Event Notification Report for October 27, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/26/2000 - 10/27/2000
EVENT NUMBERS
3746337464374653746637467
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37463
Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: FRITZIE FLENTJE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: FRITZIE FLENTJE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 10/27/2000
Notification Time: 12:00 [ET]
Event Date: 10/27/2000
Event Time: 10:28 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/27/2000
Notification Time: 12:00 [ET]
Event Date: 10/27/2000
Event Time: 10:28 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/27/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - RPS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - RPS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ANTON VEGEL (R3)
FRANK CONGEL (IRO)
BILL BEECHER (PAO)
JOE GIITTER (IRO)
ANTON VEGEL (R3)
FRANK CONGEL (IRO)
BILL BEECHER (PAO)
JOE GIITTER (IRO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
MANUAL TRIP OF REACTOR DUE TO UNDERWATER DIVER TRAPPED IN FOREBAY.
Unit 1 was manually tripped at 1028 CDT as a result of the control room being contacted by security that an underwater diver was trapped in the north forebay. All control rods fully inserted into the core. All safety systems operated as expected. The circulating water system was secured. Steam Generator Atmospheric valves were used to maintain the plant in a Hot Standby condition. Neither Steam Generator has any primary to secondary leakage. All personnel involved with the underwater diving activity were removed from the circulating water forebay area and were examined by emergency medical personnel. No personnel were injured. An incident investigation is underway. All Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Emergency Diesel Generators are fully operable if needed.
Reactor restart preparations are in progress.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this event by the licensee.
Unit 1 was manually tripped at 1028 CDT as a result of the control room being contacted by security that an underwater diver was trapped in the north forebay. All control rods fully inserted into the core. All safety systems operated as expected. The circulating water system was secured. Steam Generator Atmospheric valves were used to maintain the plant in a Hot Standby condition. Neither Steam Generator has any primary to secondary leakage. All personnel involved with the underwater diving activity were removed from the circulating water forebay area and were examined by emergency medical personnel. No personnel were injured. An incident investigation is underway. All Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Emergency Diesel Generators are fully operable if needed.
Reactor restart preparations are in progress.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this event by the licensee.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37464
Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVE SAMPSON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVE SAMPSON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 10/27/2000
Notification Time: 12:55 [ET]
Event Date: 10/27/2000
Event Time: 08:10 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/27/2000
Notification Time: 12:55 [ET]
Event Date: 10/27/2000
Event Time: 08:10 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/27/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(vi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(vi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4)
GREG PICK (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION MADE TO THE MISSOURI PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
On 10/26/00 at 1300 CT an injured person was transported offsite to the University of Missouri Burn Center located in Columbia. The licensee notified the Missouri Public Service Commission of the incident this morning at 0810 CT. The injured person should be released from the hospital sometime today.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
On 10/26/00 at 1300 CT an injured person was transported offsite to the University of Missouri Burn Center located in Columbia. The licensee notified the Missouri Public Service Commission of the incident this morning at 0810 CT. The injured person should be released from the hospital sometime today.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37465
Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: DAN MARKS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: DAN MARKS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 10/27/2000
Notification Time: 18:06 [ET]
Event Date: 10/27/2000
Event Time: 14:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 10/27/2000
Notification Time: 18:06 [ET]
Event Date: 10/27/2000
Event Time: 14:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 10/27/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - DEG/UNANALYZED COND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - DEG/UNANALYZED COND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4)
GREG PICK (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
EXCESSIVE BACKLEAKAGE OF HPSI TRAIN "B" CHECK VALVE DISCOVERED DURING SURVEILLANCE TESTING.
At approximately 1600 MST on October 23, 2000, Palo Verde Unit 2 surveillance testing revealed that the "B" train high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pump discharge check valve (2PSIBV405) exhibited backleakage exceeding the acceptance criterion. Palo Verde Unit 2 is shutdown in Mode 6 for its ninth refueling outage with RCS at approximately 105 degrees F and atmospheric pressure.
