Event Notification Report for November 02, 2000

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO A DEAD TURTLE FOUND IN THE PLANT INTAKE

The licensee made a call to the U. S. Fish and Wildlife Agency and the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission to notify them of a dead loggerhead turtle (about 40 pounds) found in the plant intake.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

INSTRUMENT AIR CONTAINMENT PENETRATION FAILED LEAKAGE TESTING

"Currently Clinton is in RF-7. During performance of LLRTs of the Instrument Air penetration (1 MC-057), AOV 1IA005 (outboard isolation valve) would not close upon demand. The solenoid was later found to be sticking. Therefore, this valve was an as-found failure. Subsequently, the testing of the inboard containment isolation valve in this same penetration (1IA006), showed a leakage of 27,500 sccm at the air regulator assembly. When other known leakage pathways are combined with this leakage, the secondary bypass leakage criteria of 0.08 La (28,883 sccm) is violated (Tech Spec Section 3.6.1.3 SR 3.6.1.3.9),

"These valves were repaired, and subsequently successfully passed their LLRTs.

"Further analysis of these failures will be performed during the investigation of Condition Report 2-00-10-273."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION 1815 11/20/2000 FROM JEFF NADEN TAKEN BY BOB STRANSKY * * *

"Upon completion of further evaluation of the LLRT results for penetration 1MC-057, it was determined that the actual leakage through this penetration was approximately 751 sccm. This leakage in combination with other known leakage pathways does not exceed the secondary bypass leakage criteria of 0.08 La. As a result of this finding Clinton Power Station is retracting the 10CFR50.72 notification made on 11/2/00."

The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this retraction. Notified R3DO (Creed).

STOLEN M43A1 CHEMICAL AGENT DETECTOR

Council Bluff, Iowa Reserve Unit reported today, to Rock Island, that one M43A1 chemical agent detector, containing 250 µCi (microcurie) of Am-241, was stolen on 6/1/2000. The detector was reported stolen in Omaha, Nebraska to the Omaha police. The device has not been recovered.

24 HOUR 91-01 BULLETIN

At 1645 CST on 11-02-00, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified of a violation of NCSA GEN-15 Machining waste, defined in NCSE GPS-11 to be potentially fissile, was collected in a 55-gallon drum in the C-720 machine shop in violation of NCSA GEN-15. GEN-15 limits the containers used for accumulating fissile/potentially fissile waste to approved 5.5-gallon container. The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that fissile material will be accumulated in approved containers.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS;
The mass of fissile material contained in the waste drum is less than what is required to achieve criticality. Therefore, no possibility exists for an inadvertent criticality. However, double contingency was not maintained.

POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR:
In order for a criticality to be possible, an additional violation would have to occur resulting in unsafe mass of fissile material accumulating in an unsafe geometry.

CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC):
Double contingency for this scenario is established by implementing one control on mass and one control on volume.

ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):
A process limit of 22.3 kg. At 5.5 wt. % 235U would have to be exceeded for a criticality

NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES;
The two process conditions relied upon for double contingency for this scenario are mass and volume,

The first leg of double contingency is based on limiting the mass of uranium accumulated. Analysis has shown that the machining waste from approximately 1490 machining operations would have to be accumulated before exceeding an unsafe mass. The waste would occupy more than eighteen 5.5-gallon containers, which exceeds the volume of the 55-gallon waste container (drum) in the machine shop. This control was not violated.

The second leg of double contingency is based on the accumulation of fissile waste only in approved containers, limited to 5.5 gallons. This is controlled by limiting the volume of the containers used for accumulating fissile waste. Potentially fissile waste was placed In a container other than an approved 5.5 gallon container, violating this control. The machining waste exceeded the allowed volume of 5.5 gallons and resulted in a loss of the process condition.

Since the volume process condition was lost, double contingency was not maintained.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
Access to the area containing the 55 gallon drum has been controlled by ropes and signs. Remediation of violation will be made following development of a Remediation Guide.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.

The DOE Representative will be informed.

CRITICALITY ALARM HORNS AIR PRESSURE FOUND OUT OF SPECIFICATION DURING SURVEILLANCE

"At 1330 on 11/2/00, the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified that the testing of the C-337 and C-337-A Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) air horn regulators resulted in as found data which is outside of the optimum air pressure band allowed to insure desired horn sound quality. Twelve of the twenty-five CAAS horn regulators located in these two areas were discovered outside the desired pressure band. The effect of this as found condition is unknown at this time and is being evaluated by Engineering. This evaluation will require greater than the 24-hour reporting time limit allowed by 10 CFR 76.120.c.2. Due to the uncertainties and the length of time required to complete the engineering evaluation the condition is being conservatively reported.

"Reasonable assurance of operability of CAAS horns in these and other buildings exists based on the successful completion of quarterly and annual TSR surveillances. In addition, all CAAS horn regulators found outside of established criteria during this and previous tests on other building CAAS systems were returned to acceptable values prior to returning the systems to service.

"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 76.120(c)(2) as an event in which equipment required by the TSR is disabled or fails to function as designed.

"The NRC Senior Resident has been notified of this event." The DOE representative will be notified.

* * * RETRACTION 1450 11/22/2000 FROM TOM WHITE TAKEN BY BOB STRANSKY * * *

"On November 2, 2000, the PSS was notified that the testing of the C-337 and C-337A CAAS air horns had resulted in the discovery that the horn air regulator pressure was outside of the allowed optimum air pressure band used to ensure desired horn sound quality. This condition potentially affected the audibility of twelve of the twenty-five horns located in the C-337 and C-337A. The actual affect on the system was unknown at the time and could not be determined within the 24-hour reporting limit. Thus, the condition was conservatively reported to the NRC per 10CFR76.120(c)(2).

Subsequently, System Engineering issued Engineering Notice EN-C-822-00-035 that transmitted the results of Operability Evaluation OE-C-822-00-005. This documented the results of additional CAAS horn testing at the air regulator pressure values noted on November 2, 2000 and testing data in other buildings. The evaluation concluded that although there is an expected amount of drift or variance in the settings of the air pressure regulators [for] the CAAS horns, in the as-found condition, could have performed their intended safety function and pass the audibility criteria described in the SAR."

The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this retraction. Notified R3DO (Creed), NMSS (Smith).