Event Notification Report for October 22, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/21/2000 - 10/22/2000
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37448
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: KEVIN DONALLY
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: KEVIN DONALLY
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 10/22/2000
Notification Time: 07:55 [ET]
Event Date: 10/22/2000
Event Time: 01:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/24/2000
Notification Time: 07:55 [ET]
Event Date: 10/22/2000
Event Time: 01:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/24/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1)
WILLIAM COOK (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
24 HOUR REPORT - 10 CFR 50.72 AND APPENDIX R
"A section of the high pressure fire header will be isolated and drained. The reason for the impairment is planned maintenance for the replacement of a section of 12" piping and various small bore valve replacements. This header section provides fire protection for the Units 1 and 2 Intake Structure, the Auxiliary Boiler Feed Pump Building, the Transformer Yard and the Electrical Tunnel Deluge System.
"Indian Point Station is in cold shutdown with the reactor defueled and steam generator replacement in progress. Therefore, the Auxiliary Boiler Feed Pumps and the Main and Unit Auxiliary Transformers are out of service and do not require fire protection. The safety related equipment that is required to be protected under this plant condition are the Service Water Pumps and the 480 VAC Electrical Cables for the Spent Fuel Cooling Pumps and Component Cooling Pumps which traverse the Electrical Tunnel. Compensatory hoses will be staged prior to applying the tagout. Fire tours will also be established to supplement the frequency with which these and the other impaired areas are surveilled.
"The 24 Hour notification to the NRC for the Fire header impairment will made pursuant to 10CFR50.72 and App. R as well as the written report to follow within 14 days. The alternate fire protection system will not be established since the station is already in cold shutdown. A 30 day action statement will be entered for the inoperable hydrants protecting the Intake Structure and Service Water Pumps. A separate 14 day action statement will be entered for the inoperable Electrical Tunnel Deluge System. The duration of the impairment will be minimized and further compensatory measures may be necessary should any of the time limits be approached due to unforeseen circumstances."
The licensee intends to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE ON 10/24/00 @ 1524 BY DONNELLY TO GOULD * * *
The following update is providing additional information to clarify this event report.
The following is an update to NRC event number 37448. A section of the high-pressure fire header will be isolated and drained for planned maintenance. A section of 12-inch piping is being replaced along with various sections of valves. The isolated section of piping supplies high pressure fire water to the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Intake structure, the Auxiliary Boiler Feed Pump Building, and the Electrical Tunnel Deluge System.
The Indian Point Unit 2 Fire Protection Program requires that all piping and valves necessary for proper functioning of any portion of the system required for protection of safe shutdown systems be operable. If this condition is not restored within 24 hours, then an alternate fire protection system must be established or the plant must be placed in the hot shutdown condition utilizing normal operating procedures. Within the next 48 hours, if the system is not restored or an alternate system is not established, then the plant must be placed in the cold shutdown condition. Currently, Indian Point 2 station is in the de-fueled condition, with the core fully unloaded. Therefore, compensatory actions are not required to maintain the plant in the shutdown condition..
Compensatory measures are being undertaken by Indian Point 2 station for prudence. The intake structure contains the Service Water Pumps, which are safe shutdown equipment and are used to cool the Spent Fuel Pool. The inoperable hydrant on the intake structure will be supplemented by staged fire hoses and a 4 hour fire tour, and Indian Point 2 will enter a 30 Day Action Statement per SAO-703. Additional fire hoses will also be staged for the inoperable hydrant outside the auxiliary pump building. The electrical tunnel contains the 480 VAC Electrical cables for the Spent Fuel Cooling Pumps, the Component Cooling Water Pumps as well as additional electrical loads. Compensatory hoses will be staged in this area and the fire detectors are all still operational. A 14 Day Action Statement per SAQ-703 will be entered for this impairment.
The 24 Hour Notification to the NRC for the fire header impairment will be made pursuant to 10CFR50.72 and Appendix R by telephone and a follow up facsimile. The duration of the impairment will be minimized and further compensatory measures may be necessary should any of the time limits be approached. due to unforeseen circumstances. Additional action statements may be entered if changes in plant status are required.
The NRC Resident Inspector was informed.
The Reg 1 RDO(Silk) was notified.
