Event Notification Report for October 20, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/19/2000 - 10/20/2000
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37443
Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: ALAN HALL
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: ALAN HALL
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 10/20/2000
Notification Time: 14:08 [ET]
Event Date: 10/20/2000
Event Time: 13:43 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/20/2000
Notification Time: 14:08 [ET]
Event Date: 10/20/2000
Event Time: 13:43 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/20/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(vi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(vi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
CAUDLE JULIAN (R2)
CAUDLE JULIAN (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
The licensee notified the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (FF&WCC) regarding the rescue of a live green sea turtle from the intake canal. The animal will be transferred to the FF&WCC for rehabilitation at the Sea Turtle Hospital in Marathon, Florida. The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification.
The licensee notified the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (FF&WCC) regarding the rescue of a live green sea turtle from the intake canal. The animal will be transferred to the FF&WCC for rehabilitation at the Sea Turtle Hospital in Marathon, Florida. The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37444
Facility: SALEM
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVE SAUER
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVE SAUER
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 10/20/2000
Notification Time: 22:50 [ET]
Event Date: 10/20/2000
Event Time: 19:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/31/2000
Notification Time: 22:50 [ET]
Event Date: 10/20/2000
Event Time: 19:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/31/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1)
WILLIAM COOK (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
DESIGN ISSUE REGARDING MSIV CLOSURE ABILITY DURING MODE TRANSITION
"The main steam isolation valves, which accomplish the steam line isolation function, require steam pressure assist to close (fast close). They can also be closed hydraulically (slow close).
"The main steam isolation valve function had been demonstrated to be acceptable in Mode 1, 2, and 3. However, the analyses performed for Mode 3 do not explicitly address all steam pressures in region between the NOP/NOT area of Mode 3 and the entry condition to Mode 4. The potential could exist where the plant is in a Mode 3 condition in transition to a Mode 4 condition. During this transition condition, if a steam line break were to occur, closure of the MSIVs would be required. If the steam pressure in this transition condition were near the minimum pressure required to close the MSIVs at the initiation of the event, it is possible that the steam pressure in the system could decay below the required pressure to close the MSIVs. This would mean that the fast close Main Steam Isolation Function could-be inoperable in Mode 3.
"This function is operable in Modes 1 and 2. Further analysis is required to demonstrate operability in all conditions bounded by Mode 3."
The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this notification by the licensee.
* * * RETRACTION 1636 EST 10/31/2000 FROM SIMPSON TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *
"On October 20, 2000, Salem Units 1 and 2 reported that the potential exists with the plant in Mode 3 conditions that if a steam line break were to occur, closure of the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) may be required and may not be available for fast closure. If the steamline pressure was near the minimum pressure required to close the MSIVs at the initiation of the event, it is possible that the steamline pressure during a steamline break could decay below the required pressure to close the MSIVs. This would mean that the fast close Main Steam Isolation function could be inoperable in Mode 3.
"Upon further evaluation at the main steam line break analysis during Mode 3 Conditions, PSEG now concludes that the MSIVs will be and have always been operable in all parts of Mode 3. The evaluation concluded that although the MSIVs may not always close automatically for the range of steam line break sizes and initial conditions in Mode 3, for those situations where the MSIVs do not close upon receipt of an automatic or manual signal, MSIV closure has been shown to not be required to provide protection to satisfy design basis requirements (e.g. minimum DNBR remains above the minimum DNBR limit value and peak containment pressure remains below 47 psig).
"Based on the above information, the 4-hour report made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii) is being retracted."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this retraction. Notified R1DO (McFadden).
"The main steam isolation valves, which accomplish the steam line isolation function, require steam pressure assist to close (fast close). They can also be closed hydraulically (slow close).
"The main steam isolation valve function had been demonstrated to be acceptable in Mode 1, 2, and 3. However, the analyses performed for Mode 3 do not explicitly address all steam pressures in region between the NOP/NOT area of Mode 3 and the entry condition to Mode 4. The potential could exist where the plant is in a Mode 3 condition in transition to a Mode 4 condition. During this transition condition, if a steam line break were to occur, closure of the MSIVs would be required. If the steam pressure in this transition condition were near the minimum pressure required to close the MSIVs at the initiation of the event, it is possible that the steam pressure in the system could decay below the required pressure to close the MSIVs. This would mean that the fast close Main Steam Isolation Function could-be inoperable in Mode 3.
"This function is operable in Modes 1 and 2. Further analysis is required to demonstrate operability in all conditions bounded by Mode 3."
The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this notification by the licensee.
* * * RETRACTION 1636 EST 10/31/2000 FROM SIMPSON TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *
"On October 20, 2000, Salem Units 1 and 2 reported that the potential exists with the plant in Mode 3 conditions that if a steam line break were to occur, closure of the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) may be required and may not be available for fast closure. If the steamline pressure was near the minimum pressure required to close the MSIVs at the initiation of the event, it is possible that the steamline pressure during a steamline break could decay below the required pressure to close the MSIVs. This would mean that the fast close Main Steam Isolation function could be inoperable in Mode 3.
"Upon further evaluation at the main steam line break analysis during Mode 3 Conditions, PSEG now concludes that the MSIVs will be and have always been operable in all parts of Mode 3. The evaluation concluded that although the MSIVs may not always close automatically for the range of steam line break sizes and initial conditions in Mode 3, for those situations where the MSIVs do not close upon receipt of an automatic or manual signal, MSIV closure has been shown to not be required to provide protection to satisfy design basis requirements (e.g. minimum DNBR remains above the minimum DNBR limit value and peak containment pressure remains below 47 psig).
"Based on the above information, the 4-hour report made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii) is being retracted."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this retraction. Notified R1DO (McFadden).