As a result of the surveillance test failure, additional testing and engineering evaluation ensued. At approximately 1400 MST on October 27, 2000, upon disassembly of the check valve internals, engineering personnel observed excessive articulation between the swing arm and the valve disc. This condition may have developed during the previous operating cycle. Therefore, during some previous periods of on-line unavailability of the "B" train HPSI system, the redundant "A" train HPSI system might not have design basis minimum flow to the RCS due to backleakage through the "B" train check valve. During those on-line periods of unavailability, check valve 2PSIBV405 alone may have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of the HPSI system to mitigate the consequences of an accident. (10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D)). Similarly, had check valve backleakage been found while the reactor was in operation and on-line maintenance of the "B" train HPSI in progress, the HPSI system may have been seriously degraded, (10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i)).
No Technical Specification were entered since Unit 2 is in Mode 6, refueling.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
At approximately 1600 MST on October 23, 2000, Palo Verde Unit 2 surveillance testing revealed that the "B" train high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pump discharge check valve (2PSIBV405) exhibited backleakage exceeding the acceptance criterion. Palo Verde Unit 2 is shutdown in Mode 6 for its ninth refueling outage with RCS at approximately 105 degrees F and atmospheric pressure.
As a result of the surveillance test failure, additional testing and engineering evaluation ensued. At approximately 1400 MST on October 27, 2000, upon disassembly of the check valve internals, engineering personnel observed excessive articulation between the swing arm and the valve disc. This condition may have developed during the previous operating cycle. Therefore, during some previous periods of on-line unavailability of the "B" train HPSI system, the redundant "A" train HPSI system might not have design basis minimum flow to the RCS due to backleakage through the "B" train check valve. During those on-line periods of unavailability, check valve 2PSIBV405 alone may have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of the HPSI system to mitigate the consequences of an accident. (10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D)). Similarly, had check valve backleakage been found while the reactor was in operation and on-line maintenance of the "B" train HPSI in progress, the HPSI system may have been seriously degraded, (10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i)).
No Technical Specification were entered since Unit 2 is in Mode 6, refueling.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37466
Facility: SALEM
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVE SAUER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVE SAUER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 10/27/2000
Notification Time: 23:53 [ET]
Event Date: 10/27/2000
Event Time: 22:28 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/27/2000
Notification Time: 23:53 [ET]
Event Date: 10/27/2000
Event Time: 22:28 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/27/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
DAVID SILK (R1)
DAVID SILK (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION SIGNAL RECEIVED DURING REACTOR CAVITY DRAINDOWN OPERATION.
"Received containment ventilation signal from the particulate radiation monitor (2R11A). Reactor refueling cavity draindown after core reload was in progress. Along with other post refueling restoration activities. All containment isolation valves were closed at the time of the isolation, so no position changes occurred. The isolation was reset and occurred again at 2311[EDT] no valves again were open at the time. The signal will not be reset pending further investigation. Monitor isolation setpoint is 3960 counts per minute and the current reading is 3750 counts per minute with occasional spiking into alarm."
Air samples taken confirm that the particulate radiation monitor is functioning properly. The licensee suspects that the airborne activity is related to the draindown of the reactor cavity. The licensee will inform Lower Alloways Creek Township and the NRC resident inspector.
"Received containment ventilation signal from the particulate radiation monitor (2R11A). Reactor refueling cavity draindown after core reload was in progress. Along with other post refueling restoration activities. All containment isolation valves were closed at the time of the isolation, so no position changes occurred. The isolation was reset and occurred again at 2311[EDT] no valves again were open at the time. The signal will not be reset pending further investigation. Monitor isolation setpoint is 3960 counts per minute and the current reading is 3750 counts per minute with occasional spiking into alarm."
