAMA RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: DESIGN FUELS CORPORATION
Region: 2
City: HUEYTOWN State: AL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DONALD C. WILLIAMSON
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Licensee: DESIGN FUELS CORPORATION
Region: 2
City: HUEYTOWN State: AL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DONALD C. WILLIAMSON
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 11/08/2000
Notification Time: 15:34 [ET]
Event Date: 11/07/2000
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/08/2000
Notification Time: 15:34 [ET]
Event Date: 11/07/2000
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/08/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
MICHELE EVANS (R1)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
CHARLES MILLER (IRO)
PAUL LOHAUS (OSP)
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
MICHELE EVANS (R1)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
CHARLES MILLER (IRO)
PAUL LOHAUS (OSP)
PRELIMINARY INCIDENT NOTIFICATION OF THE DISCOVERY OF A TN TECHNOLOGIES SOURCE HOLDER (WITH A 1-CURIE CESIUM-137 SOURCE AND THE SHUTTER LOCKED OPEN) NEAR HUEYTOWN, AL, AND POSSIBLE ILLEGAL TRANSPORT OF THE DEVICE FROM DESIGN FUELS CORPORATION IN McMURRY, PA, DURING THE EARLY 1990s
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the State of Alabama Department of Public Health, Alabama Office of Radiation Control:
"Subject: Preliminary Notification of a Found Source"
"Members of the staff of the Alabama Office of Radiation Control (the Agency) traveled to Hueytown, AL, on November 7, 2000, to investigate the finding of a TN Technologies Model-5191 source holder containing 1,000 millicuries of Cs-137 (as of 1985)."
"Circumstances of the Event"
"Based on initial information, it appears that the general licensed device was illegally transported by Design Fuels Corporation from their facility in McMurry, PA, to Alabama in the early 1990s. During this transport, and until the time it was discovered, the device shutter was locked in the open position. The device was discovered in a wooded area away from personnel, on private property not accessible to the general public. It is believed the device had been in that location since early 1992."
"The device shutter has subsequently been locked in the closed position, and the device [has been] moved to a secure storage location near Hueytown, AL, pending determination of final disposition. Maximum exposure readings with the shutter open were 2.6 rem/hr at near contact with the pipe opposite the source holder. After closing the shutter, maximum readings are 1.8 mrem/hr at contact with the pipe opposite the source holder, 0.5 mrem/hr at 30 cm, and 7.0 mrem/hr at contact with the source holder. The source was tested for leakage. Leak test results were negative."
The Alabama Office of Radiation Control notified the NRC Region II office (Richard Woodruff). At this time, the NRC Region II office plans to clarify this information with the State, notify the Environmental Protection Agency, and issue a Preliminary Notification of Event or Unusual Occurrence.
(Call the NRC operations officer for contact information.)
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the State of Alabama Department of Public Health, Alabama Office of Radiation Control:
"Subject: Preliminary Notification of a Found Source"
"Members of the staff of the Alabama Office of Radiation Control (the Agency) traveled to Hueytown, AL, on November 7, 2000, to investigate the finding of a TN Technologies Model-5191 source holder containing 1,000 millicuries of Cs-137 (as of 1985)."
"Circumstances of the Event"
"Based on initial information, it appears that the general licensed device was illegally transported by Design Fuels Corporation from their facility in McMurry, PA, to Alabama in the early 1990s. During this transport, and until the time it was discovered, the device shutter was locked in the open position. The device was discovered in a wooded area away from personnel, on private property not accessible to the general public. It is believed the device had been in that location since early 1992."
"The device shutter has subsequently been locked in the closed position, and the device [has been] moved to a secure storage location near Hueytown, AL, pending determination of final disposition. Maximum exposure readings with the shutter open were 2.6 rem/hr at near contact with the pipe opposite the source holder. After closing the shutter, maximum readings are 1.8 mrem/hr at contact with the pipe opposite the source holder, 0.5 mrem/hr at 30 cm, and 7.0 mrem/hr at contact with the source holder. The source was tested for leakage. Leak test results were negative."
The Alabama Office of Radiation Control notified the NRC Region II office (Richard Woodruff). At this time, the NRC Region II office plans to clarify this information with the State, notify the Environmental Protection Agency, and issue a Preliminary Notification of Event or Unusual Occurrence.
(Call the NRC operations officer for contact information.)
