Event Notification Report for October 28, 2000

GREATER THAN ONE PERCENT OF STEAM GENERATOR 1-2 TUBES WERE DETERMINED TO BE DEFECTIVE.

On October 28, 2000, during the Unit 1 tenth refueling outage, analysis of eddy current data on steam generator (SG) 1-2 indicated that greater than one percent of the total tubes inspected in SG 1-2 were defective. Thirty eight (38) defective tubes in SG 1-2 were detected and plugged. Most of the pluggable indications are due to either primary water stress corrosion cracking or outside diameter stress corrosion cracking. Review of the eddy current inspections are complete. Results of the steam generator tube inspection fall into Category C-3, which requires a four-hour non-emergency report in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) Table 5.5.9-2 and 10 CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C).

An LER in accordance with 10 CFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) and Special Report in accordance with TS 5.6.10.c will be submitted within thirty days.

The NRC Resident Inspector will notified of this event notification by the licensee.

RWST CROSS-TIE VALVES UNEXPECTEDLY OPENED DURING PLANNED MAINTENANCE

At 1511 hours, with Unit 2 in Intermediate Shutdown (ISD), approximately 375 degrees F, Unit 1 and Unit 2 RWST Cross-tie-valves opened when the High Steam Flow SI signal was unblocked for planned maintenance. By design, the Header to Line SI signal which opens these valves is unblocked when High Steam Flow is unblocked. At the time of the unblock, a header to line condition existed on Unit 2 due to plant conditions. This design was newly implemented during the current Unit 2 refueling outage and procedures did not provide adequate steps to prevent the valves from opening. A Header to Line SI signal was not received as it was properly defeated in accordance with station procedures. The cross-tie valves were manually closed when the condition was identified as not required.

Unit 1 is currently at 100% power. Unit 2 is in Intermediate Shutdown with RCS heatup and pressurization in progress.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.

* * * UPDATE 1725EST ON 11/27/00 FROM ALLEN HARROW TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:

"At 1740 hours on 10/28/00, Surry Power Station made a 4 hour Non-Emergency Notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii) due to the opening of the RWST Cross-tie valves when the High Steam Flow SI signal was unblocked for planned maintenance (Event Number 37469).

"Based on further review of the event reported on October 28, 2000 it has been determined that the conditions did not meet the criteria of 10CFR50.72 as clarified in NUREG 1022, Rev 1. The NUREG states:

'Usually, the staff would not consider this to include single component actuations because single components of complex systems, by themselves, usually do not mitigate the consequences of significant events. However, in some cases a component would be sufficient to mitigate the event (i.e. perform the ESF function) and its actuation would, therefore, be reportable. This position is consistent with the statement that the reporting requirement is based on the premise that ESFs are provided to mitigate the consequence of a significant event.

'Single trains do mitigate the consequences, and, thus, train level actuations are reportable.'

"Specifically, the initial assessment considered the event as an ESF actuation and therefore reportable under criterion 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii). The nature of this event does not constitute a train actuation. The only signal affected was that going to the RWST Cross-tie valves. This occurred because the block signal was unblocked due to placing the RCS narrow range temperature loops in trip while performing the RTD cross calibrations while heating up Unit 2 following a refueling outage. The details of this event are consistent with the discussion and examples of NUREG 1022 that would not be reported.

"This notification is being made to retract the report made on 10/28/00 based on the above discussion."

The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector. Notified R2DO(Rodgers).

PENETRATION LEAKAGE EXCEEDED BOTH THE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE LIMITS AND THE 10CFR100 RELATED LIMITS.

On May 4, 2000 the Suppression Chamber Containment Purge System Inlet valves 2CPS*AOV105 and 2CPS*AOV107 were leak tested as required by Technical Specification Quarterly Leak Rate requirements. The local leak rate test (LLRT) determined that the Inboard valve leak rate was out of spec and the penetration was isolated with the Outboard valve to maintain primary containment. With the failure of the inboard isolation valve and due to system configuration the outboard valve could not be tested in the proper direction.

On 05/10/00 a leak test was performed on the down stream manual isolation 2CPS-V1 and this valve was locked closed to satisfy primary containment requirement. This was necessary because the surveillance period of the outboard isolation valve 2CPS*AOV105 would expire with no acceptance test method available to satisfy the LLRT requirements of the valve.

The manual valve 2CPS-V1 has resilient seats and is subject to a quarterly LLRT requirement. On 10/20/00 a LLRT was attempted on 2CPS-V1 but was aborted due to the high leakage past the outboard valve 2CPS*AOV105 and into containment. On 10/27/00 the leakage past the outboard valve 2CPS*AOV105 was corrected and a LLRT of 2CPS-V1 was performed. 2CPS-V1 failed the LLRT. A blank flange was installed to reestablish primary containment. On 10/28/00 a Mass Flow Leakage test was performed on 2CPS-V1 and it was determined that the leakage past the valve exceeded measurement capability of test instrumentation, and therefore leakage was in excess of maximum pathway leakage. This means that the penetration leakage exceeded both the primary containment leakage limits and the 10CFR100 related limits in Technical Specification Table 3.6.1.2-1.

Therefore this condition could have prevented the Primary Containment from performing its safety function to limit the release of radioactive material.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.