Event Notification Report for October 13, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/12/2000 - 10/13/2000
General Information or Other
Event Number: 37426
Rep Org: NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HEALTH
Licensee: NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HEALTH
Region: 1
City: BETHESDA State: MD
County:
License #: 19-00296-10
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ZOON
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Licensee: NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HEALTH
Region: 1
City: BETHESDA State: MD
County:
License #: 19-00296-10
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ZOON
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 10/13/2000
Notification Time: 16:04 [ET]
Event Date: 10/13/2000
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/13/2000
Notification Time: 16:04 [ET]
Event Date: 10/13/2000
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/13/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
Person (Organization):
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1)
PATRICIA HOLAHAN (NMSS)
JOSEPH GIITTER (IRO)
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1)
PATRICIA HOLAHAN (NMSS)
JOSEPH GIITTER (IRO)
THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HEALTH REPORTED A MISSING PHOSPHORUS - 32 SOURCE
On September 22, 2000 a researcher and Authorized User within the NIH Radiation Safety Program reported to his area health physicist that approximately 600 microcuries of Phosphorus-32 labeled DCTP was missing from a source vial. The source vial of NEN Catalog Number BLU513Z had been first opened the previous day, September 21, 2000, by another researcher who remembered removing only 400 microcuries of the total activity of 1000 microcuries for an experiment. This researcher then replaced the vial into the refrigerator, noting that 30 microliters (600 microcuries) were left.
The research laboratory staff distinctly recalled locking the laboratory at the end of that day, in accordance with NIH policy for the security of radioactive materials, and also recalled having to unlock the laboratory the next morning.
However, on September 22 at 11 A.M., when a third researcher went to use the remaining P-32 DCTP from the same vial as was used the previous day, the vial was completely empty.
The researchers performed extensive contamination surveys to determine if the contents had spilled; no contamination was found. Following notification of the Radiation Safety Branch, the area health physicist performed extensive contamination checks throughout the Department to ensure that the material had not been used to intentionally contaminate anything. Again, no contamination was found. The Authorized User notified the NIH Police of the missing material.
The Authorized User contacted everyone within the Department to determine the resolution of the missing P-32. The Department Chief has held meetings with his staff and interviewed all Authorized Users within the Department; to date no one has admitted using the F-32 DCTP. However, it is the belief of everyone involved that the P-32 DCTP was borrowed by another researcher, who is not willing to admit it, for a legitimate research experiment. This is based on the fact that the P-32 compound was within the locked laboratory; therefore, someone with a key to that laboratory, i.e. a member of the Department, is most likely to have used the P-32.
On September 22, 2000 a researcher and Authorized User within the NIH Radiation Safety Program reported to his area health physicist that approximately 600 microcuries of Phosphorus-32 labeled DCTP was missing from a source vial. The source vial of NEN Catalog Number BLU513Z had been first opened the previous day, September 21, 2000, by another researcher who remembered removing only 400 microcuries of the total activity of 1000 microcuries for an experiment. This researcher then replaced the vial into the refrigerator, noting that 30 microliters (600 microcuries) were left.
The research laboratory staff distinctly recalled locking the laboratory at the end of that day, in accordance with NIH policy for the security of radioactive materials, and also recalled having to unlock the laboratory the next morning.
However, on September 22 at 11 A.M., when a third researcher went to use the remaining P-32 DCTP from the same vial as was used the previous day, the vial was completely empty.
The researchers performed extensive contamination surveys to determine if the contents had spilled; no contamination was found. Following notification of the Radiation Safety Branch, the area health physicist performed extensive contamination checks throughout the Department to ensure that the material had not been used to intentionally contaminate anything. Again, no contamination was found. The Authorized User notified the NIH Police of the missing material.
The Authorized User contacted everyone within the Department to determine the resolution of the missing P-32. The Department Chief has held meetings with his staff and interviewed all Authorized Users within the Department; to date no one has admitted using the F-32 DCTP. However, it is the belief of everyone involved that the P-32 DCTP was borrowed by another researcher, who is not willing to admit it, for a legitimate research experiment. This is based on the fact that the P-32 compound was within the locked laboratory; therefore, someone with a key to that laboratory, i.e. a member of the Department, is most likely to have used the P-32.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37428
Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: NORTHNESS
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: NORTHNESS
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 10/13/2000
Notification Time: 22:18 [ET]
Event Date: 10/13/2000
Event Time: 17:14 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/13/2000
Notification Time: 22:18 [ET]
Event Date: 10/13/2000
Event Time: 17:14 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/13/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
DAVE LOVELESS (R4)
DAVE LOVELESS (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
THE PLANT HAD AUTO START OF THE ONE COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP
During testing of vital bus "F" components,(first and second level undervoltage relays) with the emergency diesel generator 1/3 parallel to the aux. Power(bus "F"), a signal was generated which tripped the aux feeder breaker and that separated bus "F" from the PG&E system or auxiliary power. This event picked up a safety relay which started the third component cooling water(CCW) pump 1/1, which is an ESF component. They do not need three pumps running, so they secured pump 1/2.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.
During testing of vital bus "F" components,(first and second level undervoltage relays) with the emergency diesel generator 1/3 parallel to the aux. Power(bus "F"), a signal was generated which tripped the aux feeder breaker and that separated bus "F" from the PG&E system or auxiliary power. This event picked up a safety relay which started the third component cooling water(CCW) pump 1/1, which is an ESF component. They do not need three pumps running, so they secured pump 1/2.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.