Event Notification Report for October 25, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/24/2000 - 10/25/2000
EVENT NUMBERS
3745437455374563745737462
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37454
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: UNDERWOOD
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: UNDERWOOD
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 10/25/2000
Notification Time: 12:28 [ET]
Event Date: 10/25/2000
Event Time: 11:47 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/25/2000
Notification Time: 12:28 [ET]
Event Date: 10/25/2000
Event Time: 11:47 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/25/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
73.71(b)(1) - SAFEGUARDS REPORTS
10 CFR Section:
73.71(b)(1) - SAFEGUARDS REPORTS
Person (Organization):
ANNE BOLAND (R2)
ANNE BOLAND (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
SECURITY EVENT INVOLVING AN INDIVIDUAL GRANTED SITE ACCESS
Unescorted access granted inappropriately. Immediate compensatory measures taken upon discovery.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.
Unescorted access granted inappropriately. Immediate compensatory measures taken upon discovery.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37455
Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BAHNER
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BAHNER
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 10/25/2000
Notification Time: 16:07 [ET]
Event Date: 10/25/2000
Event Time: 11:59 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/25/2000
Notification Time: 16:07 [ET]
Event Date: 10/25/2000
Event Time: 11:59 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/25/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - DEG/UNANALYZED COND
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - DEG/UNANALYZED COND
Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4)
GREG PICK (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
ISOLATION CAPABILITY OF MANUAL VALVES IN THE COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM
During the tenth refueling outage on Unit 1(1 R10), a leakage test of several component cooling water (CCW) System manual valves was conducted. The subject valves are used to separate the two vital normally cross-tied CCW trains in case of a CCW leak either as an independent event or as a passive failure following a loss of coolant accident. The leakage rate was determined to be approximately 70 gpm. Manual adjusting of the valves reduced the leakage rate to an insignificant level.
The licensing/design bases for the CCW system, as discussed in Table 9.2-7 of the FSAR and in SER 16, is for a maximum 200 gpm leak to occur. Leakage would be detected by falling level in the CCW surge tank. Because of the remaining 4000 gallons in the CCW surge tank after receipt of the low-level alarm, there would be at least 20 minutes for the operator to isolate the leak before the surge tank is empty. The period is extended if the automatically operated, Design Class II, normal makeup path functions as designed and adds makeup water to the system. PG&E's abnormal operating procedure, OP AP-11, has provision for aligning a 250 gpm Class I supply of water to the CCW surge tank.
The design/licensing basis of a 200 gpm leak being isolated in 20 minutes assumes that manual valves used during the isolation operation hold and terminate the leak. There is no evidence that PG&E nor the NRC have considered that a leak would not be isolated upon completion of actions to separate the trains. The identified condition, though not believed to represent a safety concern, is different than that discussed in SSER 16. Therefore, the condition is considered to be outside the design basis for the plant.
Preliminary investigations of the Unit 2 valves have, not identified any gross leakage. Additional investigations are ongoing.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.
During the tenth refueling outage on Unit 1(1 R10), a leakage test of several component cooling water (CCW) System manual valves was conducted. The subject valves are used to separate the two vital normally cross-tied CCW trains in case of a CCW leak either as an independent event or as a passive failure following a loss of coolant accident. The leakage rate was determined to be approximately 70 gpm. Manual adjusting of the valves reduced the leakage rate to an insignificant level.
The licensing/design bases for the CCW system, as discussed in Table 9.2-7 of the FSAR and in SER 16, is for a maximum 200 gpm leak to occur. Leakage would be detected by falling level in the CCW surge tank. Because of the remaining 4000 gallons in the CCW surge tank after receipt of the low-level alarm, there would be at least 20 minutes for the operator to isolate the leak before the surge tank is empty. The period is extended if the automatically operated, Design Class II, normal makeup path functions as designed and adds makeup water to the system. PG&E's abnormal operating procedure, OP AP-11, has provision for aligning a 250 gpm Class I supply of water to the CCW surge tank.