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37498
Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: PETE ORPHANOS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: PETE ORPHANOS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 11/07/2000
Notification Time: 05:30 [ET]
Event Date: 11/07/2000
Event Time: 02:31 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/07/2000
Notification Time: 05:30 [ET]
Event Date: 11/07/2000
Event Time: 02:31 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/07/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
MICHELE EVANS (R1)
MICHELE EVANS (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) ISOLATED AND INOPERABLE DUE TO FAILED STEAM LEAK DETECTION SYSTEM TEMPERATURE ELEMENT
"On November 7, 2000 at 0231[EST] Limerick Generating Station received a High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System isolation due to a failed Steam Leak Detection System temperature element. Outboard isolation valves HV-055-2F003, HV-055-2F100, HV-055-2F041 and HV-055-2F042 received isolation commands. The system isolated as designed. Investigation [into] the cause of the failed temperature element is ongoing. The HPCI system remains isolated and inoperable."
Unit 2 is in a 14-day LCO A/S. Other ECCS equipment has been verified operable. The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector.
"On November 7, 2000 at 0231[EST] Limerick Generating Station received a High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System isolation due to a failed Steam Leak Detection System temperature element. Outboard isolation valves HV-055-2F003, HV-055-2F100, HV-055-2F041 and HV-055-2F042 received isolation commands. The system isolated as designed. Investigation [into] the cause of the failed temperature element is ongoing. The HPCI system remains isolated and inoperable."
Unit 2 is in a 14-day LCO A/S. Other ECCS equipment has been verified operable. The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37499
Facility: FARLEY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JIM HUNTER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JIM HUNTER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 11/07/2000
Notification Time: 06:35 [ET]
Event Date: 11/07/2000
Event Time: 05:10 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/07/2000
Notification Time: 06:35 [ET]
Event Date: 11/07/2000
Event Time: 05:10 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/07/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(v) - OTHER ASMT/COMM INOP
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(v) - OTHER ASMT/COMM INOP
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
DEDICATED TELEPHONE SYSTEM FOR STATE NOTIFICATIONS INOPERABLE
During testing of the Emergency Notification Network (ENN) to the states of Georgia and Alabama, the system failed producing a constant hum on the speaker in the control room. The licensee notified their Birmingham office to initiate repairs. There is currently no estimate available for restoration. The licensee informed the affected states via commercial telephone and will inform the NRC resident inspector.
* * * UPDATE 0919EST ON 11/7/00 FROM ROBERT FUCICH TO S. SANDIN * * *
The licensee returned the ENN system to service as of 0744EST and will inform the NRC resident inspector. Notified R2DO(Bonser).
During testing of the Emergency Notification Network (ENN) to the states of Georgia and Alabama, the system failed producing a constant hum on the speaker in the control room. The licensee notified their Birmingham office to initiate repairs. There is currently no estimate available for restoration. The licensee informed the affected states via commercial telephone and will inform the NRC resident inspector.
* * * UPDATE 0919EST ON 11/7/00 FROM ROBERT FUCICH TO S. SANDIN * * *
The licensee returned the ENN system to service as of 0744EST and will inform the NRC resident inspector. Notified R2DO(Bonser).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37501
Facility: SALEM
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RUSS GUMBERT
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RUSS GUMBERT
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 11/07/2000
Notification Time: 16:55 [ET]
Event Date: 11/07/2000
Event Time: 15:01 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/07/2000
Notification Time: 16:55 [ET]
Event Date: 11/07/2000
Event Time: 15:01 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/07/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MICHELE EVANS (R1)
MICHELE EVANS (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
FEEDWATER ISOLATION DUE TO CYCLING OF A BOILER FEED (BF) VALVE AND THE SUBSEQUENT STEAM GENERATOR WATER LEVEL PERTURBATION
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"[The] 21 steam generator level rose to the high-high level trip setpoint of 67% narrow range level at which time a feedwater isolation signal was generated. This is an [engineered safety feature (ESF)] actuation. The plant is in Mode 4 at 332°F reactor coolant system temperature with [four] reactor coolant pumps in service. Steam generator levels were being maintained by intermittent feed with the main feed system and auxiliary feed system in standby. Temperature control is via steam dumps to [the] condenser. The 21 through 24BF13s and BF40s went closed. With the exception of [the] 21BF19, the 22 through 24BF19s were already closed. The 21BF19 went closed due to the high-high level. The condition was caused by cycling open of [the] 21BF19 during troubleshooting of position indication. [The] feedwater isolation is currently reset, and steam generator levels are being maintained with main feed as prior to the event. No other steam generator levels were effected, and 21 steam generator level is returned to the pre-event level of [approximately] 40% narrow range."
The licensee stated that all systems functioned as required.