"A section of the high pressure fire header will be isolated and drained. The reason for the impairment is planned maintenance for the replacement of a section of 12" piping and various small bore valve replacements. This header section provides fire protection for the Units 1 and 2 Intake Structure, the Auxiliary Boiler Feed Pump Building, the Transformer Yard and the Electrical Tunnel Deluge System.
"Indian Point Station is in cold shutdown with the reactor defueled and steam generator replacement in progress. Therefore, the Auxiliary Boiler Feed Pumps and the Main and Unit Auxiliary Transformers are out of service and do not require fire protection. The safety related equipment that is required to be protected under this plant condition are the Service Water Pumps and the 480 VAC Electrical Cables for the Spent Fuel Cooling Pumps and Component Cooling Pumps which traverse the Electrical Tunnel. Compensatory hoses will be staged prior to applying the tagout. Fire tours will also be established to supplement the frequency with which these and the other impaired areas are surveilled.
"The 24 Hour notification to the NRC for the Fire header impairment will made pursuant to 10CFR50.72 and App. R as well as the written report to follow within 14 days. The alternate fire protection system will not be established since the station is already in cold shutdown. A 30 day action statement will be entered for the inoperable hydrants protecting the Intake Structure and Service Water Pumps. A separate 14 day action statement will be entered for the inoperable Electrical Tunnel Deluge System. The duration of the impairment will be minimized and further compensatory measures may be necessary should any of the time limits be approached due to unforeseen circumstances."
The licensee intends to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE ON 10/24/00 @ 1524 BY DONNELLY TO GOULD * * *
The following update is providing additional information to clarify this event report.
The following is an update to NRC event number 37448. A section of the high-pressure fire header will be isolated and drained for planned maintenance. A section of 12-inch piping is being replaced along with various sections of valves. The isolated section of piping supplies high pressure fire water to the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Intake structure, the Auxiliary Boiler Feed Pump Building, and the Electrical Tunnel Deluge System.
The Indian Point Unit 2 Fire Protection Program requires that all piping and valves necessary for proper functioning of any portion of the system required for protection of safe shutdown systems be operable. If this condition is not restored within 24 hours, then an alternate fire protection system must be established or the plant must be placed in the hot shutdown condition utilizing normal operating procedures. Within the next 48 hours, if the system is not restored or an alternate system is not established, then the plant must be placed in the cold shutdown condition. Currently, Indian Point 2 station is in the de-fueled condition, with the core fully unloaded. Therefore, compensatory actions are not required to maintain the plant in the shutdown condition..
Compensatory measures are being undertaken by Indian Point 2 station for prudence. The intake structure contains the Service Water Pumps, which are safe shutdown equipment and are used to cool the Spent Fuel Pool. The inoperable hydrant on the intake structure will be supplemented by staged fire hoses and a 4 hour fire tour, and Indian Point 2 will enter a 30 Day Action Statement per SAO-703. Additional fire hoses will also be staged for the inoperable hydrant outside the auxiliary pump building. The electrical tunnel contains the 480 VAC Electrical cables for the Spent Fuel Cooling Pumps, the Component Cooling Water Pumps as well as additional electrical loads. Compensatory hoses will be staged in this area and the fire detectors are all still operational. A 14 Day Action Statement per SAQ-703 will be entered for this impairment.
The 24 Hour Notification to the NRC for the fire header impairment will be made pursuant to 10CFR50.72 and Appendix R by telephone and a follow up facsimile. The duration of the impairment will be minimized and further compensatory measures may be necessary should any of the time limits be approached. due to unforeseen circumstances. Additional action statements may be entered if changes in plant status are required.
The NRC Resident Inspector was informed.
The Reg 1 RDO(Silk) was notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37449
Facility: PEACH BOTTOM
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM CAMPBELL
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM CAMPBELL
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 10/22/2000
Notification Time: 18:41 [ET]
Event Date: 10/22/2000
Event Time: 17:55 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/22/2000
Notification Time: 18:41 [ET]
Event Date: 10/22/2000
Event Time: 17:55 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/22/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(i)(A) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(i)(A) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1)
WILLIAM COOK (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN
The licensee reported that one of the suppression chamber to drywell vacuum breakers cannot be seated completely and the unit 2 primary containment has been declared inoperable. Technical Specification 3.6.1.1 Condition b requires that the unit be taken to a hot shutdown condition within 12 hours. The licensee intends to reduce reactor power in order to make a drywell entry if possible to correct the problem. If the problem cannot be corrected, the licensee intends to take the unit to cold shutdown and deinert the containment.