The design/licensing basis of a 200 gpm leak being isolated in 20 minutes assumes that manual valves used during the isolation operation hold and terminate the leak. There is no evidence that PG&E nor the NRC have considered that a leak would not be isolated upon completion of actions to separate the trains. The identified condition, though not believed to represent a safety concern, is different than that discussed in SSER 16. Therefore, the condition is considered to be outside the design basis for the plant.
Preliminary investigations of the Unit 2 valves have, not identified any gross leakage. Additional investigations are ongoing.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37456
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: CHRISTIAN
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: CHRISTIAN
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 10/25/2000
Notification Time: 17:06 [ET]
Event Date: 10/25/2000
Event Time: 15:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/25/2000
Notification Time: 17:06 [ET]
Event Date: 10/25/2000
Event Time: 15:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/25/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
ANTON VEGEL (R3)
ANTON VEGEL (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION(CRV) TRAINS DECLARED INOPERABLE.
Both CRV trains declared inoperable due to degraded relays. An investigation continues to determine the affects on Emergency Filter train( EFT) systems as well. (share the same type of relays) Repair/replacement has been initiated and an investigation is ongoing. The plant is in a 24 hour LCO action statement which returning one train to service or be in hot shutdown in the following 12 hours.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
* * * UPDATE ON 10/25/00 @ 1816 BY WITSCHEN TO GOULD * * *
The licensee verified that both Emergency Filter trains are also affected by the degraded relays. They are in the same LCO action statement, but they have to restore one Control Room Vent train and one Emergency Filter train to service within 24 hours.
The NRC Resident was notified.
The REG3 RDO(Vegel) was informed.
Both CRV trains declared inoperable due to degraded relays. An investigation continues to determine the affects on Emergency Filter train( EFT) systems as well. (share the same type of relays) Repair/replacement has been initiated and an investigation is ongoing. The plant is in a 24 hour LCO action statement which returning one train to service or be in hot shutdown in the following 12 hours.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
* * * UPDATE ON 10/25/00 @ 1816 BY WITSCHEN TO GOULD * * *
The licensee verified that both Emergency Filter trains are also affected by the degraded relays. They are in the same LCO action statement, but they have to restore one Control Room Vent train and one Emergency Filter train to service within 24 hours.
The NRC Resident was notified.
The REG3 RDO(Vegel) was informed.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 37457
Rep Org: NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER
Licensee: UNKNOWN
Region: 3
City: MISHAWAKA State: IN
County: ST. JOSEPH
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CREWS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Licensee: UNKNOWN
Region: 3
City: MISHAWAKA State: IN
County: ST. JOSEPH
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CREWS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 10/26/2000
Notification Time: 00:25 [ET]
Event Date: 10/25/2000
Event Time: 20:10 [CST]
Last Update Date: 10/26/2000
Notification Time: 00:25 [ET]
Event Date: 10/25/2000
Event Time: 20:10 [CST]
Last Update Date: 10/26/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
ANTON VEGEL (R3)
PATRICIA HOLAHAN (NMSS)
GEOFFREY WRIGHT (R3)
CINDY PEDERSON (R3)
LARRY CAMPER (NMSS)
ANTON VEGEL (R3)
PATRICIA HOLAHAN (NMSS)
GEOFFREY WRIGHT (R3)
CINDY PEDERSON (R3)
LARRY CAMPER (NMSS)
RECOVERY OF TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE FROM THE LOADING DOCK OF A DEPARTMENT STORE.
AT 2010 LOCAL TIME ON 10/25/00 A TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE [MODEL 3430, S/N 29119] CONTAINING BOTH A CESIUM-137 AND AMERICIUM-241 SOURCE WAS DISCOVERED ON THE LOADING DOCK OF A DEPARTMENT STORE LOCATED IN MISHAWAKA, IN. THE RESPONDING FIRE DEPARTMENT CONTACTED THE SOUTH BEND FIRE DEPARTMENT FOR HAZMAT (RADIOLOGICAL) ASSISTANCE. A PRELIMINARY RAD SURVEY SHOWED APPROXIMATELY 2mR/HR CONTACT. THE INDIANA STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH WAS INFORMED. THE CONDITION OF THE TROXLER TRANSPORT CASE SUGGESTS THAT IT MAY HAVE BEEN STOLEN. FIRE STATION #3 IN MISHAWAKA HAS TAKEN CUSTODY OF THE TROXLER AND IS STORING THE DEVICE IN A LOCKED SECURE AREA. THE INITIAL REPORT FROM THE NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER INDICATED THAT 75 MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC WERE EVACUATED. REGION 3 WILL FOLLOWUP IN THE MORNING. SEVERAL FEDERAL AND STATE AGENCIES WERE INFORMED BY THE STATE OF INDIANA AND THE NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER.