Air samples taken confirm that the particulate radiation monitor is functioning properly. The licensee suspects that the airborne activity is related to the draindown of the reactor cavity. The licensee will inform Lower Alloways Creek Township and the NRC resident inspector.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 37467
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: T. HUDSON
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: T. HUDSON
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 10/28/2000
Notification Time: 02:24 [ET]
Event Date: 10/27/2000
Event Time: 09:10 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/28/2000
Notification Time: 02:24 [ET]
Event Date: 10/27/2000
Event Time: 09:10 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/28/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
ANTON VEGEL (R3)
JOSEPHINE PICCONE (NMSS)
ANTON VEGEL (R3)
JOSEPHINE PICCONE (NMSS)
24-HOUR NRC 91-01 BULLETIN REPORT INVOLVING LOSS OF GEOMETRY CONTROL FOR STACKED PIPE
"Two sections of removed seal exhaust/wet air station exhaust piping were discovered stacked near the C-310 seal exhaust/wet air station in violation of NCSA 310-002. Requirement 3.1.3.b of this NCSA limits the height of equipment items stored in the slab configuration less than or equal to 4.75 inches. The purpose of the requirement is to maintain a safe geometry of the removed equipment items.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
"The safe geometry relied on for double contingency was violated; however the analysis demonstrating sub-criticality was performed at an enrichment above the current assay limit. In addition the actual configuration of the violation state is smaller than the analyzed configuration. Therefore, additional uranium material would be required to initiate a criticality.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR:
"In order for a criticality to be possible, the pipes would need to be entirely full of slugged oil with uranium at an enrichment of 5.5% and an additional violation would have to occur.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):
"Double contingency for this scenario relies upon geometry and a second independent and concurrent process upset.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):
"The pipes contain an oily film. The assay of any material is less than or equal to 2 wt. % U235.
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
"Double contingency for this scenario relies upon geometry and a second independent and concurrent process upset.
"The first leg of double contingency is based on maintaining a safe geometry. This is controlled by limiting the slab configuration to no greater than 4.75 inches. The two pipes were stacked in a manner which exceeded the 4.75 inch slab height. Thus, the control was violated and the process condition was not maintained.
"The second leg of double contingency is based on the geometry upset being sub-critical and the need for a second independent violation to occur before a criticality is possible. This control was not violated.
"Since the safe geometry process condition was not maintained, double contingency was lost.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
"Access to the area has been controlled by ropes and signs. The specific corrective actions will be specified in a remediation guide."
The NRC resident inspector was informed.
"Two sections of removed seal exhaust/wet air station exhaust piping were discovered stacked near the C-310 seal exhaust/wet air station in violation of NCSA 310-002. Requirement 3.1.3.b of this NCSA limits the height of equipment items stored in the slab configuration less than or equal to 4.75 inches. The purpose of the requirement is to maintain a safe geometry of the removed equipment items.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
"The safe geometry relied on for double contingency was violated; however the analysis demonstrating sub-criticality was performed at an enrichment above the current assay limit. In addition the actual configuration of the violation state is smaller than the analyzed configuration. Therefore, additional uranium material would be required to initiate a criticality.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR:
"In order for a criticality to be possible, the pipes would need to be entirely full of slugged oil with uranium at an enrichment of 5.5% and an additional violation would have to occur.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):
"Double contingency for this scenario relies upon geometry and a second independent and concurrent process upset.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):
"The pipes contain an oily film. The assay of any material is less than or equal to 2 wt. % U235.
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
"Double contingency for this scenario relies upon geometry and a second independent and concurrent process upset.
"The first leg of double contingency is based on maintaining a safe geometry. This is controlled by limiting the slab configuration to no greater than 4.75 inches. The two pipes were stacked in a manner which exceeded the 4.75 inch slab height. Thus, the control was violated and the process condition was not maintained.
"The second leg of double contingency is based on the geometry upset being sub-critical and the need for a second independent violation to occur before a criticality is possible. This control was not violated.
"Since the safe geometry process condition was not maintained, double contingency was lost.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
"Access to the area has been controlled by ropes and signs. The specific corrective actions will be specified in a remediation guide."
The NRC resident inspector was informed.