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.
The licensee reported that one of the suppression chamber to drywell vacuum breakers cannot be seated completely and the unit 2 primary containment has been declared inoperable. Technical Specification 3.6.1.1 Condition b requires that the unit be taken to a hot shutdown condition within 12 hours. The licensee intends to reduce reactor power in order to make a drywell entry if possible to correct the problem. If the problem cannot be corrected, the licensee intends to take the unit to cold shutdown and deinert the containment.
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 37964
Rep Org: 3M COMPANY
Licensee: W. L. GORE
Region: 3
City: EAUCLAIRE State: WI
County:
License #: 1429-1811GL
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE LEWANDOWSKI
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Licensee: W. L. GORE
Region: 3
City: EAUCLAIRE State: WI
County:
License #: 1429-1811GL
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE LEWANDOWSKI
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 05/03/2001
Notification Time: 14:06 [ET]
Event Date: 10/22/2000
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/03/2001
Notification Time: 14:06 [ET]
Event Date: 10/22/2000
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/03/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
MELVYN LEACH (R3)
DON COOL (NMSS)
DICK WESSMAN (IRO)
MELVYN LEACH (R3)
DON COOL (NMSS)
DICK WESSMAN (IRO)
3M COMPANY REPORT REGARDING A W. L. GORE FACILITY LOSS OF A STATIC ELIMINATOR CONTAINING 10 MILLICURIES OF POLONIUM-210
On 09/12/00, 3M Company (located in St. Paul, Minnesota) announced its intent to purchase W. L. Gore (located in Eauclaire, Wisconsin). The acquisition took place during late October or early November 2000. On 03/14/01, 3M Company representatives visited the newly acquired W. L. Gore facility and discovered the existence of static eliminators. An audit was subsequently performed, and 3M Company was able to account for all but one static eliminator.
Apparently, the W. L. Gore facility received the polonium static eliminator in question on 08/10/00. This static eliminator was manufactured by Nuclear Radiation Development (NRD), and it was comprised of an in-line ionizer tube approximately 4 inches long and 1/4 inch in diameter with 10 millicuries of polonium-210 plated on the inside of the device. The static eliminator was installed on a large circuit substrate manufacturing machine for use in the W. L. Gore facility under the NRD general license (1429-1811GL).
On 09/06/00, the circuit substrate manufacturing machine was sent back to its manufacturer (Everrett Charles) for an upgrade. The static eliminator was reported to be on the machine when it was shipped to Everrett Charles (location unknown); however, the static eliminator was determined to be missing after Everrett Charles returned the upgraded machine to W. L. Gore on 10/22/00.
Everrett Charles was notified of the missing static eliminator during the week of 04/09/01. NRD was also notified during the week of 04/16/01. It was reported that searches were performed, but the missing static eliminator was not found.
(Call the NRC operations officer for a 3M Company contact telephone number.)
On 09/12/00, 3M Company (located in St. Paul, Minnesota) announced its intent to purchase W. L. Gore (located in Eauclaire, Wisconsin). The acquisition took place during late October or early November 2000. On 03/14/01, 3M Company representatives visited the newly acquired W. L. Gore facility and discovered the existence of static eliminators. An audit was subsequently performed, and 3M Company was able to account for all but one static eliminator.
Apparently, the W. L. Gore facility received the polonium static eliminator in question on 08/10/00. This static eliminator was manufactured by Nuclear Radiation Development (NRD), and it was comprised of an in-line ionizer tube approximately 4 inches long and 1/4 inch in diameter with 10 millicuries of polonium-210 plated on the inside of the device. The static eliminator was installed on a large circuit substrate manufacturing machine for use in the W. L. Gore facility under the NRD general license (1429-1811GL).
On 09/06/00, the circuit substrate manufacturing machine was sent back to its manufacturer (Everrett Charles) for an upgrade. The static eliminator was reported to be on the machine when it was shipped to Everrett Charles (location unknown); however, the static eliminator was determined to be missing after Everrett Charles returned the upgraded machine to W. L. Gore on 10/22/00.
Everrett Charles was notified of the missing static eliminator during the week of 04/09/01. NRD was also notified during the week of 04/16/01. It was reported that searches were performed, but the missing static eliminator was not found.
(Call the NRC operations officer for a 3M Company contact telephone number.)