AT 2010 LOCAL TIME ON 10/25/00 A TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE [MODEL 3430, S/N 29119] CONTAINING BOTH A CESIUM-137 AND AMERICIUM-241 SOURCE WAS DISCOVERED ON THE LOADING DOCK OF A DEPARTMENT STORE LOCATED IN MISHAWAKA, IN. THE RESPONDING FIRE DEPARTMENT CONTACTED THE SOUTH BEND FIRE DEPARTMENT FOR HAZMAT (RADIOLOGICAL) ASSISTANCE. A PRELIMINARY RAD SURVEY SHOWED APPROXIMATELY 2mR/HR CONTACT. THE INDIANA STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH WAS INFORMED. THE CONDITION OF THE TROXLER TRANSPORT CASE SUGGESTS THAT IT MAY HAVE BEEN STOLEN. FIRE STATION #3 IN MISHAWAKA HAS TAKEN CUSTODY OF THE TROXLER AND IS STORING THE DEVICE IN A LOCKED SECURE AREA. THE INITIAL REPORT FROM THE NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER INDICATED THAT 75 MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC WERE EVACUATED. REGION 3 WILL FOLLOWUP IN THE MORNING. SEVERAL FEDERAL AND STATE AGENCIES WERE INFORMED BY THE STATE OF INDIANA AND THE NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 37462
Rep Org: SOIL & MATERIALS ENGINEERS
Licensee: SOIL & MATERIALS ENGINEERS
Region: 3
City: PLYMOUTH State: MI
County:
License #: 21-17158-02
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: FRANK HENDERSON
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Licensee: SOIL & MATERIALS ENGINEERS
Region: 3
City: PLYMOUTH State: MI
County:
License #: 21-17158-02
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: FRANK HENDERSON
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 10/27/2000
Notification Time: 10:02 [ET]
Event Date: 10/25/2000
Event Time: 07:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/27/2000
Notification Time: 10:02 [ET]
Event Date: 10/25/2000
Event Time: 07:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/27/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
ANTON VEGEL (R3)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
ANTON VEGEL (R3)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE STOLEN FROM VEHICLE IN MISHAWAKA, INDIANA
A TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE CONTAINING 8 mCi Cs-137 AND 44 mCi Am-241 WAS STOLEN FROM AN EMPLOYEE'S VEHICLE PARKED OVERNIGHT AT A HOTEL IN MISHAWAKA, IN. THE DEVICE WAS SUBSEQUENTLY RECOVERED BY THE LOCAL FIRE DEPARTMENT AND RETURNED TO THE LICENSEE. THERE DOESN'T APPEAR TO BE ANY DAMAGE. THE LICENSEE CONTACTED THE NRC REGION III OFFICE AND WILL SUBMIT A WRITTEN REPORT.
HOO NOTE: SEE EVENT #37457 FOR FURTHER DETAILS ON RECOVERY.
A TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE CONTAINING 8 mCi Cs-137 AND 44 mCi Am-241 WAS STOLEN FROM AN EMPLOYEE'S VEHICLE PARKED OVERNIGHT AT A HOTEL IN MISHAWAKA, IN. THE DEVICE WAS SUBSEQUENTLY RECOVERED BY THE LOCAL FIRE DEPARTMENT AND RETURNED TO THE LICENSEE. THERE DOESN'T APPEAR TO BE ANY DAMAGE. THE LICENSEE CONTACTED THE NRC REGION III OFFICE AND WILL SUBMIT A WRITTEN REPORT.
HOO NOTE: SEE EVENT #37457 FOR FURTHER DETAILS ON RECOVERY.