The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector and the Lower Alloways Creek Township.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"[The] 21 steam generator level rose to the high-high level trip setpoint of 67% narrow range level at which time a feedwater isolation signal was generated. This is an [engineered safety feature (ESF)] actuation. The plant is in Mode 4 at 332°F reactor coolant system temperature with [four] reactor coolant pumps in service. Steam generator levels were being maintained by intermittent feed with the main feed system and auxiliary feed system in standby. Temperature control is via steam dumps to [the] condenser. The 21 through 24BF13s and BF40s went closed. With the exception of [the] 21BF19, the 22 through 24BF19s were already closed. The 21BF19 went closed due to the high-high level. The condition was caused by cycling open of [the] 21BF19 during troubleshooting of position indication. [The] feedwater isolation is currently reset, and steam generator levels are being maintained with main feed as prior to the event. No other steam generator levels were effected, and 21 steam generator level is returned to the pre-event level of [approximately] 40% narrow range."
The licensee stated that all systems functioned as required.
The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector and the Lower Alloways Creek Township.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37502
Facility: CRYSTAL RIVER
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: RICKY E. RAWLS
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: RICKY E. RAWLS
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 11/07/2000
Notification Time: 18:18 [ET]
Event Date: 11/07/2000
Event Time: 14:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/07/2000
Notification Time: 18:18 [ET]
Event Date: 11/07/2000
Event Time: 14:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/07/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(vi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(vi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION REGARDING THE DISCOVERY OF A DEAD SEA TURTLE IN THE INTAKE
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"[The unit] was operating 100% with all [systems] normal for MODE 1. Maintenance was pulling an intake structure BAR rack in preparation for routine cleaning when the crew noticed a partially decomposed sea turtle floating to the surface. The dead sea turtle was retrieved and sent to the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) for analysis."
"NMFS has previously conducted an endangered species Act consultation with the NRC and FPC. This consultation resulted in the establishment of sea turtle protection criteria under a Biological Opinion and an Incidental Take Statement. This turtle discovery is within the sea turtle protection criteria established by the NMFS with FPC. A written report will be submitted to NMFS."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"[The unit] was operating 100% with all [systems] normal for MODE 1. Maintenance was pulling an intake structure BAR rack in preparation for routine cleaning when the crew noticed a partially decomposed sea turtle floating to the surface. The dead sea turtle was retrieved and sent to the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) for analysis."
"NMFS has previously conducted an endangered species Act consultation with the NRC and FPC. This consultation resulted in the establishment of sea turtle protection criteria under a Biological Opinion and an Incidental Take Statement. This turtle discovery is within the sea turtle protection criteria established by the NMFS with FPC. A written report will be submitted to NMFS."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37575
Facility: OCONEE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: RANDY TODD
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: RANDY TODD
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 12/07/2000
Notification Time: 14:29 [ET]
Event Date: 11/07/2000
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/07/2000
Notification Time: 14:29 [ET]
Event Date: 11/07/2000
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/07/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
Person (Organization):
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
BRIAN SMITHN (NMSS)
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
BRIAN SMITHN (NMSS)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Refueling |
LOSS OF A RADIOACTIVE CALIBRATION SOURCE CONTAINING 0.022 MICROCURIES OF AMERICIUM-241
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"[...] This is a non-emergency event being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(2)(i) which references [10 CFR] 50.72. The event did not directly affect operation of Oconee unit(s) 1, 2, or 3."
"[...] This report is categorized under 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1)(ii)."
"[...] Description of event:"
"On [11/07/00,] a radioactive calibration source, designated as ONS-1075, was recognized as missing inside the Oconee restricted area. Following an unsuccessful search, it was classified as lost. [10 CFR] Part 20 requires a telephone report to the NRC Operations Center within 30 days from the date of loss of this quantity of licensed material. In addition, 10 CFR 20.2201(b) requires a written report within 30 days following the telephone report. The written report will be submitted within that period."
"Description of the lost licensed material[:]"
"The lost calibration source was a 47 mm glass fiber filter material impregnated with 0.022 microcurie[s] of [Am]-241, covered with mylar and contained in a stainless steel planchet. This quantity is 22 times the 10 CFR [Part] 20, Appendix C quantity. For comparison, the average home smoke detector contains a source of approximately 1 microcurie."
"Circumstances under which the loss occurred[:]"
"On 10/30/00[,] an individual used the source used to calibrate a radiation measuring device. Prior to returning the source to its storage location, the individual, who was experiencing elevated blood pressure, was relieved from duty and was referred to his personal physician. On 11/07/00, after being released to return to work by his physician, the individual resumed the calibration process and noted the absence of the calibration source."
"Probable disposition of licensed material[:]"
"Following a search and investigation associated with the missing calibration source (see below), it was concluded that the most probable disposition of the lost source was inadvertent disposal as dry active waste."
