Event Notification Report for October 26, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/25/2000 - 10/26/2000
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37461
Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: MACLENNAN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: MACLENNAN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 10/26/2000
Notification Time: 18:57 [ET]
Event Date: 10/26/2000
Event Time: 14:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/26/2000
Notification Time: 18:57 [ET]
Event Date: 10/26/2000
Event Time: 14:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/26/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
Person (Organization):
ANTON VEGEL (R3)
ANTON VEGEL (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
| 2 | N | Y | 95 | Power Operation | 95 | Power Operation |
SAFE SHUTDOWN MAKEUP PUMP (SSMP) DECLARED INOPERABLE.
At approximately 1415 hours on 10/26/00, the Safe Shutdown Makeup Pump (SSMP) tripped unexpectedly during quarterly operability testing. At the time of the trip, the in-plant operator was transferring the flow controller to automatic from the manual position to obtain proper IST flows. At 1525 hours, during a second attempt, the pump again tripped under the same circumstances. The SSMP was run a third time, this time using the flow controller in manual without transferring to automatic. On this attempt, the SSMP obtained the proper pressure and flow but the local controller indications remained erratic. The SSMP was declared inoperable from the time of the first trip. The licensee entered Technical Specification 3.8.(j) a 14 day Limiting Condition of Operation. All other Emergency Core Cooling Systems for Unit 2 are fully operable.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
At approximately 1415 hours on 10/26/00, the Safe Shutdown Makeup Pump (SSMP) tripped unexpectedly during quarterly operability testing. At the time of the trip, the in-plant operator was transferring the flow controller to automatic from the manual position to obtain proper IST flows. At 1525 hours, during a second attempt, the pump again tripped under the same circumstances. The SSMP was run a third time, this time using the flow controller in manual without transferring to automatic. On this attempt, the SSMP obtained the proper pressure and flow but the local controller indications remained erratic. The SSMP was declared inoperable from the time of the first trip. The licensee entered Technical Specification 3.8.(j) a 14 day Limiting Condition of Operation. All other Emergency Core Cooling Systems for Unit 2 are fully operable.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37460
Facility: GRAND GULF
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: K . EHRHARDT
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: K . EHRHARDT
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 10/26/2000
Notification Time: 16:40 [ET]
Event Date: 10/26/2000
Event Time: 14:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/26/2000
Notification Time: 16:40 [ET]
Event Date: 10/26/2000
Event Time: 14:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/26/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii) - DEGRAD COND DURING OP
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii) - DEGRAD COND DURING OP
Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4)
GREG PICK (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
KAOWOOL ISSUE
During a plant walkdown to identify specific raceway configurations as part of their plan to address Kaowool issues, a condition was found that may affect both divisions of ESF switchgear room coolers. This condition is conservatively being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii). These areas were already under fire watch in accordance with their fire protection program, as a precautionary response to issuance of SECY-99-0204 - Kaowool. Fire detection and fires suppression are available in the affected area.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be informed of the event by the Licensee.
During a plant walkdown to identify specific raceway configurations as part of their plan to address Kaowool issues, a condition was found that may affect both divisions of ESF switchgear room coolers. This condition is conservatively being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii). These areas were already under fire watch in accordance with their fire protection program, as a precautionary response to issuance of SECY-99-0204 - Kaowool. Fire detection and fires suppression are available in the affected area.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be informed of the event by the Licensee.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37458
Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: JERRY GOSMAN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: JERRY GOSMAN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 10/26/2000
Notification Time: 15:54 [ET]
Event Date: 10/26/2000
Event Time: 14:05 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/26/2000
Notification Time: 15:54 [ET]
Event Date: 10/26/2000
Event Time: 14:05 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/26/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
ANTON VEGEL (R3)
ANTON VEGEL (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
SINGLE FAILURE RESULTING IN BOTH SAFEGUARDS TRAINS BECOMING INOPERABLE
Prairie Island has three safeguard vertical cooling (service) water pumps. These pumps are equipped with an air/vacuum valve that acts to expel air from the pump upon starting. A ball float closes off the valve opening after the air is expelled, and is held closed by pump developed head. It was postulated that the air/vacuum valve could fail to close and the flow of water out of the valve could cause flooding. Plant evaluation determined that documentation does not exist that conclusively demonstrates that the failure cannot occur or that the resultant flooding does not affect the opposite safeguards train pump. Since the operability determination is indeterminate, both trains of safeguards pumps were declared inoperable. A single failure resulting in both safeguards trains becoming inoperable is outside the plant design basis.
Compensatory actions are being put into place to restore operability of the safeguards pumps. The initial actions are to station a qualified individual in the safeguard pump area. The qualified individual will observe any start of a safeguard pump and ensure no failure of the air/vacuum valve has occurred. If a failure occurs such that flooding is an immediate concern, the qualified individual will contact the Control Room to secure the pump.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
Prairie Island has three safeguard vertical cooling (service) water pumps. These pumps are equipped with an air/vacuum valve that acts to expel air from the pump upon starting. A ball float closes off the valve opening after the air is expelled, and is held closed by pump developed head. It was postulated that the air/vacuum valve could fail to close and the flow of water out of the valve could cause flooding. Plant evaluation determined that documentation does not exist that conclusively demonstrates that the failure cannot occur or that the resultant flooding does not affect the opposite safeguards train pump. Since the operability determination is indeterminate, both trains of safeguards pumps were declared inoperable. A single failure resulting in both safeguards trains becoming inoperable is outside the plant design basis.
Compensatory actions are being put into place to restore operability of the safeguards pumps. The initial actions are to station a qualified individual in the safeguard pump area. The qualified individual will observe any start of a safeguard pump and ensure no failure of the air/vacuum valve has occurred. If a failure occurs such that flooding is an immediate concern, the qualified individual will contact the Control Room to secure the pump.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.