"Exposures of individuals to radiation[:]"
"No individuals are believed to have been exposed to this material. A dose assessment assuming a hypothetical maximally exposed individual concluded that external exposure would be negligible, and internal dose would be 49 mRem CEDE if ingested or 11.4 Rem CEDE if inhaled. Given the probable disposition and physical characteristics of this source, it is unlikely that this source was ingested or inhaled; therefore, it is not considered credible that any individual could receive the maximum calculable dose from this source."
"Action taken to recover the material[:]"
"On 11/07/00[,] the individual conducted a search of the source's storage area and all reasonable areas where the source would be used in order to continue the calibration. When the source was not found, the individual notified his supervisor, and the search was expanded to include the individual's office area and some personal effects. Because the calibration source is very similar in appearance to common samples used to quantify removable surface radioactive contamination, it was suspected that the calibration source had been mistakenly discarded as sample waste. No dry active waste shipments had been made during the elapsed time between 10/30/2000, when the source was last known to have been used, and 11/7/00, when the search was conducted. However, a significant amount of waste had accumulated at the collection point. This waste was visually searched, but the source was not located."
"Measures that have been, or will be, adopted to ensure against a recurrence of the loss of licensed material[:]"
"This type of calibration source is similar in appearance to routine samples prepared for counting in the detector. Oconee will pursue a method for better marking of these sources to minimize the possibility of a source being visually mistaken for a waste sample."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
NOTE: The licensee stated that Oconee Unit 1 was operating at 100% power at the time of the event (on 11/07/00). However, the Unit 1 is currently defueled as part of a planned refueling outage.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"[...] This is a non-emergency event being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(2)(i) which references [10 CFR] 50.72. The event did not directly affect operation of Oconee unit(s) 1, 2, or 3."
"[...] This report is categorized under 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1)(ii)."
"[...] Description of event:"
"On [11/07/00,] a radioactive calibration source, designated as ONS-1075, was recognized as missing inside the Oconee restricted area. Following an unsuccessful search, it was classified as lost. [10 CFR] Part 20 requires a telephone report to the NRC Operations Center within 30 days from the date of loss of this quantity of licensed material. In addition, 10 CFR 20.2201(b) requires a written report within 30 days following the telephone report. The written report will be submitted within that period."
"Description of the lost licensed material[:]"
"The lost calibration source was a 47 mm glass fiber filter material impregnated with 0.022 microcurie[s] of [Am]-241, covered with mylar and contained in a stainless steel planchet. This quantity is 22 times the 10 CFR [Part] 20, Appendix C quantity. For comparison, the average home smoke detector contains a source of approximately 1 microcurie."
"Circumstances under which the loss occurred[:]"
"On 10/30/00[,] an individual used the source used to calibrate a radiation measuring device. Prior to returning the source to its storage location, the individual, who was experiencing elevated blood pressure, was relieved from duty and was referred to his personal physician. On 11/07/00, after being released to return to work by his physician, the individual resumed the calibration process and noted the absence of the calibration source."
"Probable disposition of licensed material[:]"
"Following a search and investigation associated with the missing calibration source (see below), it was concluded that the most probable disposition of the lost source was inadvertent disposal as dry active waste."
"Exposures of individuals to radiation[:]"
"No individuals are believed to have been exposed to this material. A dose assessment assuming a hypothetical maximally exposed individual concluded that external exposure would be negligible, and internal dose would be 49 mRem CEDE if ingested or 11.4 Rem CEDE if inhaled. Given the probable disposition and physical characteristics of this source, it is unlikely that this source was ingested or inhaled; therefore, it is not considered credible that any individual could receive the maximum calculable dose from this source."
"Action taken to recover the material[:]"
"On 11/07/00[,] the individual conducted a search of the source's storage area and all reasonable areas where the source would be used in order to continue the calibration. When the source was not found, the individual notified his supervisor, and the search was expanded to include the individual's office area and some personal effects. Because the calibration source is very similar in appearance to common samples used to quantify removable surface radioactive contamination, it was suspected that the calibration source had been mistakenly discarded as sample waste. No dry active waste shipments had been made during the elapsed time between 10/30/2000, when the source was last known to have been used, and 11/7/00, when the search was conducted. However, a significant amount of waste had accumulated at the collection point. This waste was visually searched, but the source was not located."
"Measures that have been, or will be, adopted to ensure against a recurrence of the loss of licensed material[:]"
"This type of calibration source is similar in appearance to routine samples prepared for counting in the detector. Oconee will pursue a method for better marking of these sources to minimize the possibility of a source being visually mistaken for a waste sample."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
NOTE: The licensee stated that Oconee Unit 1 was operating at 100% power at the time of the event (on 11/07/00). However, the Unit 1 is currently defueled as part of a planned refueling outage.